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No, from my read of the code, it's a single-byte overflow because the casing code works 1 character at a time and doesn't account for the ß->SS expansion case. Not only is it a single byte, but that single byte has a fixed value; you can't use ß->SS to push some other character off the end of the string.

(Correct me if I'm wrong!)

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No this is correct I think. And it's not easy to control what lives next to that buffer. But AI probably can figure out a chain of requests that this then changes the length block of another object or flips a pointer or something, so it's tedious but can be used to escalate to basically arbitrary memory corruption. That's kinda the issue with AI, this would have been extremely tedious to exploit before LLMs but now anyone with an unlocked good enough model can do it.

That's why hiding the POC still helps a bit, because any model probably will require quite a bit of wall clock time to actually build one itself. Then making that work on e.g. a running gitlab instance with other traffic... much harder yet again I'd assume since that should alter memory state without you having control over it.

Still if someone builds an exploit with even 1% success rate they just need to run it on enough instances in parallel and will eventually break through some of them probably.

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Right, I'm not talking down the severity of the vulnerability; if anything I think people are underrating it. But it's a constrained 1-byte overflow.
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Yeah that seems right on a second look
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From the pseudocode it's always a single byte. Desyncing before the end of the buffer is fine. Desyncing at the very end causes the single byte overflow.
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