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Selling a pen labeled "this pen will refuse to sign certain orders" is not sabotage or malicious and is thus not a supply chain risk. The DoD is free to not buy from Anthropic, but designating them as a supply chain risk is incorrect, as well as arguably arbitrary and capricious given their public criticism of Anthropic's beliefs.
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The DoD buys from suppliers, who buy from suppliers, and so on. Hence supply chain. Hence supply chain risk.
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I don't think anyone doubts that subcontracts exist. They doubt that Anthropic's insistence that Claude isn't capable of being the operating system for an automated killbot and associated terms the DoD previously agreed to means that there's any danger to the US military from Lockheed Martin using Claude as a code assistant to build GUIs.
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"Supply chain risk" specifically refers to risk of malicious attack or sabotage through the supply chain, not all risks associated with supply chains.

A vendor with particularly poor QA might be a risk in your supply chain but isn't a "supply chain risk" according to this designation and neither would Anthropic be.

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You would think that's a surprisingly easy concept to grasp, but many are viewing this through the lens of desired outcome and not reality.
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Supply chain risks are usually when someone does a attack over the supply chain. Like when the mossad planted literally explosives in radio devices for Hezbollah.

Antrophic merely said they don't allow their tools to be used for autonomous killing.

A very specific case.

So where is the danger making it necessary preventing all suppliers from using Claude at all? That only concerns those who work directly on autonomous killing and only they will have to go to Altman or Musk.

So none of that is any threat to the military - so it was just black mailing to make them do the governments will - which is something usually dictatorships do, not democratic systems.

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supply chain risk has a standard definition that matches what you think, and a legal definition that lets the government do whatever it wants.
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They thought the product was such garbage they threatened them for not letting them use it any way they wanted?
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Oddly when the topic of e.g. car infotainment systems comes up, like BMW locking you out of features in your own car, this place is up in arms, but when the military has a problem with it, suddenly they should be forced to accept it?
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I am not the military. The military has special, near infinite powers I don't have. Therefore I always support anything that corrects the balance.
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The pen example makes sense if the intermediary were to ship the pen as part of the final product but not if the pen is simply used to draft designs of the final product. It seems that this designation would prohibit using the pen anywhere in the process which doesn't really make sense.
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> so as to surveil

How does Android and iPhone meet the grade given apps have pretty consistently leaked locations, base layouts etc?

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apps, not the actual devices by the supplier
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I think that still matches "an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function".

https://taskandpurpose.com/news/military-cybersecurity-ad-tr...

> The U.S. military has disabled advertising tracking tools in government-issued phones, computers and other devices, officials recently told Congress.

> The different military branches confirmed they had done so, some only this summer, following reporting that commercially available data taken from these devices and sold freely by data brokers, was being used by Iran and other adversaries to track and in some cases target American bases and personnel.

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Who is the adversary in this case?
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the courts interpret the statute, we have to read their argument where they explain why they think that's not the right definition to focus on. (the "adversary" is in section 3252, but they say that independently from that section 4713 allows determination of exigency.)

https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/09/26-104... see page 30

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Anthropic
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"risk that an adversary may" any of them.

China, Russia, Iran, come to mind.

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Because those countries do not control Anthropic's products.
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Because it's incorrect.

Those are (arguably) adversaries but the actor here is Anthropic, which is not an adversary.

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That's not at all what this is. Anthropic was very clear up-front what they would and wouldn't allow. They were not going to "subvert" anything. "Degrade function" in this context means that there is a risk that ongoing changes to the covered system will cause problems for the government. That wouldn't have been the case here; it would have been clear from the start what the military would and wouldn't be allowed to do with it, and that wouldn't change.
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It is not the textbook definition, because what Anthropic is doing is not sabotage, malicious, or subversive. Those are the key words in the definition. They are just refusing to add a feature to the military's specification. So their bid falls short of requirements.
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just because someone copied one sentence from some online reference it doesn't mean that the court used it for arguing their decision.

https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/09/26-104...

> Whatever paradigmatic examples individual members of Congress may have had in mind, the statutory definition is not limited to “adversar[ies],” 10 U.S.C. § 3252(d)(4), and instead covers “any person,”

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You're not addressing the argument, though. No one is saying that the target must be an "adversary".

Anthropic's actions were not sabotage, malicious, or subversive. That seems to be a requirement of the definition.

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I tried to hint in my comment that the argument is completely different. the supply chain risk is just what the media runs with. (yes, it's in the opinion, but that is the weaker part. and the court agrees, that it basically does not apply to Anthropic.)

there's section 4713 which is roughly "Secretary of War can pull the nat.sec. card, bye"

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> They are just refusing to add a feature to the military's specification.

That fails to accord with the claim:

>The Department reasonably feared that Anthropic might manipulate Claude’s design to prevent it from performing national-security functions that the Department deems contractually authorized and necessary

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That isn't sabotage, that is simply product design. Anthropic is free to create their products that refuse to kill people, and the DoD is free not to buy those products if they don't fit their needs.

However, that's not what a supply chain risk is. It's not an order to "don't buy these products if they don't work the way we want them to", its designating Anthropic as a national security threat because they might intentionally sabotage US military operations.

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> they might intentionally sabotage US military operations

Yes, this is why the DoW won’t use them.

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The name has not been legally changed. The law still says it is the department of defense, regardless of what name they choose to use.
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As I said elsewhere, it's utterly preposterous that the DOD actually considers this a reasonable threat, because it's simply not a reasonable possibility. There's no way Anthropic would do that, precisely because of the consequences that would follow if they did, and got found out. Moreover, they already clearly stated their terms and preferences. It's all out of the open. There's no supply chain risk, that designation is purely political.
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> Moreover, they already clearly stated their terms and preferences.

No it isn’t see above

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>DoW

DoD. Gulf of Mexico. Lake Ontario.

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That fails only if you believe and agree with the government's argument, which I don't.

I don't think it's reasonable to fear that Anthropic would change the deal after contractually agreeing to terms of use. The government is using that as an excuse because they know that Anthropic hasn't actually met the definition of a supply-chain risk.

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We know who has a notorious habit of changing "deals" last minute or randomly. And that isn't Anthropic.
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>The Department reasonably feared that Anthropic might manipulate Claude’s design to prevent it from performing national-security functions that the Department deems contractually authorized and necessary (emphasis mine)

They didn't "reasonably" fear anything. There is absolutely no evidence to support these allegations. Anthropic has the right to impose licensing terms. Merely disagreeing with the government is not evidence of wrongdoing.

If Anthropic wasn't allowed to say what they said, how would they be allowed to object to their government's illegal use of their products at all? It sounds to me like their only choices were "shut up" or "be punished", which is a clear-cut violation of their rights.

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Anthropic, in the original negotiations, said the can't answer every hypothetical use case. And the DOD should just come and ask as they come up (during an operation).

Which means the exact use limitations WOULD NOT BE DELINEATED IN WRITING in advance.

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But that is not at all a reasonable fear. Is it really reasonable to believe that Anthropic, after receiving a government contract, would then proceed to sabotage their own product to not function as contracted? That seems like an utterly ridiculous claim to me, nothing close to "reasonable". There is no charitable way to view this designation except as political punishment and/or as a favor to Altman and Musk.
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> would then proceed to sabotage their own product to not function as contracted?

Claude terms here: ANTHROPIC EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, NON-INFRINGEMENT, AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE

Like most so-called AI, the Claude program is inherently unreliable. I doubt Anthropic would ever agree to "function as contracted".

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The point to me is that the contract would include the understanding that the system was not 100% reliable.
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The department feared Anthropic would refuse if it was used to mass surveil on Americans or kill people without human oversight. Facts already laid out in the terms. Instead of simply canceling or negotiating, they used overwhelming government force against it to apply a designation never before applied to an American company. When its an interaction between trump/trump's government and any other party, it is a good first approximation to assume Trumps side are wrong.
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??? What are you talking about. Anthropic isn't an adversary and they're not required to sell for purposes they don't want to. It's not sabotage and it's not malicious.

This is a designation reserved for terrorists and the link.

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If you're preventing the military from doing some action because you disagree with it, that makes you an adversary.

Actively handicapping a product that's otherwise capable qualifies.

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> If you're preventing the military from doing some action because you disagree with it, that makes you an adversary.

No, it doesn't. The military doesn't have a right to force product requirements and terms of use on companies they contract with.

If they don't like the contract terms, they can simply not sign a contract and not do business with a company. Trying to get them designated a supply-chain risk is just political retribution.

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>If they don't like the contract terms, they can simply not sign a contract and not do business with a company.

How is that not what they're saying here by banning it in the supply chain?

How else do you prevent any dod purchases or contracts from 'having contact' with a software you don't trust?

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To be credible, you need to address the point that this prevents subcontractors from using it to code.
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> Actively handicapping a product that's otherwise capable qualifies.

But they're not actively handicapping it. They're saying it would be wildly irresponsible to assume it's "otherwise capable".

And very critically: they have taken zero steps to "actively handicap" it in any way.

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Wanting veto power in execution is functionally the same as actively handicapping it, regardless of how implemented.
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Actively handicapping a product that's otherwise capable qualifies. If you discover that the military is using your capacitors to make rocket launchers, so you introduce a manufacturing defect that will cause them to fail at high heat, you're a supply chain risk and can be rightfully designated as such.

The converse does not qualify. If I advertise a chemical with an admixture that prevents it from being used to make explosives, the military has absolutely no right to demand that I produce a version of that chemical without the admixture. Selling a product which can't do what the DoD wants does not make me a supply chain risk, no matter how easy it would be for me to make a different product that's fit for their purpose.

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So... don't buy from Anthropic? How many of the US population is an adversary, according to your definition?

Say everyone had something to sell and DOD wanted to buy it. But some people wouldn't make the product changes DOD demanded. Now, they are the adversary of the DOD?

I hear Trumplandia is nice this time of year.

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that section is not important (the court says so, read page 30 https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2026/09/26-104... ) section 4713 is ("determination of exigency" regarding procurement decisions)
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