I'm starting to get annoyed about the OMG OMG BREAKING BREAKING ALARM-EMOJI crap that's not a real emergency.
Four times in the last month, I dropped everything and started investigating whether a serious CVE related to any of our dependencies warranted an emergency bump, only to be frustrated that images, even from AWS, did not have the fix yet. So then I had to worry about whether I should build from source. We actually built PHP from source and deployed it to prod, just to get ahead of the PHP2Shell vulnerability
But yesterday's PHP vulnerability, CVE-2026-115560, didn't even apply to us or most people running PHP, and I don't think there are any realistic working exploits out there. I'm not saying that it's not possible, but I'm starting to feel that there's a large difference between what's theoretically possible and what's practically possible. And given the storm of patches and vulnerabilities found, this will become increasingly important to ask.
I think everything above a CVE score of 9.0 should warrant some level of “how exploitable is this in real life,” and anything above 9.5 should be proven to be easy for an attacker to execute, not just “possible in theory.” I don't see how we will survive as developers if there isn't some sort of better triage for vulnerability severity assessment. If everything is an emergency, then nothing is an emergency.
So you can take e.g. a 9.3 critical down to 6.5 medium by setting CIA requirements to low and exploit maturity to Unreported.
I’m not saying CVSS is perfect but if you want to have a score that applies to your environment, you have to input some info about your environment into it.
“how exploitable is this in real life” is answered by the exploitability score, which is calculated from Attack Vector, Attack Complexity, Attack Requirements, Privileges Required, and User Interaction scores.
Heartbleed, Spectre, log4shell, they were all worthy of a 9.8.
This isn’t.
The score is just fine. The people misinterpreting everything with a CVSS score higher than 8 as the end of the world are panicking over nothing.
But risk or severity is not what CVSS measures. It's a score intended for security professionals who know the context, graded against a fixed algorithm, with a fixed definition for each answer. The nvd.nist.gov site isn't always the easiest to use, so grab a good CVSS calculator[1] and look at what it means. That's why the alphabet soup vector string is there: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
I'm sorry, CVSS wasn't meant to eliminate your need to think or understand your environment. Yes, if it's a 9.8 CVSS you should look at it. Triggering you to look at it is all the CVSS is meant to do!
Now, whether you think CVSS scores mark too many things as High or Critical is a little secondary. There is a reason we're at CVSS v4. Defining metrics and keeping them useful while remaining objective is difficult. This vulnerability, however, is exactly the kind a chain exploit would take advantage of.
[0]: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-121481 [1]: https://www.metaeffekt.com/security/cvss/calculator/
Risk is not what the CVSS score measures, correct. However the CVSS base score is first and foremost a measure of severity (of the vulnerability). I think they were being loose with their terminology when they wrote "severity is low" and probably meant to say "risk".
The spec talks about this in depth. Paraphrasing: The base score captures intrinsic characteristics of the vulnerability assuming a (reasonable) worst-case configuration.
It's a measure of "How screwed am I if I'm using this software in this specific-but-reasonable manner?", it's not a measure of "How screwed is everyone using this software?".
P.S. I broadly agree, just adding a minor correction on the terminology.
And CVSS v4 does add criteria that let's the provider specify how urgent it is, if it can be automated, etc.
I think the bigger problem is that the scoring system lets you specify a small number of factors and still reach a 10.0, and all the optional and supplemental factors reduce it. Like if you try to enter this vulnerability into v4 and fill out more factors, you easily drop it into the 8s.
So essentially everyone submitting the vulnerability is doing the bare minimum, contributing to the perception that the scores are inflated.
And then people don't use the current version of the score. CVSS 3.1 came out in 2021. CVSS 4.0 came out in 2023. Why the hell is everyone still using 3.1?
They are indeed, but that means CVSS has turned into a trigger for The Boy Who Cried Wolf. So we need a different metric. The problem, of course, is that adding a new score creates an xkcd 927 issue.
If you want a quick overview of the risk: CVE-2026-121481 is listed as CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H which is what calculates the CVE score. This is missing the temporal/environmental components (which rarely ever seems to get entered).
(Although I agree it should be an internal function.)
Someone should design something better, and less malleable.
Something that was super complex a few years ago might be super simple today. And I'm not talking about LLMs, I'm talking about stuff like if some CVE was dependent on you breaking e.g. MD5 in 1998, then it'd be "high", but in 2026 it's most certainly not that. And it doesn't need to take 28 years for something like that to change. It can theoretically happen over night or as the result of some other vulnerability. It even goes the other way too e.g. when ASLR was introduced.
Then again, given that I once had to respond to a report which assigned a similar amount of severity to the strlen() function claiming that it will read beyond its bounds if its input is missing a null terminator (DUH!), I'm not surprised at the lack of critical thought among a certain population in this industry.
They will statically determine (e.g. by SSHing in and rummaging around) that a library with a known vulnerability exists on the filesystem, but determining the reachability of that bug in the system as a whole (can this be exploited by the entire internet, or 3 sysadmins, or no one at all?) is not really an automatable task.