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I think everyone is over fixated on AI finding complex bugs beyond a typical person's understanding either to locate or exploit.

I think for any one of those bugs there might simply be half a dozen footguns or bugs that once it's spelled out you wonder how anyone let it slide.

I think that's the case where LLMs might indentify most.

It's challenging though as the current AI audits produce so many false positives it's hard to know when it's being pedantic or when it's genuinely caught a human being a bone head

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This one might be hard to find using the author’s approach of throwing everything at various builds of ssh.

It is not really that hard to find in the wild if you had a device built this way, when overflowing buffers on embedded devices is a standard attack vector.

It might be hard to root cause, but it would not be that hard to find.

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Finding more and more that these complex bugs people gloss over like you are now are being used in exploit chains and the end result is still my clients getting hacked
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In many ways each individual decision makes some sense; wanting to stop loads of programs being affected by a (remotely triggerable?) crash wanting to avoid time based attacks wanting to be able to set accounts to not have a password

Each one relies on a perfectly valid argument - that * can't match because we all know it'll be rejected by the other thing.

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I would be more concerned about the lack of explicit return types, one of the arguments for strongly typed languages is that you should not have ambiguous data and yet…

Granted I mostly work with high level programming languages so I may be missing something.

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> Each one relies on a perfectly valid argument - that * can't match because we all know it'll be rejected by the other thing.

But that's not a perfectly valid argument, and it never was.

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The real problem here is the C language. Our industry should have dumped it a long time ago and we’re now paying the price of prevarication.
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Which of the several flaws in this bug chain would have been materially different with a language other than C?
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Any use of sum types would have prevented this immediately.

The whole thing exists because APIs that return a NULL value that "nobody checks", plus a string that you shouldn't use if you actually did check the null value.

In languages with sum types, this cannot happen.

Either you get your hash, or no result at all. You couldn't get eg NULL and *.

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C has unions. C has sum types. People have been doing tagged unions in C for longer than rust has been a language
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I don't think I've ever seen a C function that uses unions for this purpose though?

I can think of two common patterns that I've seen frequently:

* Return NULL for errors (sometimes with a global errorno() function).

* Return an integer error with any return values as out parameters.

So if it is possible to improve, why doesn't anyone do it?

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Yet the authors of crypt did not use them. The C language is not designed in a way to encourage people to write code that correctly uses tagged unions (or nullable pointers for that matter).
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Where are you going with those goal posts?
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Nowhere. It's the same argument as upthread. A language that forces downstream consumers of an API to correctly deal with all possible outcomes would have prevented this.
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Nope.

Because in fact all the changes were about changing the function signatures. The function signature is enforced by the linker. The semantic of strings that go through isn't.

Returning 2 values is possible in C (via pointers input parameters). The main issue here is that libc is a strong API contract based on C function signatures, that nobody can change, only augment with new symbols. Such strong API compatibility constraints happen in any programming language, and workaround to fit new behaviours in old APIs happens everywhere.

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I don't think nh2 is saying that this is how the "issue" should've been solved here, but that it's a fatal flaw of C itself (yes I know, unions, but no one uses them).

But also, its not like there were many alternative languages when the POSIX standards were designed so it's fair that it works like this.

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C's lack of all of

- sum/union types

- multiple return values/tuple types

- exceptions

means that most ways of returning an error from a function are not available in C. Because of this, many C APIs, including `crypt` in this case, resort to in-band error signalling by using a sentinel value (like NULL, a negative integer, "*" etc.).

Most other languages lack one or two of the above, but very few lack all three, and so most have developed a different culture around error reporting (Result in Rust, multiple return values in Go, exceptions in Java, Python etc.).

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One of the small but important significances of Rust is that it very often gets to have the same machine code as a correct "in-band error signalling" strategy from C but with source code that the maintainers can actually understand.

And really often when your "in-band error signalling" in Rust is more expensive you realise (perhaps to your horror) that your C wouldn't be correct, so you just dodged a bullet. For example Option<OwnedFd> is, like OwnedFd, a 32-bit value, Unix has always reserved -1 to mean invalid, so Rust can treat that as a niche. But the Windows equivalent Option<OwnedHandle> can't do this because, well, cue Raymond Chen: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20040302-00/?p=40...

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The first 2 it has, and the 3rd, you really don't want.
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C has sum types/unions? What are you talking about? You don't need multiple return. You can use a struct and it's the same thing.
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not in a way that forces the user to actually handle them properly. C is a weakly typed language and as such is pretty badly suited to systems programming.
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For the other part of the issue (the truncation in SHA512), in Rust you could've had:

    struct Input<'a>(&'a [u8]);
    

    impl<'a> Input<'a> {
      fn new(input: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Error> {
        if input.len() >= 256 {
           return Err(Errro...);
        }
        
        Ok(Self(input))
      }
    }
Now the truncation is a terrible idea in the first place, but at least with this it would have been entirely obvious to the caller that it was there.
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Wouldn't Rust's Result or Go's error checking prevent that?

While not mandatory, a person would probably use it instead of the * hack.

Simply because the calling side wouldn't have an option to forget the check like with the NULL case

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Rust and go still make it pretty easy to not check results if you don’t care about the success value (lots of code just does `let _ = foo()`), but if you do want the value (like with a hashing function), Rust makes it really hard to not check the error too. There’s no syntax to say “assume this worked and give me the success value, including whatever garbage is there if it’s not set”:

- result.unwrap() will panic if it failed

- result.ok() throws away the error but gives you a None value instead (still can’t use it as if it’s a success)

- matching on the Ok variant and doing nothing on the Err variant, you only get to use the success value inside the Ok arm

Etc etc.

The problem is when the compiler says “NULL is a valid instance of T”, which go lets you do, and rust doesn’t (without using the unsafe keyword and intentionally casting a null pointer, which you don’t do by accident.) Go lets you write code like `var hash string; hash, _ = hashfn()` and it compiles and now you have null instead of a valid hash.

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> NULL is a valid instance of T

This by the way is Tony Hoare's famous "Billion Dollar Mistake"

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Do you work in industry or academia?
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There is no industry, it's just people
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You must be new here. While I applauded the idea of musl when it first came out (coincidentally, glibc wasn't having the best time in its development then), the developer's arguments why <some behavior drastically different from every libc under the sun> was akchyually correct, which was why you had to fix a program that hadn't been broken for 30 years and now suddenly was, made me put him under the "clowns" category and never look at musl seriously again.

When later it turned out that musl's procrustian stack size made Python not really runnable under it, it cemented my resolve to not go near musl.

And now we have this.

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I’m also reminded of the clowns pushing “it’s smaller!” container images based on social media vibes rather than analysis where, yes, not using Debian+glibc saved tens of megabytes on the base OS but did so at the expense of measurable performance reductions & compatibility issues like the one you mentioned, and literally every single one of those dudes I worked with was shipping containers pushing a gigabyte so the size reduction had no measurable impact on deployments.
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Uh, isn't this the case of the opposite? The musl devs trying to accomodate broken programs?
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A little?!? I’m sorry, but musl is a joke, this is yet another proof of that fact, and I have no idea why anyone uses it in production, they have only themselves to blame after the many warning signs.
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