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I'm trying to address this w/ clank.talk: a self-discoverable scripting language for agents that replaces bash with a controlled sandbox environment and strives to be easy for humans to read:

https://clank.talk

I'm designing this for the student AI infrastructure here at Montana State, to avoid rolling out the current wild-west of local agents to our student body.

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As much as I wanted to say you’re wrong, you’re right. After reading TFA, the security boundary is not sound.

Wanting agents to act like you is wrong. You need to own that trust boundary. Build whatever tooling satisfies the contract that agents should have a “not”+<you> (or <you>+”-agent”) identity, and you actuate across that boundary explicitly.

For example, I have a second agent GitHub account that points at my human one. That allows me to write a trusted proxy that ACLs its identity tightly.

It cannot write to public repos ever. In the worst possible case, it externalizes to a private repo’s issue tracker. (Still has never happened in ~4 months)

Once you have this, you can let agents run free. But, it isn’t trivial to set up. Moreover, people don’t want to “do the work.”

All this assumes you abide by “never run untrusted agents on trusted hardware.”

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Truthfully, I tend to agree with you. I built lend mainly for the fact that I like ssh tools a lot (feel free to check my other projects) and have always wanted a way to run local commands without having to setup reverse ssh when I don't need to run sshd on my laptop.

For example, I store k8s credentials in 1pass and the cluster is only accessible via the network on my remote machine. I can grab the credentials from my laptop for the work I want to do on the remote, and never have to install 1pass on the remote machine.

Primary use case for lend wasn't agents when I started the project. It just was natural to add support for it after the fact.

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> "when basically giving their AI direct access to what the keys enable"

Well, ideally, you would be giving the model direct access to a subset of what a given key enables- if fine grained access control for generated keys isnt available.

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This is actually a big difference between giving someone you don't trust your keys and unlocking the door for them when they ask.
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The problem with this analogy is that agents ask you to unlock your door all the time. People you don't trust don't normally ask that.
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Not having the credentials make it into the chat transcript for one.
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