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Is there even an agreed and actionable definition of consciousness? I'm worried that if such a thing existed some humans would fail to measure up.
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To the best of my knowledge, there is not an agreed and actionable definition of consciousness, and any attempt to make one comfortably fails to cleanly divide humans from machines.

It's more of a vibey term, and as such it is genuinely very difficult (perhaps impossible even) to concretely determine whether an LLM possesses consciousness. LLMs successfully express a lot of consciousness-like traits.

At some point you have to ask the question: does it even matter? If an LLM can sufficiently mimic consciousness, isn't that sufficient for us to treat it as conscious, even if it is in-fact not conscious (especially because we don't actually know)?

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As I've mentioned somewhere else already and you pointed out; the issue is that consciousness is a loose term and and it's a semantical issue that should be resolved first. It won't be, because the murkiness is beneficial to the corpus, amongst other things. And to your point about the appearance of "consciousness" being enough imho Chiang explains fairly well why it's not.
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There is a difference between saying software can never be conscious and saying the software we have today isn't conscious.
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Yes. There are really three separate questions:

  - Are current LLMs conscious?
  - Is it possible that future versions of LLMs with similar architectures could be conscious?
  - Can any AI be conscious?
I'd assign probabilities of around 0.1, 0.2, and 0.9. My completely ignorant take is that we probably need something more "dynamic" than a bunch of transformer layers in order to produce consciousness, but I wouldn't be shocked to be mistaken.
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I assign probabilities of zero to all 3. Computer program being conscious leads to ridiculous and obviously false conclusions (think about a person running a program using pen and paper for memory).
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why is that obviously false? To a functionalist, a pen and paper and a set of rules is sufficient for consciousness.
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Gist of the argument:

If it was true, you can create extreme pain by running a program. You can run the program by simulating a CPU, using pen and paper for memory. So you're essentially claiming that some simulated being is in pain because there are some 1s and 0s on paper. In fact, you can decide to use an arbitrary encoding of the memory, so a sufficiently long sequence of 0s written on paper corresponds to a simulated being feeling pain in some encoding. That is clearly nonsense.

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Time scale matters a lot in how we as humans perceive things like agency. Plants grow too slow for us to see any intent, but when you speed up a time lapse, suddenly it looks like plants reach for sunlight and vines for supports. Now, that may be projection on our part, but it may not be.
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This only seems insane/crazy from the perspective of everyday life. But philosophically it checks out, "We live in a simulation" and all that.

The crux if it is that if you ever break from "the universe can be fully expressed mathematically", you are stuck in the mud of supernatural beliefs.

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Once or twice I've experienced extreme pain, and it was downstream of a bright light shining on a wet rock for millions of years.

I try to imagine myself long ago, on the outside looking in, with someone explaining to me that extreme pain, wondrous art, hunger, triumph, and despair would all unfold in due time where the rocks were wet and the lights bright enough.

I can imagine myself calling this clear nonsense.

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Isn't pain just a manifestation of a bunch of chemical and electrical signals in the brain and body? It's not "clearly nonsense" to me that you could cause pain by writing a sufficiently long sequence of 0's - for it to be obviously wrong, you'd have to have some understanding of where consciousness comes from.

If you don't understand that, how can you assert that it doesn't come from mathematical relationships?

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This seems like a logical error. I don't understand how an internal combustion engine works, but I know it doesn't come from goblins jumping up and down inside.
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The fact that you know it literally means you understand, at least to some extent, how an internal combustion engine works (i.e. it is powered somehow by combustion, and jumping goblins are not combusting generally).

If you would have zero knowledge about ICEs, how would you know?

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I think 10-20% chance is wildly generous. What specific mechanism makes you think there's a 10% chance that current LLMs are conscious?
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Not GP but given we have no idea what conciousness is it seems foolhardy to go too low or too high for any of those numbers
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I think the problem with this argument is that it's too inclusive. Is the bacteria that's adapted to an antibiotic conscious? It's showing intelligence right? I think if you're going to say something is potentially conscious, for me to take the argument seriously at least, there needs to be some plausible mechanism. I just don't see one for LLMs.
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maybe the bacteria are conscious. How sure are we that they're not?

The only strong argument I have against it is the anthropic principle -- there are billions of times more bacteria than humans, so it's overwhelmingly unlikely that I'd be a human rather than a bacteria.

Not a very good argument of course.

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Yeah I get what you are saying but I don't see much of a plausible mechanism for humans either and yet clearly there is one.
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I have yet to be convinced that LLMs can produce definitive knowledge that is not a result of combining previous information. Humans can (if they can't then science basically collapses epistemelogically, see: philosophical skepticism), but I see no evidence of LLMs doing it. And from the number of truly new ideas and concepts delivered by LLMs (exactly zero), I think it's reasonable to just treat them as induction machines for now, but to treat anything they "know" as a Gettier case.
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I would like to push back on the idea that humans can provide definitive knowledge that is not a result of combining previous information.

Pretty much every single idea in science can be traced back to some combination of earlier ideas, and as they get earlier / simpler, they can be related back to some combination of direct observations.

It's not clear to me at all that our entire body of scientific knowledge can't be simply recreated by "combining results of observations + previous information". And LLMs can perform observations in addition to combine previous information, which in my estimate is genuinely sufficient for them to plausibly be able to rebuild all of science.

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How can you say for sure that every effect must have a cause? How can you be any more sure about that there can't be an effect without a cause than the old believe that black swans couldn't exist that was so universally believed that it became a cliche ("rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno")?

If every piece of knowledge is created by combining previous ones, then no true grounded knowledge is possible. Every bit of knowledge is grounded by another bit of knowledge which is itself grounded on, ..., etc, etc.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/

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Your comment is conflating a few things here, the philosophical problem of induction is one I am very familiar with, and it's also unrelated to what we are talking about.

"If every piece of knowledge is created by combining previous ones, then no true grounded knowledge is possible" - this is not true, and has a very simple solution. What you are calling "grounded" knowledge comes simply from observation.

When the very first human saw that an apple falls of a tree, they have acquired what you call "grounded" knowledge. They can then combine that knowledge with the grounded knowledge that other things fall from trees to start reasoning about why things might fall from trees.

The problem of induction is different. It says, we know that things fall from trees because things have always fallen from trees, but how can be certain that what we call the laws of physics will not arbitrarily change on us?

And of course, it's a famous problem because it doesn't have a satisfying answer. The answer is basically "well everything we know is wrong if induction is wrong, so we will pretend induction is not wrong and hope for the best". And at least so far, that approach has seemed to work (heh heh heh).

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> people conflate "consciousness" with the ability to make novel insights, think genuinely, etc.

The funniest thing is that LLMs will lap people in those capacities way before people who think like that accept that they might be conscious.

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