Also, how do you know that there isn't someone performing a MITM (man in the middle) attack? FTP has no mechanism that I know of to verify that you're connecting to the server that you think you are.
It may well be that you're not a sizeable target and that no-one is interested in hacking your site, but that's just luck and not an endorsement of unencrypted FTP.
We have to put a limit to paranoia. If things work correctly for decades and there are no signs of foul play after endless real world usage, it's safe to say nobody is hacking our FTP.
It's different if you're a bank or the KGB or the CIA.
> It may well be that you're not a sizeable target and that no-one is interested in hacking your site, but that's just luck and not an endorsement of unencrypted FTP.
Do you drive an armored car?
It costs approximately zero to use encryption and protect against the FTP exploits, so why continue to use FTP? There's literally no advantage and several possible disadvantages. Just relying on not being hacked before seems a foolish stance to me.
I challenge you to select any FTP website of your choosing and make a tiny change to prove that you've hacked it and let me know here.
A frame-less one?
I don't even know if I'm talking about your servers or your bike at this point, ha
We have to be proportional when we do risk assessment. Just because it's part of modern programmer faith to be against FTP, doesn't mean it's sensible. Most hackers are just repeating what others have told them, and a lie becomes common sense.
If FTP is considered unsafe, then riding any non-armored vehicle should also be unacceptable.
Whether or not the connection you're using is encrypted doesn't really matter because the ISP and hosting provider are legally obligated to prevent unauthorized access.
(It's different if you're the NSA or some other state-level actor, but you're not.)
And what happens if your ISP is compromised without their knowledge? What happens when it's a consumer device such as a router? Don't forget that nearly every TP-Link router has an active malware infection.
It's not just one ISP that you have to trust, it's every single intermediate piece of equipment.
Intercepting traffic is a trivial & common form of compromise, and the problem multiplies by how many different parties you are handing your data to. It is wildly irresponsible to not attempt to protect against this.
"You <-> ISP <-> Bank webpage" is an entirely different security threat model than "You <-> Server you rent from an ISP".
Also, unsanctioned wiretapping is an entirely different criminal offense than stealing leaked credentials.
You can't make blanket statements like that without understanding ISP peering agreements and how data is stored and where.
Let's not pretend like slapping cryptography over L3 is the entirety of being secure. Often (most of the time?) cryptography doesn't even matter much for security.
P.S. Security (prevent stealing sensitive data) and verification (making sure nothing extra is added during transfer) are different problems.
...In what world do people rent servers from consumer ISPs? This used to exist in the 1990s, but is nonexistent now.
If this still exists, it's email-only and has already been outsourced elsewhere. No consumer ISP currently in existence is running these sorts of services on their own hardware.
> Also, unsanctioned wiretapping is an entirely different criminal offense than stealing leaked credentials.
I want to be very clear: There are countries that effectively do not have laws that would ever be adequately enforced on ISPs, either because of corruption, a lack of resources in the courts systems, or both. The use of bribery to compel ISPs into intercepting and recording internet traffic is already rampant at scale. You can't rely on the law to protect you when the internet goes across borders.
> Let's not pretend like slapping cryptography over L3 is the entirety of being secure. Often (most of the time?) cryptography doesn't even matter much for security.
Not sure what your point is. Yes, transport security is not the solution to every problem. But it is by far the lowest hanging fruit, the threat modelling is incredibly clear and obvious. There is a reason transport encryption has become universal across every use case imaginable - it's the literal first step to not getting completely pwned before you've even done anything.
> P.S. Security (prevent stealing sensitive data) and verification (making sure nothing extra is added during transfer) are different problems.
And? On the transport level, they have the same solution: TLS. Confidentiality and integrity work hand-in-hand. It's very rare you will need one without the other.
Unencrypted FTP does not give you either of these, and in fact by being limited to password authentication, it helps turn every passive data collection attack into a persistent remote control attack.
That is nonsense. The reality is that most data simply is not sensitive, and there is no valid reason to encrypt it. I wouldn't use insecure FTP because credentials, but there's no good reason to encrypt your blog or something.
It's not so much about the data, but protecting your credentials for the server.
Jokes aside https is as much about privacy as is is about reducing the chance you receive data that has been tampered. You shouldn't only not use FTP because credentials but also because embedded malware you didn't put there yourself.
The bad news with FTP in particular is that only one request has to be intercepted and recorded to have persistent compromise, because the credentials are just a username and password transmitted in clear.