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You're not gonna remember a AES256 key either (or at least not many of them), not to mention the ergonomics associated with entering a AES256 key. The whole point of security chips like google's titan m2 or apple's secure enclave is to strengthen weak passwords (eg. 6 digit pins) so they offer comparable security to 256 bit keys, without having to enter 256 bit keys.
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Password isn't used directly as key. The key is derived with PBKDF.
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>The key is derived with PBKDF.

Which doesn't do shit even if you're using argon with 32 GB memory usage or whatever. NSA is always going to be able to out-compute you. Not to mention you need a difficulty level that's usable for daily use, but the NSA can brute-force at their leisure, possibly decades in the future.

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The NSA is only going to spend so much time trying to crack my specific password on 100 billion dollars of hardware. If I have a 6 word password (barely harder than XKCD) (72 bits), .1 second local hashing, and their computer is ten billion times faster than mine ($10 per my-computer-equivalent), in a month they'll get through 0.006% of the search space.

The "decades into the future" part is a much bigger threat than their ability to out-compute me in the short term.

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>You're not gonna remember a AES256 key either

Did we wake up in a world without key derivation functions to turn passwords/phrases into keys?

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>you're not gonna brute force an AES256 key

There was a great article around last week about PDFs using randomly generated keys that ended up using non-secure random number generators and the effect was the only unique portion of the key is was 9bits, and obviously forceable. I wouldn’t even describe this between burrito bites activity as “brute”.

The point being “AES” doesn’t mean secure. Secure through the whole implementation means secure. People fuck up crypto all day, calling out a specific cipher doesn’t mean much.

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