[0]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android
What can Signal do to annihilate your concerns without giving you access to their system?
At best they (very) passively fight against third party clients connecting to their official servers.
At best they (very very very) passively fight against self-hosting the server by not providing elaborate guides and having the public repo lag behind production.
The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.
This is straight up lies, and I don't need to prove it to this specific user, because I already have, but (s)he likes to be obtuse and wilfully ignorant.
For anyone else, full source reproducible verified for iOS: https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...
And the Android clients come with closed source components from Google. It's still not a problem, but it's true.
The build of Signal Server from public source does not mean that's what they deploy in production.
For security analysis the Signal Server is immaterial, all claims of security can be verified from the client. For all intents and purposes the server is just a dumb pipe.
You have no idea how demotivating your comment is for people who have taken a pay cut, and dedicated their lives to try and find a better balance between usability, privacy and sustainability.
There are better alternatives to signal and other companies who aren't outright lying to their users about what data they collect and store in their privacy policy.
You can read more about the issue here: https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....
Note that at the bottom of that article they talk about giving users a way to "disable" the pin, but there is no actual opt of the pin. If you choose not to create one, one is created for you, and that's used when uploading your data to the cloud even though you won't ever be able to recover the data. You cannot opt out of the data collection.
You can't just say it and leave. Anything better than SMS which was not even meant for communication.
But lumping imessage and even Facebook messenger in the same pile is disingenuous.
There are serious cryptographers working on iMessage too, eg. https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-qua...
SMS should indeed not be included in the same conversation as those two.