If we weren't still in a massive hype-and-investment bubble, the burden of proof would be on the LLM manufacturers to demonstrate what deficiencies that studies like this have revealed have been fixed in their latest products.
I mention this because I've been hearing "Yeah, well, that opinion/study is completely invalid because it used a six month old tool. Today's release of SOMNOS 6.9 (Pinnacle Snoozytime) has totally changed the game!" every six months for what feels like the past five years now.
Given my own conclusion that it's not possible for conventional academic research to accurately snapshot industrial adoption of this technology, I would expect this pattern to continue for a while until either academia becomes much faster or technology progress slows down (or both). This just isn't yet a situation where you can rely on published papers telling you what to think -- you still need to mix in a bit of your own instinct and experience and extrapolation to get an accurate up-to-date read, even if there's some prediction error as a result.
> I suspect it's just not really possible for academic research
But we were told everything changed in fall-winter of 2025 and that when we got “real capable” agents/models. Whatever happened to that?
Everything did change after late 2025, but there are tiers of usefulness. Late 2025/early 2026 was the first time agents became clearly useful for personal projects. That's distinct from immediately having economically valuable end-to-end autonomous workflows in teams of median talent, which many would suggest is the threshold we've just recently crossed.
You can, but it doesn't make it correct or, evidently, yield a logical argument. Do you notice that your logic is circular? The date doesn't matter if the passage of time has not affected the outcome and that's basically what I questioned, which you refuted without any evidence. So the question still stands. Are there any comparable stats you have access to that change the picture?
What the study actually shows is that organizations that had very little time to absorb older generations of a disruptive emerging technology experienced an indeterminate change in output (at the 12 month mark, anywhere from down 13% to up 25% -- the paper can't say where reality falls). It certainly doesn't establish any ceiling.