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It is true that mileage is a good proxy for finding bugs, but this is isomorphic to the fundamental differences between testing v. verification. You can prove absence of classes of bugs with verification. Obviously there can be other logic bugs in newer software. No question. The issue is the memory-corruption bugs in socket-facing daemons can have catastrophic consequences, especially in light of chaining kernel vulnerabilities which defeats the privilege drop that nginx does.

So I'd say it is about a more holistic risk-analysis not just handwaving "all code can have bugs, duh!"

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A more holistic risk-analysis would also need to consider the fact that a high-performance webserver written in Rust may also have memory safety issue due to use of "unsafe" features or unsafe dependencies, may be affected by memory safety issues in the standard library, may also have catastrophic logic errors, may be more affect by supply chain risks due to the use of a language-level package manager, and may have a larger patch gap.
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Which is like complaining that Python is unsafe because it is written in C.

That is a far smaller surface as seen by research into incorporating rust in Android leading to none of the high profile vulnerabilities C and C++ led to previously.

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Not in the slightest. It's like pointing out that a Python script calling out to binaries written in C doesn't have the memory safety of Python's GC. Which is obviously the case, and if you're a serious developer it's a failure point you're very mindful of.

On the Android point, I remember those metrics were highly flawed and didn't account for the inequality of substructural type ergonomics in different contexts. You can get very nice metrics by rewriting things that fit to the grain of safe Rust, which gives you an inaccurate picture of how much unsafe code is "real world". LLMs have changed the field here, but it's worth pointing out that blog post you're referencing was more self-congratulatory marketing than serious science.

Also problematically, I remember it being highly misleading in that the actual observed result was lower severity in vulnerabilities, but a very minimal effect on the total number over all. That's certainly significant, but it wasn't how it presented itself, which is rather problematic if you expect people to take it seriously as objective research.

Measurements probably real, but not worth citing. It's not like on their own blog they're under usual academic journal pressures to overclaim results, p-hack, and engage in other misleading behaviors.

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By research you mean blog posts by Google?
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What specifically distinguishes the empirical research presented in Google’s blog posts, for example the one linked below, from your definition of research?

https://blog.google/security/rust-in-android-move-fast-fix-t...

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This argument is cope.

In theory, that could be possible. In practice, there have been many many case studies demonstrating the opposite and not that many case studies demonstrating in favor of your argument.

e.g. Cloudflare replaced Nginx with Pingora: https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-we-built-pingora-the-proxy-t...

> With those assurances we can focus more on how a change to our service will interact with other services or a customer's origin. We can develop features at a higher cadence and not be burdened by memory safety and hard to diagnose crashes.

> When crashes do occur an engineer needs to spend time to diagnose how it happened and what caused it. Since Pingora's inception we’ve served a few hundred trillion requests and have yet to crash due to our service code.

> In fact, Pingora crashes are so rare we usually find unrelated issues when we do encounter one. Recently we discovered a kernel bug soon after our service started crashing. We've also discovered hardware issues on a few machines, in the past ruling out rare memory bugs caused by our software even after significant debugging was nearly impossible.

The CVE counts for new parts of the Linux kernel written in Rust are much lower than the (recent) CVE counts for even mature, years old parts of the Linux kernel written in C, to say nothing of the historical record.

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