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I work on the JDK, and while I have no involvement with this issue, knowing how we work, what has likely happened is quite the opposite. Bugs don't slip through our triage, and every bug that leads to a VM crash, especially in the compiler backend, is flagged for security review by the security research team; once that happens, no public communication is done. I don't know this is what happened here, but it is the most likely thing to have happened.

We're not talking any large open source project here. We're talking about a project that, like Linux, runs much of the world's software infrastructure, and even bugs that could potentially be vulnerabilities need to be handled with great care.

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Should jdk security team have wiped the PR then, if they noticed it? since it leaked a 0day
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Because it runs so much of the world's most important software, the JDK is heavily watched, and removing a PR would only draw attention to it.

Also, it's not really a leaked 0-day because there's ways to go from a bug to an exploit (even going from Calif's detailed public report to an exploit is not trivial, because exploits depend on the particular application; there has been no disclosed exploit that requires only the JDK).

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deleted
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Agreed, but in this case it looks like the submitter closed it? What's that about?
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They closed themselves immediately after the stale bot pinged to say it was going to be closed automatically. If you're not that investigated in a PR for a niche corruption bug, you open it and nobody responds for two months, when you get notified about it it's pretty reasonable to just close and move on. Perfectly normal OSS contributor behaviour imo (especially in this new world where every project is drowning under AI contributions, and struggling to stay responsive).
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> you open it and nobody responds for two months, when you get notified about it it's pretty reasonable to just close and move on.

Why invest more time to close it? The automation will do it for you.

In this case, there's evidence from a linked issue that Oracle was in communication with the author outside the PR. When you get a ping, and you know it's being worked on outside the PR, it does make sense to close it, cause you know it's being resolved elsewhere.

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For example, not to get another useless notification from a bot later
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They knew about the fix coming?
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That's my guess. But also opening a public issue was a faux pas.
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> But also opening a public issue was a faux pas.

Sorry, but why?

Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?

If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.

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Submitter wrote:

> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.

That's obviously a security vulnerability. If they didn't understand that, how did they even find it?

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At the time maybe he assumed it was just a crash.
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From the report:

> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.

It was obviously a security vulnerability. That the project didn't immediately re-write then close the PR and admonish submitter is astounding.

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Given they (those best able to understand the significance of the crash) didn't consider the bug worth fixing, I'm not sure why they'd admonish the submitter. Or why submitters in the future should act more carefully.

The takeaway from this is not "the submitter was wrong", it's "we need to move off of openjdk yesterday".

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Assumes facts not in evidence. We do not know that the maintainers "didn't consider the bug worth fixing". And yes, submitters should "act more carefully" when they know they are reporting a vulnerability.
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A project with auto bug close signals to me that it is badly managed and hence should be used with caution.
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Completely agree with this. At some point I want to make a side-project that you can run that auto-comments on tickets to keep them alive.
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It wasn't auto-closed.
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Doesn't matter, it was about to be.
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Even Duke gave up on the current state of software.

Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?

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Grab a billion tokens and farm auto-closed GitHub issues. Become HN famous for a day.
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The bot auto-closes issues that have been inactive for 16 weeks. The CVE was published at about 10 weeks in. The auto-close bot was completely irrelevant to this. The issue wasn't that it got auto-closed (it didn't) but that nobody from the project looked at the PR. That's a hard problem to solve, because any big project has a lot of volume and it's easy to miss things. It's unfortunate but a fact of life that you can't just toss up a PR and expect anyone to automatically look at it.
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> you can't just toss up a PR and expect anyone to automatically look at it.

Except soon you can expect LLM triage to be standard.

We would then find out if enough tokens would be invested in this one to figure out it was important, but any look is better than none.

I actually think the suggestion in the PR should have been auto accepted by an LLM.

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