He's right. DNSSEC is a mess, and we should fix that. We should fix that whether or not we delete CAs because CAs rely on DNS to verify that you own your domain. If DNS isn't secure, neither are CAs.
replyIn the long run, fixing bugs is almost always better than working around them. DNSSEC is a bug. So are CAs. We can and should fix both.
His argument is that DNSSEC is fundamentally broken, and you can't fix it via incremental improvements.
replyHe is not arguing that DNS security cannot or should not be improved; in fact, he explicitly states the exact opposite.
I don't have an objection to doing a different DNS security system, and in fact I like DoH a lot. You can do DoH all the way back from authority servers if you like, and that addresses domain validation without boiling the ocean with 1990s cryptography the way DNSSEC tries to do.
replyECDSA was added to DNSSEC 3 years before that blog post in april 2012 (rfc6605).
replyAnd then for the next 10 years APNIC wrote posts about how actually using ECDSA broke resolvers.
replyIt's going to settle into general usability at just about the time cryptographers deprecate ECC entirely!
They can be deprecated for confidentiality purpose, but DNSSEC doesn't use confidentiality.
replyYou're trying to argue that DNSSEC isn't exposed to HNDL attacks, so can use signature algorithms that CRQCs break. But that's neither here nor there: the approaching cryptographic research consensus is going to deprecate all ECC (and all RSA); yes, signatures aren't the priority for immediate removal, but nobody is recommending ECC signatures. The point is all this is happening just as ECC in DNSSEC may finally be stabilizing.
replyI have seen their comments across this site for a very long time. Unfortunately I do not respect or put any stock in what they say, because of how unbelievably rude and dogmatic they are, and always have been.
reply"As a rule, strong feelings about issues do not emerge from deep understanding."
Fortunately, you can investigate this stuff for yourself and develop your own opinion. IMHO, DNSSEC doesn't actually "secure" much of anything. It can be disabled trivially by anyone operating a resolver. As I mentioned elsewhere, none of the major sites (FAANG) use it. What does that tell you?
replyThen propose a censorship resistant protocol.
replyYes I'm not saying DNSSEC is or isn't good. I think a multi-layered approach would be best for redundancy.
replyWait. Hold on. It is either good or it isn't. If it's good, we should be using it (maybe in a layer cake, maybe a la carte). If it's bad, it should not be used anywhere.
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