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For those too young to remember 2014, Heartbleed led to both BoringSSL and LibreSSL being forked from OpenSSL.
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And also led to Amazon's s2n-tls and libcrypto being released around 2015 too as I call.

EDIT: found the release announcement - June 2015 - https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/introducing-s2n-a-new-...

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AWS-LC[0] itself based on BoringSSL, it makes it feel safer for those behind ALBs (but looks like this CVE may not be TLS related).

[0]: https://github.com/aws/aws-lc

Edit: corrected fork to based on, I don't actually know if it was a fork and a repo just says based on

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I wonder. Realistically, Boring and Libre haven't taking off. I measure that by most use and default deploys. But with LLMs, we may be entering a new world.

In that world, certainly some projects may be impervious to fixes. We've all seen projects that basically eschew all change, and ignore issue trackers, and are basically dead.

But the ones which still live? Eventually this first wave of LLM derived fixes will get through the old churn. Presumably, code will improve dramatically. If that's so, OpenSSL will become "good code". And the same with old legacy projects which are still hanging around.

Meaning... will legacy simply exist forever? Our two forks above will likely fade away, if openssl's code becomes clean as can be.

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We used BoringSSL at Cloudflare. I imagine there’s a lot of usage in places you can’t see despite it not seeing more adoption. One place you can see it is all browsers use it since Chromium bundles it everywhere except Apple but Apple’s OSes use it to underpin their Network.framework which underpins WkWebview so all Apple devices use it.
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Seriously, at this point BoringSSL is surely more widely deployed than OpenSSL? A billion Apple devices, plus every Chrome installation?
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> all browsers use it since Chromium bundles it

Doesn't Firefox use NSS instead?

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BoringSSL is somewhat widely used because Google baked it into their projects (and partially by Microsoft, I believe they made a FIPS variant of it and used it in Go?)

LibreSSL had, IIRC, problem known as OpenBSD-itis. Or to put it bluntly, the developers didn't really care about any other platform. Plus I will admit that being the first and loud "we will fix openssl" they got linked with some loud PR that showed less understanding of code they mocked than OpenSSL developer who wrote it, and that's really impressive when you consider some of the mocked code fragments were results of developers never reading foundational documentation for a platform

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> LibreSSL had, IIRC, problem known as OpenBSD-itis. Or to put it bluntly, the developers didn't really care about any other platform.

Well put. This is the crux of the issue.

If you ever try to use libreSSL you rub up against so much friction that most projects would hammer out early.

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There's LibreSSL portable. It worked better in legacy machines I own, go figure.
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TIL it's 2036
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To be fair, frustrations with OpenSSL long preceded Heartbleed. Heartbleed was just the final straw for those who forked libressl and BoringSSL.

And to be fair to OpenSSL, it was one of the first widely used crypto libraries, along with Netscape's NSS. Setting aside the reasonablebess of the initial choices, the rapid uptake meant those choices were difficult if not impossible to completely unwind, particularly the style and typing of parameters and error reporting. Even today debates rage about signed vs unsigned, etc, in C and other languages. (But suffice it to say there are still alot of unforced errors, IMO, such as implicit output buffer sizes.)

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Not breaking userspace is more important than security………
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The forks of OpenSSL are fairly API compatible with upstream, especially if you're not using new and exotic features. So for many projects you can just link to a better maintained fork and be done.
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"not breaking userspace" refers to kernel development. OpenSSL is userspace.
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Paraphrasing to "don't make breaking API/ABI changes for projects consuming your API/ABI" doesn't materially change a reasonable point. (And I generally agree with that point, although I confess openssl specifically really strains my view)
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And this is why the Linux Desktop will never go mainstream. You should never break apps at all, the OS's API surface goes beyond just the kernel.
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The Linux desktop is already mainstream. It has been a first class GUI experience for awhile now. Not to mention the endless papercuts in the proprietary OS's stemming from enshittification (Windows generally) or absurdly poor design (hello Finder).
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> OpenSSL is userspace.

If only it kept itself to that…

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Yeah, we all know users would rather be reliably hacked than unreliably safe.
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Users would rather risk getting hacked than have a computer that doesn't boot or doesn't go on the internet. If they preferred the latter they'd unplug it.
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Correct. You can plan around reliable insecurity and stay safe. You cannot ensure safety (or security) of unreliable software.
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I just don't get it; this is a task to hand to an LLM, "go rebuild OpenSSL, use Rust (no mistakes)" and have it churn through a greenfield implementation. Then open a PR =). Why hasn't this happened yet? The fact that the LLM will write tests and deal with all the compiler errors probably puts it lightyears ahead.
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There’s already a Rust TLS library, rustls, that’s relatively mature (10 years in development, a couple of paid maintainers, robust development and release processes). It’s not a drop-in replacement for OpenSSL, though. There’s a companion project to build an OpenSSL-compatible wrapper API for it, but that’s not as far along. Interestingly, while rustls has a plug-in API that lets you choose your favorite Rust encryption library for the low-level operations (aws-lc-rs, Ring, Graviola, etc), those libraries all tend to contain a lot of assembly … not just for speed, but because it’s easier to avoid side channel timing vulnerabilities in assembly.
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Can you explain why it is easier to avoid side-channel timing attacks in assembly?
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Compilers like to make code go brrr as much as they can. With crypto you want the code to run at a deterministic speed (execution time), regardless of input. With hand written assembly you can (more easily) make sure you have the same cycle count regardless of what the input is.
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I guess it's easier to control the timing of your operations if you write them directly in assembly. Otherwise, the compiler optimizations could change the code in unexpected ways.
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At a guess, because it is easier to control timing in assembly than in a higher level language that will compile your source code into whatever shape it feels like
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It's still impossible to control actual timing, but easy to ensure control flow isn't data-dependent, which is what you need. Classic example is memcmp. Although you can write the or-then-check-zero memcmp in any high level language and it's very unlikely to compile to data-dependent timing unless your compiler is AGI.
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> Although you can write the or-then-check-zero memcmp in any high level language and it's very unlikely to compile to data-dependent timing unless your compiler is AGI.

No need for "AGI", the compiler just needs to have enough value tracking to know that the value saturates (once a bit is set, it never gets unset), and an heuristic to move the comparison inside the loop when it might allow it to do less loop iterations.

(I wrote a Rust crate to do precisely that kind of "constant time memcmp", and the only truly reliable way to do so without help of the compiler, is by using inline assembly as a "black box" to make a few things invisible to the compiler's optimizer. It was inspired by code in the Linux kernel which did the same thing also using inline assembly as a "black box".)

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The side channels issue is where rust crypto libraries are currently the weakest
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LLMs have a bottleneck, human review. And human review is absolutely required at this stage (the future is unknown). A rust built LLM only reviewed SSL library would be a recipe for disaster.

Beyond that, when it comes to exceptionally complex APIs, forward thinking implementation, and revising the 'way things are done'? These are weak points for LLMs. If you don't know how to write OpenSSL(or its replacement), and don't understand all its quirks, and the entire industry surrounding it, you cannot be the human driving the LLM successfully.

There is no way for a human to catch all the design mistakes an LLM will make, otherwise.

People seem to get upset, when I say this, for reasons I cannot fathom. However, we need to have a mental model of how we trust LLM output, and the 'new junior' is great for that. Especially considering that every day, is a new day for an LLM, its context window always loses yesterday.

So consider LLMs as an eager, intelligent, incredibly well read junior, just out of college. And on their third day of work.

Zero real world experience. Constant review required.

Would you want that junior to design, build, and write test scripts for a library to underpin the entire internet?

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> A rust built LLM only reviewed SSL library would be a recipe for disaster.

There was a great quote at this year's OpenSSL conference that went something like "LLMs if left to their own devices will reinvent sendmail".

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Is that Zawinsky's law of LLMs?
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you don't get credit for that because it is clear you are not very skillful at what AI-bros value most, namely manipulating other nerds...

if you look at the commit history of OpenSSL, you can easily notice how a lot of people started contributing once their clanker got up to speed. They are very happy to rip out weird C and replace it with assembler or intrinsics. Rip out lists of characters formatted as a single string and replace them with array syntax, each char quoted.

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