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Care to elaborate?
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People at the big labs have been terrified of losing the chain of thought because they currently monitor it to prevent users from using their models in certain ways they consider unsafe or bad for their business. Personally I think chain of thought monitoring is a bad way to do this and obviously needs to be replaced by some way of analyzing the model's activations directly.
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Agreed, having text as a reasoning layer impedes performance while giving a false sense of security.

It could be encoding anything in its adjective choices etc. The same thing that model providers are using for watermarking can used by the model itself for private thought.

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The “obviously” here is puzzling. It is certainly obvious this would be better but it is not at all obvious how to do so.
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Exactly, because the whole thing is entirely based on autocompleting the next word, which is exactly why CoT prose helps getting better predictions.
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Why people don't treat categorizing model activations as a science is beyond me.
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Please, go on. How would you do it, specifically?
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It's also one of the major way labs can understand these models. Without the models are significantly harder to understand and align.
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I can't wait for everybody to look back on "alignment" and realize that it's a flawed premise at its core and as such, a fool's errand
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Alignment is a very broad term. True, it encompasses things like censorship and mandatory refusals in areas people will never agree 100% on, but a completely-unaligned LLM would be next to useless. When the system prompt tells the model, "You are a helpful assistant," that's alignment.
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Well if we are going to be broad enough about "alignment" to just mean training that makes it practically useful, then yeah, it's a flawed premise and people are wasting their breath talking about it at all
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Also agreed. Begging for crumbs at the CoS table is impeding cracking the tough nut of MechInterp. And further facing the fascinating and fertile fact that nobody has a clue of how any of these black boxes really work.-
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That’s certainly the long term goal, but it seems foolish to abandon it without a solution to the problem.
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> hey currently monitor it to prevent users from using their models in certain ways they consider unsafe or bad for their business

Can't they just monitor the text outputs as well?

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The usual meaning: say you have an interpretability signal that reveals reward hacking or other badness. Your most obvious response is to use that signal as a penalty in training. Doing that is called "the Most Forbidden Technique" because you can expect it to degrade the signal without stopping the badness.

But this doesn't seem to describe the OP, it's a different way to lose monitorability.

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The Most Forbidden Technique by Zvi Mowshowitz, Mar 12, 2025:

https://thezvi.substack.com/p/the-most-forbidden-technique

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Hmm, like allowing hosts to retain their memories...
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It reminded me of Dune: "Thou shalt not make a machine in the likeness of a human mind."
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the chain of thought is not auditable. The best you can do is have another model which later maps the intermediate latent states at every thinking iteration to text describing that latent state, but it's going to be lossy.
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But the chain of thought as text can be elusive, no? It might not be related with the actual "reasoning" of the model. There was a paper about this.
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This is correct, the decoded text has nothing to do w/ calculations that eventually get decoded into text. It's just a veneer that gives the appearance of legibility.
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One of the core claims made in the paper is "To inspect any latent reasoning span, one can easily recover its semantics by mapping each latent step produced by HybridLink to its nearest token embedding, as in Eq. 5". They show some charts to support this.

In doing this however, you lose meaning where the model is expressing combinations of tokens in a vector, and your logging/monitoring outputs just the closest one. You would need another model going through and outputting the full meaning being described (with more than one output token per reasoning token)

I wonder if their observability claims will hold up on a model trained from scratch to reason in latent space.

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Isn't this where everything is converging? Binary is more efficient than text for many system, including language.
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> Binary is more efficient than text for many system, including language.

It is not necessarily primarily about efficiency, but more the fact that a lot of thinking doesn't use language at all.

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And language does not map to every idea.

The idea of using language for reasoning about protein folding borders on ludicrous. Surely there is latent space more appropriate and (human) language has no expression for it.

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Apparently we mostly reuse spatial reasoning and vision lol. I don't know that much about it, though.
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He's referring to this technique's effect of obscuring interpretibility. Making it much more difficult to verify chains of thought and alignment.
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It's not like llms can't hide reasoning in the upper layers of any given token as it is...
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I believe the theory is that if selection pressure is not applied at that level, then developing deception in that level becomes an inefficiency (=less adaptive and unlikely to be conserved).
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In short we no longer see text based reasoning traces meaning it's easier for the models to fool us in case of malicious plans.
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Shockingly all the answers so far are subtly incorrect or extremely unclear.

The actual answer is that this is massive loss for Interpretibilty, AKA "telling whether the model is lying to you or not". Which sounds silly when you're thinking about chatbots, but is an incredibly important line in the sand for superheavy, longrunning, self-improving agents. To say the least!

It's based on this philosophy, FWIW: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/

And a good writeup I just found of recent worries regarding Astra's same shift towards intelligence at the cost of safety: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/HCRs8btkiamtWSNAL/astra-is-h...

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It's worth pointing out that merely having the chain-of-thought in latent space isn't by itself "The Most Forbidden Technique". Rather, it's doing what the authors propose as the next step in the paper:

  Hybrid generation can also make post-training more efficient. Because latent thoughts remain auditable during rollout, an external critic can assign step-level credit to latent spans, branch promising trajectories, or terminate ones whose latent reasoning has already gone wrong, before any text or tool call is produced.
Unless I'm misunderstanding, they're suggesting RL training against the CoT. Which, uh, that is The Most Forbidden Technique, as I understand it, when combined with the latent reasoning space. It allows for the model to "learn"/optimize for malicious behaviors that are just far enough away from the quantized token they're auditing against.
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If you accept any of the AI-equivalents of Pascal's Wager, latent thinking represents an uninterpretable and thus unalignable portion of AI machinery. Ie: a malevolent AI can hide bad stuff from people and Manchurian candidate themselves after it's too late.
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That assumes nothing can detect or analyze it beforehand.
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The idea is that it would be substantially more difficult
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