Humans have a powerful need to affix blame and punish individuals. On the internet, you are forever the worst moment of your life.
We set air traffic controllers up to fail, and then when something goes wrong we torture them until they die, and then torture their memory after they die.
Pretty easy!
It doesn't serve us well to act like this administration is anything other than extremely aberrational.
But scapegoating any single politician for the systemic problems of aviation is as unhelpful as scapegoating the controller for the crash at Laguardia.
Is it still an aberration the second time 'round?
1: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/cleared-to-collide-the-c...
Deciding to change policies to effect the recommendation isn't their role. That's why you will so often see a safety investigatory body repeatedly recommend the same thing. The UK's RAIB (which is for Rail investigations) for example will often call out why a fatal accident they've investigated wouldn't have happened if the regulator had implemented some prior recommendation, either one they're slow walking or have rejected.
The investigators don't need to care about other factors. Are melons too expensive? Not their problem. Only unfriendly countries grow melons? Not their problem. They only need to care about recommending things that would prevent future harm which is their purpose.
And if it was the role of investigators to change policy, then there would be enormous pressure from industry to reach convenient conclusions, poisoning the investigation process.
https://www.airlinepilotforums.com
You will see many are terrified ( in commercial pilot terms...) of flying into La Guardia or JFK...
Just a quick read/speculation based on the linked forum post...
Short of insane visibility conditions that prevented them from seeing the plane coming, the firetruck operator seems to be the liable party (beyond the airport for understaffing controllers—this seems to be exacerbated by government cuts but that's still no excuse for having a solo controller at that busy of an airport, especially at night).
The controller in question seems to have caught their mistake quickly and reversed the order instead asking the firetruck to stop (but for some reason, this wasn't heard).
Is it common now to have solo operators running control towers?
The fire truck received the go ahead. They weigh 3x more than a normal firetruck. They're rushing to a different emergency. The plane is moving fast as hell. They can't just react instantaneously.
The ATC worker is clearly too stretched and such an incident was an inevitability. When they're shouting stop, they are no longer directly talking to the firetruck, which obscures the situation for everyone.
It is a terrible tragedy that will only be prevented with reform in staffing and safety procedures.
AC No: 150/5210-20A - "Subject: Ground Vehicle Operations to include Taxiing or Towing an Aircraft on Airports"
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/...
“you must ensure that you look both ways down the runway to visually acquire aircraft landing or departing even if you have a clearance to cross.”
These trucks seem to have pretty good visibility from inside. Not sure if La Guardia model was the same: https://youtu.be/rfILwYo3sXc
Says at pag 9:
"While driving on an aerodrome : Clear left, ahead, above and right
Scan the full length of the runway and the approaches for possible landing aircraft before entering or crossing any runway, even if you have received a clearance."
They have mostly glass cabs for exactly that reason. Only thing that would block your view is a passenger in the right seat.
But if your truck has blind spots and vis is poor, you shouldn't be driving as fast if at all.
We can’t say that emergency vehicles should just stay in on dark and stormy nights.
The rest of the emergency vehicles were stopped because they hadn’t been authorized. Truck 1 started moving because he had received specific instructions to do exactly what he was doing.
I take it you’re not a pilot, controller or someone who has ever worked an aviation radio?
At Class D airports it’s always been the norm. But KLGA is Class B.
Also first time ATC told the truck to stop it wasn’t too clear who the message was addressed to. It’s a bit hard to hear “Truck1” there, not clear who he wants to stop. The second time, one can argue by the time “stop” command was heard it might have been better to gun the engine. As the truck sort of slowed down in the middle of the runway.
What government cuts? 2025 FAA air traffic budget was up around 7% from 2025
https://enotrans.org/article/senate-bill-oks-27-billion-faa-...
> The crash has raised fears that operations at US airports are under extreme stress. Airports have been dealing with a shortage of air traffic controllers, exacerbated by brutal federal government personnel cuts by Donald Trump’s administration at the start of his second presidency.
Not my opinion, just reading from there.
I'm just looking for: budget was X in <2026 and in 2026 it is Y, where X > Y
I am reminded of the Uberlingen disaster:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_%C3%9Cberlingen_mid-air_c...
Both precedents are applicable, because the Laguardia controller is also going to be savaged.
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/cleared-to-collide-the-c...
The system is smart enough that if you get red bars to cross for an airplane departing once it passes your position the red clears because it knows the airplane is already past you. It is not dumb - it was deliberately designed to minimize false positives so everyone would trust it otherwise they might ignore it when it really counts. (AFAIK it very accurate in fact so the firetrucks weren't crossing because they distrusted the red lights).
This is just like all aviation incidents and indeed most incidents of any kind: the holes in the swiss cheese lined up.
The emergency aircraft couldn't find a free gate, creating a massive distraction for ATC, airport, et al. This is probably the primary domino that started the sequence. Had a gate been free this incident would not have happened. One big hole lined up.
Normally the aircraft would visually see the truck or the truck would visually see the airplane. But it was dark and rainy. Another hole lined up.
Everyone involved was rushing because noise abatement requires the airport to close at a certain hour. Thus everyone wanted to take-off or land before that shutdown. Another hole.
Normally the controller wouldn't issue the clearance to cross or their supervisor monitoring behind them would notice the error and override. But the controller and/or supervisor were distracted by the emergency. Another hole lined up.
The controller realized the error and issued a stop command but the fire truck proceeded anyway; they may or may not have heard the transmission. Another hole lined up.
Then someone else decided to jump on frequency during this busy time (we don't know who just yet) which may have prevented the controller's stop and/or go-around commands from being heard (another hole lined up).
The ARFF crew did not obey the REILs, accepting the clearance. Perhaps they thought the red lights were due to aircraft on short final and they still had time to cross? Perhaps it was some other misunderstanding of how that system works. Another hole lines up.
And the Air Canada jet was not paying attention to the chaos on frequency. There's a reason runway crossings are typically done on tower frequency: so aircraft can hear what is going on. But it was late at night and their brains probably didn't process what was happening. Or they were too close to touching down to have the bandwidth. Another hole lined up.
I totally agree with you on that.
> The emergency aircraft couldn't find a free gate, creating a massive distraction for ATC, airport, et al.
Yes. And I want to add one more thing to this: the airplane with the "odour" issue was kinda ambivalent about the danger. They deemed it dangerous enough to declare an emergency, and request a gate then later ask for airstairs but not dangerous enough to pop the slides and just evacuate right there and then. I'm not saying this is wrong. Obviously they were evaluating the situation as new information was coming in. But it increased the workload of the ATC. They were trying to find a gate, and etc. If it was a clearer "mayday mayday mayday, aft cabin fire, we are evacuating" that might have been paradoxically less "work" for the ATC. Or at least more of a "practiced" scenario.
> Perhaps it was some other misunderstanding of how that system works.
Yeah. That's a big one. Total speculation but maybe they thought the airplane with the "odour" issue was keeping it red?
The truck involved in the collision did not have one. https://bsky.app/profile/flightradar24.com/post/3mht7m2f3rc2...
Empowering workers to make safety-critical meta-decisions does not seem to be a feature of actually-existing capitalism.
Well, what you are describing is a strike, and it is currently illegal for ATC to strike, so in theory one possible structural change would be to make it legal for the workers to do what you're describing.
[1] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-doges-cutbacks-at-the-...
I have voted based on getting particular people nominated within a federal agency, requires the President to pick someone who will 100% be from their party, and a Senate committee that will confirm them
people tend to think "I'm voting against my best interests" without knowing that the agency control was my best interest as it will most likely continue shaping an industry far beyond any particular administration
I could see that happening again with your abstract, vague, and ambiguous idea. Just say what you mean specifically, use your words, so I know if it's something that could steer my vote or not
So the odds I’m talking about the current administration are low
I wrote that I have voted for an agency appointment before, and the person I replied to also is suggesting to do that again
yes, only democrats use the meme “voting against their best interest”, sometimes this voting pattern includes or excludes them
vote in your local elections if the feds aren't involved the way you wish
The way I think about it is this: substandard ATC staffing is just as bad as lacking jetways or damaged runways. When the airport can't land planes because of physical capacity constraints, flights get cancelled or delayed (literally happening today at LGA, flights are getting canceled because they're down one runway). The carriers need to eat the costs of forcing too much demand on ATCs.
Running ATC (and limiting flights if necessary) seems like the job of the government to me.
Why put this on the carriers?
The idea that waste must be reduced is killing society, and this mindset must be addressed first before any other safety-critical system can be made reliable again.
Its previous head had a term that didn't expire until 2028 but he resigned after pressure from Elon Musk (who didn't like that he got fined), now a Trump-friendly head has been installed. What, realistically, would be the consequences if he lied? Likely none. Government officials lying on record is an every day occurrence these days.
I’m glad we’ve made our conclusions up front before the report has even come out.
That saves me a lot of reading!
That’s literally it. Anything else is speculation and extrapolation.
But don’t let that stop you if you already know what caused the tragedy.
It's scary that so many don't seem to know the difference. This is how misinformation starts and spreads.
The concept most certainly exists.
According to whom? Management, or controllers?
Certainly does not seem like controllers agree:
This is worthy of losing flagging privileges IMO.
The Secretary of Transportation said on record at the first press conference that reports this guy was working alone in the tower are INACCURATE. The actual number is the responsibility of the NTSB to disclose.
95% of this discussion is people blowing smoke out of their ass as per usual.
The evidence that he was overworked seems pretty damned obvious. He forgot about an entire airplane and put a fire truck in its path. The evidence of overwork is strewn all around LGA.
You can't think of any scenario having one controller makes sense?
I don't think people saying this stuff quite understand how busy LGA is even at night. I'd even go as far as to say that three minimum on duty with two in the tower at all times (for a ground/air split), would be the bare minimum for any hour or situation at LGA.
However, arrivals stay pretty heavy right up until 23:59 even on schedule and if you've got a lot of delayed flights (not exactly uncommon at LGA) - you may still have a lot of departures going out in the 23:00 hour.
I would not be surprised to learn that they're staffed to an appropriate level for what the schedule says is supposed to be operating at that time, but a very inadequate level for what actually winds up operating at that time on many days.
Initial analysis suggests they were running about 75% of full capacity in flight ops in the 15min prior to the accident. I doubt they were staffed to 75% of the daytime peak.
La Guardia appears to handle 400 flights a day, 22 an hour. I see 6 moving planes right now (https://www.flightradar24.com/airport/lga); hopefully they have more than one person on?
I don't want to blow your mind but if the airport closes there aren't going to be any controllers in the tower.
At one of the nation's busiest airports? Where there are two intersecting runways, both potentially with departing and arriving aircraft? Nope.
But, sure, a single-runway regional airport can probably get by with a single controller.
Here it's being done at SFO or so it seems: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?FileExtension=...
While searching I did find this other document where a GC (LC appears to be Local Control for local air traffic and GC is ground control) controller complains about combining due to short-staffing https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19837915&Fi...
Well, it'll be an interesting report from the NTSB at least.
Looking at the normal schedules - if all is on schedule there'd be no departures in the 23:00 hour but you'd still have the arrivals side running pretty heavily. However, once you factor in things not being on schedule, as they evidently were not on that night, you get:
----------
The 15min before the accident had 14 flight operations (per Juan Browne/blancolirio going through the ADSB playback). And that's in marginal weather and at night, which makes things more complicated.
That is 75% of the official maximum capacity of the airport - during the main part of the day where there's government-imposed caps on flights, it's capped at 74 operations per hour or about 18.5 per 15min.
As such, it seems apparent that you would need just as much staffing (or at least 75% as much) at that time to safely handle the traffic volume that was occurring that night as you did in the main part of the day.
Unless the normal staffing here was just 2 people, it seems clear that 1 is inadequate.
What we are seeing here is the normalization of deviance.
One last meta point. We live in the wealthiest country in the history of the world, and the highest air travel prices (some part is a function of longer distances I know). We should expect that we have ample coverage, if not over-coverage, at all times for one of our major metropolitan airports. Pay them.
The controller shortage has nothing to do with pay, controllers make a lot of money.
ATC should never work alone at any of the "Core 30" airports. https://www.aspm.faa.gov/aspmhelp/index/Core_30.html
Often Approach will take over the "tower" and operate in crippled mode (no clearances to cross active runways, you must go down to the end kind of thing).
Some airports are uncontrolled at various times and would revert to that. Some airlines would require the pilot execute a missed approach and deviate to a towered airport, others may allow them to land.
However despite the downvotes I still haven't seen evidence that they were running understaffed at that moment.
What I do know is that the developing emergency on the tarmac due to an apparently hazardous smell in another plane is likely the cause of the confusion that led to this incident. That's a trigger that could have been exacerbated by fatigue but we don't have any evidence of that yet.
I think the disagreement you see is based on the definition of what "understaffed" means. Having one ATC to do ground and air control simultaneously seems like an under-staffing situation to begin with, regardless of whether it's a common practice.
Do we have evidence that one controller did all ground and air? The only evidence I've seen was the NY Times said that, according to a source, two controllers were working and two more were in the building.
In situations like this there is as lot of disinformation. The best thing to do is not add to it - a pile of bad information is not improved by piling more on. The best thing is to patiently find reliable info and stick to it.
> The best thing is to patiently find reliable info and stick to it.
No disagreement here
Why do you (or why does anyone) think that? My point in the GP was, I have yet to see evidence that there was only one controller, and I have seen evidence that there were two.
What happens when they need the bathroom, or have some kind of medical problem? If it's really a common case for one controller to handle things, the system itself needs to be fundamentally rethought.
How many planes land at LGA in the middle the night?
One controller overnight is completely reasonable.
So if said controller has a medical episode?
I'm going to pretend to know exactly what would happen in that precise scenario but I'm confident most commercial pilots get enough training to be able to handle it.
You are defeating your own argument :-) Its exactly because every accident is an example of multiple things going wrong at the same time...that you need...multiple layers of control and safety to catch it through each hole of the cheese.
Like...another controller?
You need to recognize when something is out of the ordinary and treat it as an emergency (perhaps not a literal pan-pan/mayday emergency) sooner rather than later, and do things that may end up to have been unnecessary (like executing a go-around because emergency vehicles were on the move).
One controller on two frequencies is another example - that works fine in normal situations, but during an emergency response, perhaps the channels should be mixed; giving the pilots in the air a chance to hear the incorrect clearance onto their runway.
After all, an active runway is really more of an "air" control thing than a ground one.
“If we remove regulation and safety controls, things will be safer because everyone will be more careful.”
Because the parties involved would be more careful if there were no ATC?
Ever?
I think the better question is how you get a system in which people are only responsible for any one facet to get the same performance out of people that a painter can get out of himself when he's setting up his own ladder that he personally has to climb on.
Mandatory scaffolding for roofing contractors would save some amount of deaths/injuries (and the related expenses) but add expenses to each job.
Some roofing firms refuse to operate without scaffolding; you pay for it or you find someone else.
A painter who does a bad job setting up a ladder is going to have a bad time, a lone ATC operator having a heart attack potentially puts multiple large aircraft full of people in danger...
In practice? It depends. Delays have a tendency to cascade in the air travel system and the Port Authority can curtail or cancel the curfew at their discretion. How frequently do exceptions to normal ops have to happen for it to be unreasonable to use "normal ops traffic" as a justification for scheduling a single controller? Ultimately, controllers have to control the traffic that they get, not the traffic that they want/expect to get, and a system that is overly optimized becomes brittle and unable to deal with exceptions to the norm.
How many fatal accidents are reasonable in your opinion?
Do you really think it's appropriate to have zero margin for handling unusually high ATC workloads? Because we just saw what happens when you have zero margin for handling unusually high ATC workloads: people start dying.