What if he wanted to use it for requesting blog.cloudflare.com
;; ANSWER SECTION:
blog.cloudflare.com. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint=104.18.28.7,104.18.29.7 ipv6hint=2606:4700::6812:1c07,2606:4700::6812:1d07
Where are the ECH keysFor example,
;; ANSWER SECTION:
test.defo.ie. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . ech="AEb+DQBCqQAgACBlm7cfDx/gKuUAwRTe+Y9MExbIyuLpLcgTORIdi69uewAEAAEAAQATcHVibGljLnRlc3QuZGVmby5pZQAA"
or ;; ANSWER SECTION:
cloudflare-ech.com. 300 IN HTTPS 1 . alpn="h3,h2" ipv4hint=104.18.10.118,104.18.11.118 ech="AEX+DQBBpQAgACB/RU5hAC5mXe3uOZtNY58Bc8UU1cd4QBxQzqirMlWZeQAEAAEAAQASY2xvdWRmbGFyZS1lY2guY29tAAA=" ipv6hint=2606:4700::6812:a76,2606:4700::6812:b76
It's true one can "use it today". One could use it for the past several years as well. The software has been around for a whileBut ECH has never been consistently enabled for the general public beyond a small number of test sites that are only for testing ECH
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/sec_proto...
Presumably anyone besides Safari can opt-in to that testing today, but I wouldn’t ship it worldwide and expect nice outcomes until (I suspect) after this fall’s 27 releases. Maybe someone could PR the WebKit team to add that feature flag in the meantime?
But, in a personal/single website server, ech does not really add privacy, adversaries can still observe the IP metadata and compare what's hosted there. The real benefits are on huge cloud hosting platforms.
"Nginx 1.30 incorporates all of the changes from the Nginx 1.29.x mainline branch to provide a lot of new functionality like Multipath TCP (MPTCP)."
"Nginx 1.30 also adds HTTP/2 to backend and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH), sticky sessions support for upstreams, and the default proxy HTTP version being set to HTTP/1.1 with Keep-Alive enabled."
But, in a personal/single website server, ech does not really add privacy, adversaries can still observe the IP metadata and compare what's hosted there
I don't quite follow. I have dozens of throw-away silly hobby domains. I can use any of them as the outer-SNI. How is someone observing the traffic going to know the inner-SNI domain unless someone builds a massive database of all known inner+outer combinations which can be changed on a whim? ECH requires DOH so unless the ISP has tricked the user into using their DOH end-point they can't see the HTTPS resource record.
If I had a long running site I could do the same thing by having multiple font-end caching nodes using HAProxy or NGinx that come and go but I acknowledge others may not have the time to do that and most probably would not.
That's cool. I only make my own mini-CDN's.
There is always the option to put sites on a .onion domain but I don't host anything nearly exciting or controversial enough. For text that's probably a good option. I don't know if Tor is fast enough for binary or streaming sites yet. No idea how many here even know how to access a .onion site.
I will test out your theory and see if anyone bothers to track my IP addresses and does anything with them. I probably need to come up with something edgy that people would want to block. Idea's for something edgy?
So e.g. they'd work for exactly the way you use say TLS 1.0 in the Netscape 4 web browser which was popular when the middlebox was first marketed, or maybe they cope with exactly the features used in Safari but since Safari never sets this bit flag here they reject all connections with that flag.
What TLS learned is summarized as "have one joint and keep it well oiled" and they invented a technique to provide that oiling for one working joint in TLS, GREASE, Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility. The idea of GREASE is, if a popular client (say, the Chrome web browser) just insists on uttering random nonsense extensions then to survive in the world where that happens you must not freak out when there are extensions you do not understand. If your middlebox firmware freaks out when seeing this happen, your customers say "This middlebox I bought last week is broken, I want my money back" so you have to spend a few cents more to never do that.
But, since random nonsense is now OK, we can ship a new feature and the middleboxes won't freak out, so long as our feature looks similar enough to GREASE.
ECH achieves the same idea, when a participating client connects to a server which does not support ECH as far as it knows, it acts exactly the same as it would for ECH except, since it has neither a "real" name to hide nor a key to encrypt that name it fills the space where those would fit with random gibberish. As a server, you get this ECH extension you don't understand, and it is filled with random gibberish you also don't understand, this seems fine because you didn't understand any of it (or maybe you've switched it off, either way it's not relevant to you).
But for a middlebox this ensures they can't tell whether you're doing ECH. So, either they reject every client which could do ECH, which again that's how you get a bunch of angry customers, or, they accept such clients and so ECH works.
Russia blocked it for Cloudflare because the outer SNI was obviously just for ECH but that won't stop anyone from using generic or throw-away domains as the outer SNI. As for reasonable I don't quite follow. Only censorious countries or ISP's would do such a thing.
I can foresee Firewall vendors possibly adding a category for known outer-SNI domains used for ECH but at some point that list would be quite cumbersome and may run into the same problems as blocking CDN IP addresses.
They were wrong then, of course, and they're still wrong now.
Because I can ping almost any public server on the internet and they will reply. I can ping your website just fine and it replies to me!
But for example, our firewall at work responds to ICMP but all of the endpoints which aren't meant for public use do not. That is less because ICMP is a problem and more because everything works fine without it and least privilege is good design.
ICMP is also more than just ping, and some parts of ICMP are considered a vulnerability if exposed to the public internet by some scanning services.
I could be convinced to block inbound pings. Anything past that and I'd want solid evidence that it wouldn't break anything, with the expectation that it would.
In the snooping-mandatory scenario, either you have a mandatory outbound PAC with SSL-terminating proxy that either refuses CONNECT traffic or only allows that which it can root CA mitm, or you have a self-signed root CA mitm’ing all encrypted connections it recognizes. The former will continue functioning just fine with no issues at providing that; the latter will likely already be having issues with certificate-pinned apps and operating system components, not to mention likely being completely unaware of 80/udp, and should be scheduled for replacement by a solution that’s actually effective during your next capital budgeting interval.
Eventually these blocks won't be viable when big sites only support ECH. It's a stopgap solution that's delaying the inevitable death of SNI filtering.
Big sites care about money more than your privacy, and forcing ECH is bad business.
And sure, kill SNI filtering, most places that block ECH will be happy to require DPI instead, while you're busy shooting yourself in the foot. I don't want to see all of the data you transmit to every web provider over my networks, but if you remove SNI, I really don't have another option.
> require DPI
Enterprises own the device that I'm connected to the network with, I don't see how you can get any more invasive than that.
> countries with laws
1) what countries do national-level SNI filtering, and 2) why are you using a hyptothetical authoritarian, privacy invading state actor as a good reason to keep plaintext SNI?
> Big sites care about money
Yes, and you could say that overbearing, antiquated network operators stop them from making more money with things like SNI filtering.