Checked docks. You can convert any private chat into a private channel. Then swap the channel from private to public.
Edit: verified. You can do this but takes an extra step of converting to private channel first then swapping the channel mode.
It turns out Slack actually requires legal process or consent of parties to provide private messages to admins: https://slack.com/help/articles/204897248-Guide-to-Slack-imp...
But of course yes, another party could simply take a screenshot
If you talk shit about your superiors, it will get back to them. Same with "anonymous" surveys.
An inappropriate message may not be about something unsavory but about something private. Information about a contract which is not yet public. A discussion of a candidate who is then hired, and reads it. Etc.
Beyond that, the team are free to have private conversations between themselves. This is NOT something we log. At the end of the day, hiring good people and trusting them is important. The logic of making sure the AI does not leak those conversations also applies.
It is a new world, re:AI. It has its uses and things are changing at a rapid pace. It is not clear to be the protections we have implemented in todays paradigms are well implemented yet in the new AI world.
What a curious thing to say. My impression has been, if you put the accomplishments of computer science prior to 1990 against those subsequent, the prior would be more impressive, perhaps by a lot.
The change is for when everyone realizes this is useful info, a decision was made, you want to share this more broadly. Very often imo.
If you have a user called Claude, then you just apply ACL as normal & you don't care if they're human or bot, right?
That's why multiuser agents can be an issue.
The other way to do this, is to have claude installed for everyone, and any user's chat with claude uses their personal permissions via something like oauth delegation or AWS IAM role kinda things. But that, again, is complicated ACL logic living through the delegation of roles and access
In our cloud harness we have the notion of shared and private secrets. When something is authenticated with a shared secret it is basically something that can be used in a public setting. If something is private then it can be only accessed via trusted channel. It works for slack, telegram, etc.
In fact, our slack agents are very strong this department and it is guaranteed there is zero leak of private information.
The best norms around slack channels is to have most channels be public, but have norms where not everyone is in every channel.
Not very useful.
Still probably better than Claude's new bot which requires a service account per channel!
If a tool is authenticated as personal then it can be only accessed under personal context - i.e. privately. Now if the author of the agent wants to add tools authenticated with shared secrets that is something should be considered in the threat model.
In other words:
- reading my personal emails in a public setting - not ok - reading the agents shared inbox in a public setting - probably ok depending on the threat model
This is never secure. Some SAAS apps have automatic enrollment into company/teams based on email domain. So you can sign up with the email address of the agent and then ask for any 2fa code or other emails.
Why wouldn't you simply use the group chat ID (+more) to key the conversations on?
The issue seems to be that they 'invented' an auth and permission protocol instead of delegating to something existing, it would be as if they thought their idea of permissions were novel.