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Defending is so much harder than attacking. You don't even have to focus on one target, as you can just mass-AI-script a lot of attacks wherever it's possible, and see what sticks. Even if you did everything right, there's always the social-engineering angle, or a single compromised device, or just accidental bad upgrade through supply chain. If you can mass-spread the seed, and plant something that "calls home" constantly, you can just have an agent that would start the attack the minute it gets infected, and go deeper.

It's really a wild west right now, have no idea how we fix it. I'm assuming everything will get more concentrated in big co's hands, as having a very robust security is extremely hard.

Also, we have to agree that younger people will start companies. There will be small companies that cannot afford red teams. There will be companies that are just not equipped, and their profit margins cannot sustain constant attacks.

by nrmitchi6 hours ago|

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> It’s funny that every security breach disclosure now has a mandatory “the attacker used AI!”

This isn't in the article? They do not at all claim "the attacked used AI!".

The only mention of "AI" is "We believe this is part of a series of attacks recently targeting platform companies with the aim of compromising AI inference providers." This is the same (apparently) end-goal as the Opencode breach last week, and is not blaming or finger-point at AI. It is stating (rightfully) that AI inference is very easy to resell and turn stolen credentials into cash.

by arcanemachiner7 hours ago|

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> your own red teaming should have found them before the attacker did

Easier said than done. The defender has to do everything right, all the time, to prevent a headline like this. The attacker only needs to be right once, and it's game over. AI or no AI.

by solyin1 hours ago|

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It's a nice saying, but if you did enough things right, the attacker still needs multiple things to line up in order to get anything of value, if you get everything right. No one competent who's doing everything right is leaving open S3 buckets open to the world. Doing some things right means using multiple buckets, using multiple time limited-keys with limited read-only access, using special write-access, not having admin keys on developer laptops, a SIEM system that monitors buckets for traffic going in & out and sending emails (both amount and who it's going to) to the person on call. A firewall (inc IP-address-based blocks so eg China can't access the customer data from China at all). A WAF.

That's not an exaustive list but if the attacker gets one of those "right" once, it is not game over. (They aren't of equal strength, mind you.)

by reassess_blind17 minutes ago|

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Show me a perfectly secure complex system, and with enough time, I'll show you a vulnerability.

by gkoberger7 hours ago|

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Unless they edited the post, they never said this. You should delete this; it's false information.

by mbreese6 hours ago|

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I didn’t actually see that in this post at all. They mention that the end goal of the attackers might be to get to AI inference providers. But I don’t think they are crying “AI was used” here.

Or did I miss something?

by ndneighbor3 hours ago|

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We (Railway) make no claims about the tools the attacker used in the above post.

However, from discussions with partners, it resembled the pattern of attacks to secure AI API tokens and credentials. Preliminary forensics tell us that this was the primary goal of their attack. That said, I want to be careful here commenting until we have our formal public post-mortem.

by barrrrald7 hours ago|

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This one doesn’t?