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That's true, but it seems far more complex than just moving trivy to a separate workerflow with no permissions and likely physical isolation between it and a credential. I'm pretty wary of the idea that malware couldn't just privesc - it's pretty trivial to obtain root on a user's laptop. Running as a separate, unprivileged user helps a ton, but again, I'm skeptical of this vs just using a github workflow.

by mike_hearn13 hours ago|

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I'm looking for more general solutions. "Properly configure Trivy" is too specific, it's obvious in hindsight but not before.

Privilege escalation on macOS is very hard indeed. Apple have been improving security for a long time, it is far, far ahead of Linux or Windows in this regard. The default experience in Xcode is that a release-mode app you make will be sandboxed, undebuggable, have protected keychain entries other apps can't read, have a protected file space other apps can't read, and its own code will also be read-only to other apps. So apps can't interfere with each other or escalate to each other's privileges even when running as the same UNIX user. And that's the default, you don't have to do anything to get that level of protection.

by staticassertion10 hours ago|

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Privesc is trivial on every desktop OS if you run as a regular user. I can write to your rc files so it's game over.

App Store apps are the exception, which is great, but presumably we're not talking about that? If we are, then yeah, app stores solve these problems by making things actually sandboxed.

by mike_hearn7 hours ago|

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Any app can be sandboxed on macOS and by default newly created apps are; that's why I say if you create a new app in Xcode then anything run by that app is sandboxed out of the box. App Store enforces it but beyond that isn't involved.