All the data is encrypted and the key is held inside the secure enclave within the CPU. If the CPU fails then the data is unrecoverable.
replyThat's a big ask. Probably only work the few hundred it'd take to do that, then get the data off it, if you had some super important documents // crypto wallet.
replyIs it really? In China you can upgrade your iPhone storage this way. Sure it's not for your average phone case store, but it's not exactly rocket science either.
replyUnfortunately not really a lot of places to do this in the US. And unlike shipping new devices from China to US, shipping used devices from US to China and back is prohibitively expensive.
replyKey is held on a separate chip unfortunately
replyencrypted by both a boot password and a secure enclave held key
replyAre you suggesting that both keys should be required for decryption?
replyHow would you restore the backup if your secure hardware device is lost/stolen/damaged?
The backup would live someplace other than on the broken machine. It would be encrypted some other way (or maybe not at all, depending on threat profile).
replyNo point in encrypting those family photos burned to disc.
And the owners of the computer can't get the key in the secure enclave? Are they part of the threat model?
reply“Some person with physical access to the computer” absolutely is part of the threat model.
replySome person, yes. The owner, no.
replyThe standard way you distinguish "adversary with physical possession" from "owner" is "do they have the owner's passphrase".
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