> All these problems are solved.
reply> True, communication could be better.
Nitpick, but bit of a contradiction.
Just using subagents was a pretty useful gain. My only issue is sometimes I forgot to tell the agent to use them. Probably need a hook or skill to do it so I don't need to remember.
replyFunny the sandbox is a real security benefit but it just turned into an extra confirmation for me. I'd rather have it than not.
replyI think you mean "sandbox" like what is in the Codex TUI. Parent poster meant a VM or container (or bubblewrap/firejail) that doesn't let the agent to edit files outside of specific paths or run dangerous commands, so you can turn the whole confirmation off.
replywhat other sandbox do you need besides running a harness in a container with the right folder mounted and some due diligence like -nonewprivileges? are we talking host network sandboxes here? I think he's just referring to a rogue agent running rm -fdr --no-preserve-root, and that's safe in a container.
replyAsk your favorite LLM what a malicious script dropped into the right place in your .git directory can do to you the next time you run git outside of the sandbox.
replyAnd of course, if the agent has access to the network (which is probably required in order to talk to the AI server), then you have to think about what other things on your local network it could get into.