It's also crazy that as far as technology has advanced, the concept of the username/password is still so prevalent. Passkeys are sort of changing things, it all still feels decidedly low-tech.
Edit: Can you get a Yubikey as an RFID implant? ...asking for a friend.
replyWhat is really crazy is that things that should be just an application locally installed on the device (such as PowerPoint) need a login at all.
replyThere's a secondary issue of schools pushing children to use proprietary applications when perfectly serviceable alternatives exist (especially for school level work).
How the hell we all normalized this crap is maddening.
Username/password is the easiest way to log in, assuming there is no stupid format requirements. It's just two strings stored in your password manager. The most retarded way to implement log in is actually magic email link, which requires opening your email client, waiting for the email to arrive, and copying the code. If you want to make it even worse, you can require that to be done using the same browser that is trying to log into the account.
replyBecause everything is sitting out on the public internet now, only protected by those things.
replyBecause the alternative is that a very long or unlimited session cookie can be stolen and used for months to impersonate you. That’s the tradeoff
replyWhen was the last time that happened to a Gmail account? It has unlimited cookie sessions.
replyI actually did this for my small saas Ive sold to a couple dozen companies, and while all my programming friends at the coworking office said I was crazy, Gmail and facebook were my go to answers. If they can do it safely, I might as well try.
replyThen connect the browser directly to the secure element of the device, so the session cookie is cryptographically signed by something you are physically in possession of.
replyLogging and alerting the user that their account is being used from a new context and requiring reauthentication when accessing the account from an unfamiliar IP/user agent would mitigate this to some extent.
replyTPMs / secure enclaves can (in theory) prevent sessions or cookies from being stolen. Not claiming there aren't other attack vectors though.
replyThe alternative is offering offline versions of apps to students and allow students to open downloaded items off the cloud locally. It also means students don't require internet access when off campus.
replyI'll take that risk, especially since I've basically never heard of a successful attack hinging on a stolen session cookie being used for months. Either you do what you'll do within a few minutes, or you never do.
replyThat's a great way for someone to siphon a lot of session tokens and then auction them off to a black hat.
replyIt's also a great way to lose everything if you happen to lose your phone or laptop and it gets found a few hours or a day later and the antagonistic finder guesses your weak PIN.
In the US, service providers and manufacturers are often held liable for losses if they make something that has sub-standard security. Kia, for example, was held liable for making their cars too easy to steal. Banks have boatloads of things they have to do to protect their customers.
It's not really your choice to take the risk here, apparently.