I am adding external judges now. But, there is a hypervisor key you press to deny/allow hosts without switching terminals.
I just can't get behind relying on the harness tool boundry to protect me.
How does "a local audit of what your coding agent did and why" help prevent dangerous commands? Sounds like your solution comes too late, innit? Sure, I can see that at 16:48 the agent ran "rm -rf --no-preserve-root" but if it already executed it on my personal computer, isn't it too late then?
Personally, I think this solves the wrong problem. If you're one stray "rm" away from letting the agent delete stuff on your personal computer, you're running the agent harness the wrong way. At least give it its own user, ideally limit what paths/network it can use, but don't rely on "auditing" to prevent dangerous commands, it'll bite you in the future.
One had an eval() hidden inside a controller function named getCookie(), running whatever a remote server sent back. npm start, npm build and npm test all triggered it. Cursor didn't catch it when I asked "is this repo safe to run?" and then told it to check all dependencies.
Other one came as a bunch of Solidity files in a zip file with an issue to resolve as the interview task, nothing suspicious at first sight. However, that zip carried the whole .git folder, hooks included, which a git clone never copies, and the folder is hidden by default in Finder. Of course, there was a hook that fires on any commit or push, again eval() on some remote address.
In both cases the agent only runs npm test or git commit. Would Stroq see anything in these situations?
background daemon that continuously scans and alerts in a menubar app when a positive match is found
clicking the menubar app shows the offending entry, clicking the entry lets you redact, delete, repair, mark as false positive, etc.