upvote
> the signal shows whether you are allowed to drive in the next block, not into the current, as you are already in the current block. This seemed to be what happened here, the second train saw the green signal thought they are back in the automatic safety system and accelerated to 200km/h, not knowing that there is still a train in front.

Don't think the second train saw a green signal. They were in the middle of the block, while the first train was waiting just before the exit of the block (with a green signal ahead).

What I'm gathering from other sources is that the Spanish system allows the controller to override the point-based rules and provide manual clearance (because the blocks are long and it takes forever to reach the next signal by sight). It's a failure of the system imo. Ideally, the system, under no conditions whatsoever, should have even allowed such a practice to be allowed.

reply
> Don't think the second train saw a green signal. They were in the middle of the block, while the first train was waiting just before the exit of the block (with a green signal ahead).

If the first train was really just before the exit of a block, then it's pretty safe to assume that the second train saw the corresponding distant signal.

> the Spanish system allows the controller to override the point-based rules

Every system allows that, it is required in order to be able to operate a railway network.

> What I'm gathering from other sources is that the Spanish system allows the controller to override the point-based rules and provide manual clearance

What actual happened is my speculation, the explanation how LZB works is not. It can be the case, that they messed up while issuing manual movement authorities, but if they did not notice that they need to switch to manual operation, they will have caused a crash.

reply
> The accident from January this year in Spain was also a collision, but because a train derailed, while another train passed it. This can't really be prevented by a current train control system, other then not allowing the derailment to happen in the first place.

Or by putting all the signals to red after the derailment of the first train so as to stop all the circulation on the line, which seems not to be the common practice in Spain unfortunately.

reply
The first train going from A to B derailed, and the second train going from B to A crashed into the derailed cars 9 (20 on other sources) seconds later. Even if the second train was put in full brake in the exact same second the derailment happened, it couldn't have avoided the crash.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Adamuz_rail_disaster

reply
deleted
reply
Surely a better fallback is possible. Like if a train is known to be in a PZB with other trains ahead of it, then when LZB goes down it has to slow down/wait/follow some different protocol until PZB rules can be enforced again.
reply
I'm not sure, I can follow you. The trains were in LZB mode, because you need that in order to operate a high-speed train. You can't see the signals required for PZB at high-speeds.

> then when LZB goes down it has to slow down/wait/follow some different protocol

The trains did stop when the LZB reported an error, like they should.

> follow some different protocol

That is manual operation, which I suspect they failed to do.

reply