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> AI democratized the knowledge needed to build bioweapons. Like how with a 3d printer anyone can build a gun with no expertise.

Building simple guns out of pipes never was hard. Jury is still out if it is more or less work than getting a 3d printer working.

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Also it kind of infantalizes terrorists as if not having an LLM access or 3d printer is what stopping their attacks. Like okay I ask LLM to help me create a dirty nuclear bomb but the moment i start taking steps to do that, law enforcement will already be tracking me.

Most people saying LLMs can make terrorism easy have never given doing terroism a serious thought imo.

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The raw materials to make bioweapons are easily purchased on line with no pre-emptive tracing. It's absurd to discount the expertise factor in being a bottleneck, which LLMs have evaporated.
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> It's absurd to discount the expertise factor in being a bottleneck, which LLMs have evaporated.

Mmm. Especially in this arena, LLM assistance is like The Anarchist's Cookbook. A quarter of the time following the instructions will seriously injure you... and if you know enough to identify which instructions are the hazardous ones, you know enough to not need the assistance.

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That may be true (and I hope it is). But it's not a limitation that will remain indefinitely.
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> But it's not a limitation that will remain indefinitely.

The Sun is going to fail in somewhere between many hundreds of millions and a few billion years. This will either turn the surface of the earth into slag, freeze it, or both. Either way, all life on the planet is doomed. This fact is not a reason to fail to switch from hydrocarbon-burning electricity generators to photovoltaic, fission, wind, hydroelectric, and geothermal electricity generators. Extinction events that will happen in the extremely distant future shouldn't prevent us from doing the things that are smart to do in the medium- and long-term.

But, -to bring things to the present day- companies that are solidly on track to hit their promised growth targets don't come out and publicly say "We're working on WMDs. [0] We are incapable of safely working on these WMDs. We refuse to stop working on these WMDs. However, if you lawmakers make special laws and regulations just for us and include us in the process, we'll be quite happy to submit the stop work order to our employees!". That's a statement you only make if there's no way in hell you're going to keep your promises and you're willing to risk jail time and annihilation of your companies for a shot at being able to con Congress into giving you an ironclad excuse to fail to keep your promises.

Given enough time and focused effort, we will end up with widely-available automated librarians that are very good. We're not there yet, and -based on current events- are absolutely not going to get there in the near future.

[0] Anything with a 10% chance of destroying all humanity is a WMD.

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> The Sun is going to fail in somewhere between many hundreds of millions and a few billion years.

Cool, what does a process that's about 9 orders of magnitude slower than AI development have to tell us about AI risks?

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Sure, that's why we keep seeing so many bioweapon attacks in recent times, because AI + Amazon can end the world.
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It's strange how quick people are willing to dismiss concerns with horrible reasoning as long as it suits their biases. Perhaps a little intellectual honesty is called for considering the stakes? There are many plausible reasons why we haven't seen AI fuel bio-terror attacks yet. None of which implies it's unlikely or implausible in principle.
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But hasn't bio attacks already been possible before AI, what has changed? Maybe the barrier to entry lowered, but one could argue the availability of info has not been the bottleneck for as long as the internet has existed.

The threat is ofc real, but AI won't magically "do the thing" still, it's not code that's the bottleneck AFAIK? Correct me where I'm wrong.

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Synthesizing complex information from a range of technical sources enough to build bioweapons is cognitively impenetrable for the vast majority of people. The ability of AI to synthesize this information into a step-by-step recipe to follow is a step change in accessibility.

There's an opportunity cost to terrorism just like with any time sink. The effort to build up knowledge enough to produce some weaponized pathogen will be compared to just doing traditional terrorism. For some low capability terror cell, its easy to see how the cost/benefit analysis has been in favor of traditional terrorism up to now. The kinds of terror acts that take years of sustained effort to execute are rare. But as the barriers to entry to bioterrorism fall away and become widely accessible we may see the cost/benefit shift.

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It turns out that LLMs, especially local LLMs, tend to hallucinate a lot when thinking about anything that's overtly fiddly or technical. This is even more the case when they're in a domain that isn't a natural part of their training data. If you have to "jailbreak" the model to get it to talk, you're so wildly out of the expected distribution that you'd be crazy to trust anything it says. It's basically making up stuff as it goes along. These are foundational issues with how the models are created, not something that a bad actor can just hack around.

(The biggest real safety issue in this kind of space is actually that the model might actively goad some unsuspecting victim into doing something incredibly dumb and dangerous to themselves as much as possibly others.

IIRC, there were reports of something vaguely similar happening IRL but involving casual mischief, not any kind of extreme attacks. And because nobody else seems to have managed to elicit the same actively goading verbiage from the model, it's implicitly suspected that the person involved was the one who introduced the problematic scenarios to begin with.)

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This take belongs in 2024. It has been falsified multiple times but it never seems to go away.
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Are you thinking about model capabilities in coding and math starting late 2025 or so? Those were intentionally boosted via automated RLVR, and there's nothing even loosely comparable to that in applied biology work, let alone in the speculative "helping a bad actor do something crazy" domain that the AI safety folks are worried about. You can't extrapolate from one to the other.

The implied concerns from sensible safety advocates are also about someone jailbreaking the latest proprietary AI frontier model for something like this (which is why their current guardrails are so extreme), not about toy local models.

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I actually agree with you. Verifiable domains will have better performance.

But there’s nothing specially bad about LLMs that don’t allow it to work outside of its training set. It’s just that biology has to verify itself in physical realm and it’s a bit slower.

So yeah, I also don’t think some bad actor will find the secret to manufacturing a bio weapon using LLMs. But maybe these people think it’s possible. I’m skeptical but I’m going to also listen to the people who know it best.

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> But maybe these people think it’s possible. I’m skeptical but I’m going to also listen to the people who know it best.

The problem is that in order for the scaremongering to make any kind of sense and for "stop frontier AI immediately" to be the right response (which is what the "AI safety" folks seem to be pushing for), you don't just need this to be possible in the abstract at some undetermined point in the future. You also need to argue that it will not be helpful for white-hat biosafety researchers (there will hopefully be several orders of magnitude more white-hat biosafety folks than attackers, with orders of magnitude more resources available) to red-team that exact scenario several months or even years in advance using their trusted access to unreleased super-smart AI, and thereby devise appropriate defenses with that same AI's help. That, if anything, is the most implausible part about this entire scenario.

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>You also need to argue that it will not be helpful for white-hat biosafety researchers (there will hopefully be several orders of magnitude more white-hat biosafety folks than attackers, with orders of magnitude more resources available) to red-team that exact scenario several months or even years in advance

Sigh.

Attackers only need to win once. Defense needs to work every time.

A single wide scale attack affecting around 100k people or more will have your neighbors stomping on your face telling you to shut up, and to lock this shit down.

It's insane how you can watch a technology get better and better and better and come up idea that everything will remain the same. We are currently in the middle of development of the most powerful weapons on earth and you don't want to think about it because it's uncomfortable.

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