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Quoting the famous Science paper More Is Different [1]:

Knowing the laws of physics doesn't tell you how a brain, economy, or society works - because at every level of scale, genuinely new phenomena emerge that require their own science.

[1] https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.177.4047.393

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> Its still a bunch of instructions.

No, it's not a bunch of instructions, it's a colossal array of vectors that are the outcome of many thousands of lifetimes' worth of stimuli and reinforcement - not dissimilar in (very) abstract terms to the neurons in our brains.

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Do you believe consciousness to be an emergent property of the laws of physics?
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Regardless, the question still stands: "What does computers getting more intelligent has to do with it getting conscious?"

Just because consciousness emerged for we humans and other animals through one mechanism doesn't mean consciousness has/will/can emerge from current LLM technology.

For this extraordinary claim, I think the burden is firmly on those who are arguing that it has/will/can.

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how is anyone supposed to decide if something is conscious if no one has the slightest idea what consciousness really is
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The other point of view is that the burden is on those who suggest that biological consciousness is somehow special. What makes it so, and if the answer isn’t metaphysical, what’s stopping us from constructing it artificially?
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The key point is there is plenty of proof that consciousness is emergent, not structurally baked in. An excellent counterpoint is the "They're Made Out of Weights" post. There are plenty of emergent systems that clearly show intent and what we consider intelligence, like how ant colonies act as a unit.

If you want to get evolutionarily technical, humans are made of cells which began as individual organisms and coalesced into higher life forms. So the concept of a "life form" is very much flexible, so is every capability of a life form, including consciousness.

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That's not proof. Emergent intelligence is not consciousness.
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It might reflect a prejudice of modern human society to think more highly of people who are intelligent, and think less of people who we deem stupid.

I'd say AI should not by default gain any social status as human-equivalent even if they become (in whatever regard) more intelligent than humans. But that would require us to drop the notion that intelligence ~= respectability/status/ability to have a full subjective experience.

Most of these kind of pseudo-philosophical controversies actually tell more about the issues with humanity than the new tech/stuff...

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Since when has intelligence had a strong relationship to status and respectability? I've met intelligent people that don't get much respect or status either because they don't look good, are shy or they don't have money.
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> Its still bunch of instructions.

So is your brain. That's the problem with this argument.

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This sort of tech-centric distillation of visceral human experience into simple analogies is so grating. We can simultaneously acknowledge that consciousness is not well defined and not "testable" with certainty while also acknowledging that there is something different between the conscious experience we are all aware of as humans, and instructions executing on a chip. The only thing that has changed in the discourse about AI and consciousness vs. "is my home desktop conscious in 2004" is the quality of the simulacrum that LLMs produce vs. pre-ML chatbots.
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The brain is (part of) an allostatic system and part of a living organism which reproduces itself constantly. Certainly not "a bunch of instructions".
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Unless you ascribe to some meta-physical soul - you believe human consciousness is encoded in matter - in the interactions between atoms. Actually at a much higher level of abstraction- neurons - but it’s all simulatable in principle. Thus, yes, it could literally be a bunch of x86 instructions.
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The problem is

1. that artificial neurons are very restrictive model for actual neurons, let alone brain/organism, as there is more going on in neurons than a thresholded 0-1 activation

2. a brain does not function in isolation, but as regulator of the bodily functions (along with even more things). If you look at the brain in isolation to the body you don't really understand fully what it is doing unless you narrow your view a lot. Eg the brain modulates production of hormones, which in turn affects stuff like heart rate which then comes back to the brain as signal, in a feedback loop. Not to mention actual behaviour and interaction with the world. Toy models of organisms are not organisms.

3. "interaction between atoms" (or rather matter in general, as we have to take into account electrons, photons, gravity and a lot of other things that matter) is too general, too big, artificial neurons are a very useful (for applications) abstraction inspired by biological processes, but not modelling said underlying biology fully. Nobody can imo right now know if "computation" is a good model for "atom interactions" as in whether we can adequately enough model "atom interactions" in a computationally tractable way, and surely we do not do that right now except in very narrow scopes, and we have good reasons to believe that the current computational paradigms/turing machines are inadequate in doing that efficiently enough.

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I'm going to ask a couple dumb but genuine questions:

Does it matter that neurons are more complex than 0-1? Does the fact that transformer layers don't use purely thresholded 0-1 activation invalidate what you're saying?

How do you know that artificial neurons are less capable of producing consciousness than biological ones? How can other people independently verify this?

How does the embodied nature of human consciousness preclude consciousness emerging from a computational system? What is the definition of consciousness if it is precluded from occurring in a computational system but present in biological systems?

Why do you think exactly modeling interaction between atoms matters for consciousness? And where is the fidelity threshold? Is it the planck length?

Finally, a dumb question: how do we know humans are actually conscious, and where is the threshold between consciousness and unconsciousness? And do these criteria exclude all other forms, or other animals?

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Not the person you were asking but IMHO it all reduces to computational complexity, e.g. biological evolution provided the computational efficiencies that ultimately produced conscious minds and beings, whereas it is not obvious what scale of silicon, power or energy, and input data is sufficient for that to happen artificially. But that means my view is it is a matter of it being possible in principle, merely unknown in practice. Also my view is that denying this amounts to violating the Church Turing thesis of computational equivalence ("human brains are not magic, super-Turing, etc."), and I think a lot of talking-past one another in these public disagreements amounts to one side not actually having taken modern CS theory fundamentals enough to be persuaded of these couple of premises.
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That's my take on it too, roughly. I think if we get to trillion-parameter models and they don't exhibit what we'd call AGI, however you define it, then the current transformer based systems never will.

But calling them "unconscious" is a pretty high bar. Mice are conscious. The house sparrow pecking in my yard right now is conscious.

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>How do you know that artificial neurons are less capable of producing consciousness than biological ones? How can other people independently verify this?

How do you know that toasters or rocks aren't conscious?

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The only thing you can do is ask rhetorical questions to make your position seem obvious. Which should tell you how little you understand the thing in question.
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My point is it is very difficult to disprove that something has consciousness. What would be sufficient evidence that a rock is not conscious? The onus is on those making extraordinary claims (that a computer program is conscious) to provide evidence for it.
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it's not very difficult, it's impossible right now. you know you yourself are conscious and that's all that you can prove. you can extrapolate to other people and animals and plants but that's not proof
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>The onus is on those making extraordinary claims (that a computer program is conscious) to provide evidence for it.

By saying that a computer program is not conscious you are also making an extraordinary claim. You would have to hold an agnostic position until there is a test for consciousness.

You are relying on intuitive obviousness and rhetoric to make the opposing side look ridiculous "how could a TOASTER be conscious, preposterous!", you aren't making a actual positive argument for your view.

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Let's say I insist that rocks are conscious and I ask you to disprove that. How would you go about doing that? It's a genuine question.

I assume that we both think rocks are not conscious, but I'm genuinely unsure of how one could prove this.

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I would agree that a rock is not sentient, but determining whether or not it is conscious would require a definition of consciousness and a machine that could test for it.
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LLMs are able to do almost everything that we consider human intelligence, and in many areas of intelligence, they have surpassed us. It's not at all extraordinary to assume they're conscious.
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That's simply not true.
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It absolutely is true.

LLMs know more than any human being, are simultaneously experts in nearly every field of science and humanities, are able to make novel mathematical discoveries, can write and understand every major written language, and can give you an intelligent answer to almost any question you pose to them.

How is that not human-level intelligence? If a human could do all of that, we would consider them a genius.

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Distinction without a difference.
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That’s like saying simulating a supernova and a supernova are both extremely hot.
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The problem with this is that the word 'hot' only has meaning to a conscious being. And while we don't know what conciousness is, it's extremely hard to argue it's not an emergent property of physics. So if your supernova simulation is complex enough to also model emergent properties like conciousness, the simulated conciousness may well regard the supernova as 'hot'.
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Funny you mention simulations. The simulation theory that we all live in simulations doesn’t have any practical consequences for me or any one. If our world behaves exactly the same, what difference does it make?
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The perspective. From within the simulation there is no point in making the distinction, but from the outside it does. For another example - running a program on a virtual machine or a physical computer is the same to the program, but very different to debug when you see hardware errors.
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To take this seriously we must extend consciousness to nearly all of the tree of life.
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Maybe OP is a dualist.
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A very large number of people could do the calculations of an LLM by hand using pen and paper. It would take a long time, but if the result were conscious then were would the consciousness exist? In the humans? Is it consciousness within consciousness?
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Well if you go that route, a computer simulating digestion has almost no physical features in common with actual digestion of a stomach. The same holds for consciousness and brains and computers. Them saying it’s just instructions is shorthand for pointing out the physical differences of brains and computers.

It’s all just particles, but the higher level differences are vast, and only brains are implicated for first person perspectives via science.

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That's the "Chinese room" argument: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room

It has been very well discussed before I don't understand how anyone sane can argue against it (and indeed you can see on Wikipedia that the replies to it are sparse and don't make any sense).

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Well I don't understand how one can accept this argument. I mean if you believe in mind-body dualism it can make sense. But AFAIK Searle doesn't, instead he holds that there's something special about the brain biology that enables consciousness and that you won't find in a computer. I don't see why that would be the case if the computer can simulate the real world, and I find Searle's argument against simulation, that simulating rain doesn't make you wet, falls flat: it can make things wet in simulation, and if you connect it to sprinklers it will make you wet.
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> simulating rain doesn't make you wet, falls flat: it can make things wet in simulation, and if you connect it to sprinklers it will make you wet

It's not simulating rain if it's making you wet by using sprinklers?

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I mean you can connect the computer to sprinklers that activate when the system detects rain in the simulation if that's what you're after (that was just an aside to note that of course you don't get wet from a simulation disconnected from the real world).

But I guess that was a distraction from the main point: If consciousness emerges from biological processes in the brain connected to the world with a body, why would it not emerge from a simulation of these processes connected to the real world with sensors and actuators?

It seems like circular reasoning to me: The simulation is not like the real thing because it lacks the special thing that enables consciousness (that's Searle's biological naturalism). And it lacks what enables consciousness because it's not the real thing (that's the weather analogy).

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It's fairly obvious to me that the room as an entire system understands Chinese. The human in his thought experiment would just represent the small fraction of the brain that encodes/decodes symbols.
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Agreed, he’s saying if he’s working with a black box he doesn’t understand what it’s doing. Which is of course true. If the black box were a chinese person instead of a tool and he was writing down what they said, would he say the chinese person in the black box does not understand why they told him to write something? No, of course not.

Today we know the program to do this is always going to be inscrutable to Searle. His role is no different from someone using Claude to write an email.

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That's actually a powerful way of stating it.

If I did all of these calculations by hand, would it be conscious...

That's a powerful argument I haven't seen stated quite that way before..

I do think it's hard to know when consciousness exists, because we can't really prove it for our neighbor. We just intuitively know that it would be crazy, even immoral, to assume otherwise.

But, It's likely easier to dismiss consciousness, once we understand the mechanism, than it is to prove it.

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> That's a powerful argument I haven't seen stated quite that way before..

It's basically https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room – a classic in the philosophy of consciousness and AI.

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If you manually fired the neurons in a brain by measuring the ion concentrations at its subsides, would it be consciousness?
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Oops, auto correct: subsides = synapses

It's was a genuine question though. I'm not saying LLM use neurons, are like neurons, or are meant to be like neurons. I'm saying if you can do the math, for a substrate, that doesn't mean much. The simple math that runs it isn't the secret sauce.

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