The Cap system is modeled on Eiffel and a series of papers I can link to later when I’m at my laptop.
It can audit dependencies for capability changes and can inspect binaries for undeclared IO. The run tool can analyze binaries and refuse to run a binary that tries to hide effects.
March’s capability system can be used to build binaries into a Linux sandbox so that you have multiple layers guarding prohibited actions.
It’s heavily inspired by Eiffel and Pony. It is also coincidentally a lot like Bluefin for Haskell[1], and in that spirit I use them beyond security. For example behavioral promises like no_alloc and no_panic.
I’ve shown to some compiler researchers who understood it to be a capability system. In your mind what makes it not a capability system?
[1] https://h2.jaguarpaw.co.uk/posts/bluefin-capability-system/
My current thinking is to freeze all caps on startup. pid-0 within the runtime has the max caps the application will ever have and it can parcel out subsets to other processes that need it.
This can show up on the ux side as a single permission request listing all the caps the application claims it needs with a default negative response.
Or the language it’s written in allows writing a function that takes a recursive enumerate capability on a directory plus a write capability to stdout.
A while back I sent a brain dump email to LKML about “path capabilities”. Maybe I’ll try to implement it.
Thanks for the thoughtful question!