From my timezone, this started last night and is ongoing into today. Has this been going for longer than the status page and email indicated? If so, why was notification delayed so long?
I love your product, have an incredible amount of sympathy for you as humans (having been in similar sleep-consuming nightmares) and was willing to forgive the GCP-triggered outage as an understandable teething pain, but sadly this response has really knocked my confidence.
I understand the hard reality of security issues -- "urgently rotate your keys, they're already compromised" is an important message to share -- but "sorry, that will also require your site going down because we've blocked deploys" (presumably as a response to the incident...) is an incredibly frustrating situation to find ourselves in.
I would rather know I should put a notice on my site, or my own social media, or notify my own customers ASAP and disable some functionality (or make my own choice about porting somewhere else as a mitigation) than get caught out like this after the horse has bolted and my key has been compromised for hours.
The options railway has given us are "rotate your keys and bring down your service" or "keep your service up and let the exposed keys remain at risk." Kind of a crap position, no? Mistakes are going to happen, but when the suggested mitigations are to stab yourself in the leg or stab yourself in the ass, it's hard to be sympathetic.
I have to imagine quite a few users are asking their agents to port their stacks over to alternate providers like I am. The cost of switching has never been cheaper thanks to AI.
Customers could have simply revoked keys and not re-launched services with rolled credentials (that from your post, may have been re-stolen), but instead you let this fester.
What a disaster for Railway. I hope you get through this stressful moment, but this should be the end of Railway.
Railway / OpenAI: I had a key compromised this morning. It hit our limit, so I revoked the key... and figured, well, we'll have to track down the leak.
Then this security notice came out, telling all of their customers to rotate all their keys... As the guy whose spent the entire evening rotating keys and etc. doing
this is... it's a huge message to send.
The cost and implications go really far.
We have many production services that we've taken offline or disabled because we can't deploy to fix the credentials. because of the railway deploy problem...
Railway was stuck between some pretty nasty tradeoffs. I get that the few hour delay in communication caused some of us more cost, issues, and potential breach... and maybe larger suff.
But I also realize that rolling the keys while things may still be compromised, with deployments blocked, could make thins even more sticky
leaves only very bad options. Also we don't know how much they we're spending time actively stopping the attack. the time and focus could be very much consumed. if it was 5% of exposure and they prevented the 95% exposure.. i'm sure glad they aviated instead of communicated.
We make the best decision we can in these moments.. and they all just suck.