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I have followed digital privacy and nation-level-actor interception stories since the European Parliament's ECHELON report over a quarter-century ago, and to me it is a given that no strong state like the USA would permit a truly secure app being used at a societal scale. I use Signal myself, but am under no illusions.

The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.

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This is a reasonable take, though I would add that simply compromising the notification server is enough to get the metadata about who's talking to who.

My general impression is that Signal is about as secure as I can reasonably expect, but that the entire ecosystem is compromised because it's going through two companies that are beholden to the US government.

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Hasn't Matrix had a series of cryptographic blunders?

Ah yes, I do remember: https://soatok.blog/2024/08/14/security-issues-in-matrixs-ol...

As for Signal being open source (or your claim in the link that it is not open source as in they don't provide the source for builds; and you only need to look at the client source for the security claims), as of a previous post about Signal on HN I have started verifying the builds on iOS which I can confirm are fully source reproducible:

https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...

Signal already provide instructions on Android reproducible builds and it wouldn't really take much to extend that to fully source reproducible.

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It turns out that good privacy tech doesn't rely on jurisdictions.

It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.

Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.

For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.

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servers, computers and users all live inside a jurisdiction.

Technology must work around this fundamental fact, or work within the law: everything else is a perpetually losing battle.

You can't have an organisation providing anonymous E2EE if there are laws that force KYC or CSAM scanning; and you will be hard pressed to argue on the side of fraudsters and kiddie fiddlers in front of the population.

Like I said, the best solution is small local groups; just like neighbourhoods- there's no actual need to have ONE directory and ONE "instance" of a chat network outside of convienience.. and truthfully, it's not that convenient, because everyone chooses a different chat network anyway. (Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook messenger-- which isn't whatsapp for some reason, Wechat, Threema, etc,etc,etc,etc).

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E2EE is only about message contents. Intelligence services have made it clear that metadata is enough for them, and Signal's code (since at least the introduction of Intel SGX features) doesn't protect that, precisely because of server jurisdiction.
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But, if it was in an EU country, the media would still be collected by intelligence services. And shared due to the various eyes alliances.

I think Signal's threat model is more about law enforcement local or national than intelligence agencies with backdoors in the internet.

As it happens a lot of the abuse of our rights comes from law enforcement. So it's a big improvement to protect against that.

I don't think anyone's expecting Signal to be super anonymous when it's run on AWS.

Yeah, I admit they should work a lot more on metadata privacy. Because anonymity is important in messaging for contact privacy.

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What metadata are you concerned about? Have you seen the evidence tendered by Signal in cases where law enforcement requested data? Usually there's a dearth of data available in such cases except usually a log of when a user has registered and last accessed the servers.

See https://signal.org/bigbrother/

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I'm not concerned.

This is speculation about mass surveillance by intelligence services. If they're in your threat model then Signal is not the right choice.

Single is decent for law enforcement in your threat model, but SimpleX is still preferable.

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"Moxie Marlinspike" I am not going to trust some jabroni, straight out of central casting, who doesn't even fly by his family name. Seems like yet another usgov+hollywood fabrication. Good on you.

JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:

https://www.jwz.org/blog/2025/04/signal-3/

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