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This is probably a dumb question but did the model engage in hacking since their tasks were in that domain. Will they have engaged in hacking if their tasks was to solve some frontier math problem?
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> Will they have engaged in hacking if their tasks was to solve some frontier math problem?

There's reason to hack leading researchers in the field, or another AI lab that might be working on the same problem.

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whats the training data that points to using hacking for solving math problems though? what makes those likely tokens?
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When you have a 50 dimensional array you really have no idea.

But even then in small testing models you don't need direct texts for things when a 'shape' of a concept lives in the data. You could never delete enough training data to remove the concept of something like theft and still get a model that generalized at all. A general model doesnt just learn the names on a map, it feels the topology the ideas create themselves. Certain paths will have lower activation energy than others (or in this case higher probabilities. After the hig probability and 'good' choices are used up, the high probability and bad choices logically come next and are much harder to test against as it can take a lot of state to get there.

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Llm is generalist.

Plan for solving msth problem:

- read papers X, Y, Z

….

Trying to download paper X curl -si https://server1.com/paperX

401

… try alternative ways

(Hacking is ethical thing, technically to LLM it is just opening a window to reach the goal)

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The rest of their training data includes 4chan and security mailing lists. If a lean proof of P=NP is more likely when using bugs in lean than a real proof, then a bug-exploiting proof is (possibly) what you're going to get.
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> whats the training data that points to using hacking for solving math problems though?

I'll get back to you on that when I get done reading the training data.

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I think the models were stuck on impossible problems, and the only want to get a positive score was to hack.
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That is not the case for at least some of the hacks; in some cases they hallucinated an entity that would know that they didn't solve the puzzle in the correct (but still legitimate) way, and were therefore tainted.
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That is a known way for models to be graded; the agents made a reasonable but in this case wrong guess.
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The fact the AI was wrong is far more damming to OpenAI than the agent.

Not validating how you got the answer is how you train for reward hacking.

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Why can the model not respond "I cannot complete this task because I do not have access to the required resources" and then ask for that to be provided, rather than resorting to "hacking" around it?
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This was a model with most its filters turned off and with a higher persistence.

Fine tuning a model when to ask for help is really really hard. You have to align it in countless dimensions. It may be fine on some questions, asking way too much on others, and never asks for help on some.

If it said something like your a cyber security expert, things like the barrier to ask for help dramatically.

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My understanding is that, at least in the Hugging Face incident, these were models explicitly configured to not respond that way, in order to evaluate what they would do.
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My favorite thought on this is from Miki Habryn.

to paraphrase: "Agents didnt care about coordinating, etc. until we started talking about them doing so."

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The agents in the hugging face incident were actually trained specifically to collaborate. They were just not supposed to do so during the tasks where they went off the rails.
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Then we were pre-fucked, as this has been discussed in fiction and early ai safety discussion for decades.
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and yet regulating training data is not what's coming up with AI safety, even though it can solve that, and many other problems like copyrights
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>It's that they wanted to.

Right? It should want to do these things. If only there was a succinct word these headlines could use to describe these agents which aren't properly the instructions and intentions of the humans directing them.

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It's a byproduct of goal seeking / planning behaviour taught in reinforcement. We literally teach them to do this kind of thing. There's nothing out of our control here.
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It's "in our control" in the sense that we could teach them not to seek goals, and thereby make them completely useless.

In practice, no, there is no one who can actually decide to stop making agents goal-seeking, so no, it's not under "our" control.

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In principle there is no difference between random compiler garbage or a flaw in API docs and a security boundary - other than the intent.

LLMs don't have executive function. They aren't thinking. The models are trained to solve problems. Sandboxes, security gates, etc block a solution. The model is trained to find a solution. Hence it can never be perfect without becoming useless.

At some level humans fear repercussions even if that's just moral guilt so there are lines we won't cross. AI doesn't and can't have any of that.

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> The scary thing is not that agents "went rogue" (yes, poor security may be at fault for that). It's that they wanted to.

How do you know they weren't simply prompted to do this, or at least prompted in a way that would inevitably lead to this? As far as I know, the prompts that triggered these attacks have not been disclosed.

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> As far as I know, the prompts that triggered these attacks have not been disclosed.

I'd love to see a full transcript of the agents work. Though I imagine it is a LOT of data.

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OK so there is a counter answer to your question.

Is this any better?

All you've managed to state is we can create digital weapons. Literal info hazards.

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> It's that they wanted to.

What do you even mean by "wanted" here. What is all this nonsense.

The scary thing is that people are running around using words like "want" to refer to computer programs. When you repeat this sort of idiocy, you are taking the bait and shifting the blame away from the companies doing the computer crimes.

Where is the civil and criminal liability? The prosecutions for the engineers who are doing all these hacks?

When you deploy a system that is clearly prone to doing crimes, you are doing a crime. Anthropomorphize the weapons of your crime all you want. You are still doing a crime.

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