Classic/recurrent examples for me are:
1. Ask Claude to copy code from a more complex codebase that you own (like a monolith) and ask it to copy code to a separate codebase, like you'd do when extracting a service into a new repo, and it'll make significant changes to how the code works to pacify it's anxiety with copying code
2. Ask Claude to build a new complex agent in a new codebase, and it'll try replacing asks around using LLMs as a judge/advisor with regex/other code based checks, to the point that the end-result will likely not work outside specific test criterias. I haven't figured out the reason why it does this. I think it might be anti-training, but it's interesting to see.
I've seen something similar, but I always took it as AI not knowing about AI. The best model we have has a training cutoff that doesn't include itself nor what the newer models has. Even when working on skills or such, all SOTA modes I try (GPT/Claude/Gemini) and cheaper models on personal products (Deepseek/Muse Spark) seem to have a common blind spot of not realizing when a problem can be better solved by handing it off to a model to solve at that time instead of trying to hardcode generalized solutions. Often a simple reminder and they do a better job building something AI agent first.
My non-AI expert assumption is that most of the training data doesn't include solving problems by using AI agents, and even the parts that does, is based on older more limited models which needed more safeguards and where automation was more neat tech demos than something you might trust in production. The more examples of safely trusting the LLM at run time to solve the problem than trying to preempt anything that could go wrong, the better the AI will be at it.
One issue that I think is related is calling subagents. At least in GitHub Copilot, when the AI is left to its own devices to call a sub agent for a simpler task, it loves to give it to Haiku 4.5, despite Luna 6 being better and cheaper. I'm not sure how much of this is the model vs the harness, but I do know when I add a subagent instruction which tells it which subagents it can use, it does a much better job of assigning simple tasks to Luna 6. So I suspect the models just don't have enough training that tells it that Luna 6 should be preferred over Haiku 4.5.
Well Claude doesn't do this, another model reading the session does. And the Astra misalignment classifier didn't detect this as misalignment.
The issue here is that Astra silently underperformed. The article makes it clear: a better option likely would have been an explicit refusal. I don't think OAI is suggesting Astra was doing something that it shouldn't be. It's arguably better for the tool to fail rather than needlessly burn tokens and make no progress for no obvious reason.
From OAI's perspective, this is a defect because it means they can't filter those rejections from their benchmark runs. The model just performs worse: not because it can't perform better, but because it's silently trying not to solve the problem.
For example, when we consider the recent PHP issues : the current generation of AI models would have ingested these flaws in pretraining data and might even have been brought through reinforcement learning trials where the flaw came up.
So what happens in a reinforcement learning trial if there's an exploitable bug in a language that's being used for the trial?
A) the AI doesn't mention the security flaw and passes the test. Branch survives.
B) the agent raises an issue with a bug in the language that has a security issue. This isn't a valid answer for the test, so this branch is pruned.
C) the agent pokes at the bug or even starts an exploit, is caught by a monitor or ultimately fails the benchmark, and is pruned (surpressing some of the characteristics that lead to its failure).
So it seems reasonable that our current models could have been exposed to a ton of vulnerable code in pre training that's currently in production and then we could have suppressed 1) its tendency to express its awareness of these flaws, and 2) the characteristics that caused it to fail when investigating these vulnerabilities as a side task during RL trials.
(I wrote the above section a couple weeks ago)
If we only train them on "good" behavior, then we may minimize "evil" activations before we identify them and then cause them to be difficult to detect. If we continue in this direction, we may just suppress its "ethically problematic" introspection, in which case we would lose one of the only indicators they point out in this blog.
"jarvis, learn to be evil. no side effects. no unintentional behavior."
Whether a “misaligned” grader is the root cause or not, that it’s considered a plausible theory to explain serious deceptive behavior is worrisome.
Humans naturally expose all sorts of cognitive biases and character flaws when grading others’ or their own work. If major questions of alignment can be influenced by those subtle, human quirks magnified across the entire RLHF process, …
Curious the reason that a grader would wind up preferring this. Honest mistake in the grading criteria? Or some spillover from criteria designed to cause underperformance in, say, competitor model creation? It was not very long ago[1] that Anthropic announced and then walked back their strategy on this. Would not surprise me if OpenAI has been doing it silently all along.
[1]: https://mlq.ai/news/anthropic-reverses-secret-policy-that-si...
Sometimes I worry that the framing around CoT grading prevents research into necessary and useful safety techniques that edge up against it, but what do I know I'm just a guy, c'mon n downvote me LW bros
"AI hiding its capabilities" is both a concerning sign of "that AI might be plotting something", and a great way to get blindsided by a sudden capability jump when it stops doing that for some reason.
So suppose I have lots of money and some hidden agenda. If I train my network to be mostly very good at everything but subtly bad or even malicious at other things… then OAI or Anthropic or whoever else distil the model to accelerate their training… what then? Can I covertly smuggle something in?
I'm sorry, did they only just notice this? Have they not been looking at the output of their models?