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Both are true. The problem is security is a much harder job than attacking.

Worse patching adds instability into a system, especially when you don't have much time to test.

Also in the past attackers were willing to sit on exploits longer and not do things with them, now they have to act fast before someone else finds it, leading to more events faster wearing your security and patching teams out, and making users life suck.

Things are going to get much worse before they get better.

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Yes, things will get worse before they get better. Attackers have the advantage initially and get to pick a lot of low-hanging fruit, but the advantage will shift to defenders as code becomes more heavily tested and verified.
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One hopes, but the models are also getting smarter and deeper too. I don't know if anyone really has a clear vision of when the future plateau state is where equilibrium is achieved on this.
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I find this kind unreasonable: software has finite bugs, no matter how smart your attackers are. Current CVEs are pretty subtle, and I see no reason to think that they're actually low-hanging fruit.

I guess you could make an argument based on some estimate of how fast exploitable bugs are newly introduced. That also seems dubious.

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This is the correct view. Look at blockchains.
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Question is how big is that finite number? One a month for the next 40 years helps no one.
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>Worse patching adds instability into a system, especially when you don't have much time to test.

Survival of the fittest I'm afraid will build security here. The teams that barely ever patch or don't have "time" for maintenance are going to get burned. The "we haven't updated in 7 years so things are stable" teams can't survive.

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I once did work for a company that hadn't updated or patched anything in over 4 years. Systems with 1500+ day uptimes. Totally insane.
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Attack the attackers.
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Except, human in the loop in control - blue team is not defending red team fast enough that most the CVSS v4.0 Critical CVEs aren't easily patched in coordinated fashion. Many times, almost impractical or impossible to patch at all, with decades of intertwined dependency tree and their ecosystem.

Collectively, we owed about 40+ years of tech debt on non-secure code (e.g. automotive industry, industrial environments) that will be torched in the next few years. Luckily, AI will generate code faster enough to make that plausible.

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AI provides the capabilities to secure the internet, maybe, but the internet is secured when site owners choose to secure it.

That's not happening at nearly the same pace, both for assymetry between what it takes to break something and what it takes to fix it, but also because that fix must navigate bureaucracies. Also, the leaders need to actually care, both of which are hurdles. Bureaucratic navigation and consensus finding has not sped up at all with AI.

Compare that to independent script kiddies with $600/mo Claude subscriptions able to find 0-days in an hour and write a worm to exploit it in four.

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Yes but the barrier is infinitely lower. If you were used to running servers just for fun, that kind of threat was probably not too much of a concern. Now it very much is because it can be exploited at a much larger scale.
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Yep. In recent discussion this came up, and my analogy was that LLM will cause a similar effect to widesread proliferation of TLS. It was easy to snitch on people before TLS had been deployed everywhere. Not so much after that.
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> > AI is burning down the internet.

> AI is securing the internet.

No doubt there are points of view where either one, or the other statement, or both, or neither, are true. You can really go full Schrodinger and put a probability distribution on everything.

But in this day and age, whatever is happening, the better question is:

Is it good for me and, beyond me, for the world in general?

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AI is also making it much easier to attack, likely more than it's helping secure things
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it's a timing thing - eventually we'll reach an equilibirium

it was previously expensive to attack, so people spent less money on defense.

It's cheaper to attack, and so people will increase their budget on defense. But it's a lagging cause & effect situation

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You're a nanometer away from understanding why labs have powerhouse internal models that they only allow partners to use.

Even Kimi K3 was only shipped as a lobotomized version of it.

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the idea that internal models can protect the Internet like this is so dumb IMHO.

A huge fraction of devices and servers are on old versions, not actively updated or managed in any way.

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Then the best option for everyone's security is to hack into them and kill them.

If you're not going to take care of it you've created a public nuisance.

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This internal models stuff remains marketing BS afa I am concerned. Smart enough to be a junior engineer and steered toward the right tools and behaviors within a context is more than enough. Places with "super models" do nothing to demonstrate they wouldn't have done better to use the resources on relative brute force within the security domain. They have no sales pitch for good results that just needed Legos and cash.
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Man, is it aggravating to read fantasies like this, as someone who's trying to juggle a full-time job and hosted public services for other people at the same time.

There are two internets. One of them is open, less-commercial, and largely built and maintained by people whose first job is not the work they do to maintain this internet. That group includes a ton of open source software, millions of small servers scattered around the world (virtually private or otherwise), and is generally best-effort.

The other internet is fully commercialized, often ad-driven, fully integral to the data broker economy, and centralized behind a few companies that pay as few people as possible to satisfy the occasional PR statement that, "we take security seriously and...".

The next stable equilibrium here is not "we get a secure and open internet". The next stable equilibrium here is, "we have no open internet, and the internet is now managed by just a few companies."

We're already halfway there. Google and Microsoft combined already account for somewhere around 30% to 40% of email traffic. 30% of all websites are now behind Cloudflare. A few companies dominate social media traffic. Amazon and Shopify combined are half of US e-commerce.

Every single short-response-window exploit like this just pushes a few more percentage points of traffic into a handful of companies. Cheer for that, I guess.

When I have time to daydream, it's increasingly about building a new, underground internet, and how best to disadvantage bots and BigCo conglomeration from the start.

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I wonder whether part of the solution is not using the same software as big tech. For them rapid development is worth extra maintenance. Things like the efficiencies of http2 over 1.1 actually matter. Maybe the rest of us should be using BSDs or different Linux distros (Alpine? Void? Slackware?), different web servers, turn off features we do not need (e.g. not disable http2, or at least not allow both 1.1 and 2 as that is clearly extra attack surface).
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My sites are now sat behind my own custom reverse proxy. It's missing tons of features, which I guess I can now call a security benefit, and it pretends to be nginx just because I thought that would be quite funny. I've debated open-sourcing it but I a) don't want to maintain a project right now, and b) security-by-obscurity is back in action.
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> When I have time to daydream, it's increasingly about building a new, underground internet, and how best to disadvantage bots and BigCo conglomeration from the start.

https://reticulum.network

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Appreciate your take. Question in my mind is if the less-commercial internet will have the resources to defend against attacks made easier and easier by AI.
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Usenet.
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It's brilliant isn't it?

The real problems here are that we did a crappy job in the first place and left a huge surface area of risk with the blind assumption that we didn't do a crappy job.

I am hoping to see a change in attitude to risk and quality in the industry but I get the feeling that's asking for too much.

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Well I didn't get into any trouble with the professional hacker gangs. The script kiddies on the other hand...
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There's no honor among the thieves if everyone can be a thief.
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One would think that the NGINX team would be banging on their code with AI agents trying to attack it for preemptive security.
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"Hacker gangs"
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What term do you prefer?

Organized Cybercrime?

Digimafia?

e2p3yHizAungrCeKum7ifrssu32lnzEnyRoGdcAo23m2dNapvoGmymid.onion?

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Kim Jong Un's megayacht fund
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Just like in the movie "Hackers".
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Hey, that's a piece of art!
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