It's more interesting to split tunnel designs by where the trust lives:
- ngrok / Cloudflare Tunnel: the edge terminates TLS by design, and your public hostname is ordinary WebPKI. Anyone who controls a visitor's trust store (inspection appliance, malware root cert) can do exactly this, and the provider can see plaintext anyway.
- iroh-style P2P QUIC: there's no CA in the loop. You dial a public key (the EndpointId), and the TLS handshake authenticates raw keys, so it's pinned by construction. Relays forward ciphertext they can't terminate. A rogue root cert gets an attacker nothing; they'd need the peer's secret key.
So "can someone MITM my HTTP/3?" really comes down to "who can add to the set of keys my client trusts?" For WebPKI that's a long list. For key-addressed transports it's nobody: the trusted key is the address you dialed, unless an endpoint's secret key (or the machine itself) is already compromised.
Or alternatively said TSL-inspection boxes just block QUIC and everything auto-fails back over to HTTP/2, just like we've all been doing for years.