Laplace expressed this in "A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities" in 1814: "We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of that which is to follow. [...] For [an intelligence that has sufficient information] nothing would be uncertain, and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes."

Superdeterminism essentially extends this idea of deterministic physical evolution to quantum mechanics. It could be considered an appropriate default simply because it was previously considered to be, not only the default, but the strongly believed truth.

> Superdeterminism says that there’s no way to pick your experimental choices in a way that reveals things because any possible random number sources you could use have contrived correlations that prevent that

You're arguing against a consequence of superdeterminism, not its motivation. Its motivation is as I've described.

The word "contrived" is doing some heavy lifting in your statement. Nothing needs to be contrived in superdeterminism, even if it seems that way to an observer within the universe.

The explanatory problem you've alluded to only arises because we're trying to understand the universe from within the universe. The universe is under no obligation to make itself sensible to us.

Essentially, you're saying little more than that you don't like the idea of superdeterminism.