That's usually nested, and either cri-o or... KVM.
AWS instances are slow to launch; they take whole seconds. Nested virtualization allows running something like firecracker/crosvm/rust-vmm atop a normal AWS instance, without needing a bare-metal one.
Sometimes that’s justified in the name of making the security code simple enough to reason about, but making it harder to use has a security cost also.
If you're running multitenant for mutually-untrusting customers, that excuse goes out the window.
Also, how could VPS hosting still be a thing if KVM is that easily escaped?
EDIT: I am talking about KVM in general, not nested virtualization.
> If you're running multitenant for mutually-untrusting customers, that excuse goes out the window.
I still don't understand what you mean by this then?(Aside: my current guess at the appropriate security posture towards Nitro Sandboxes, in the current era of vulnerabilities, is "decent, but probably has security holes too, and is less widely scrutinized, don't count on it either". Thoughts?)
Any recommendations for good guides on that, besides "design very careful IAM policies and security groups, harden any common services they have access to, and ideally run them under separate AWS accounts"?
Do your lambda functions always get a per-customer dedicated instance or is firecracker distributing them so that multiple customers can have VMs on the same actual box?
Sounds like it would be pretty expensive for Amazon to dedicate an instance to every customer, especially for those with small workloads.
If that's the case, why would it not hold for Amazon but would hold for everyone else?
At some point in the past they did, for pretty much exactly this reason. I'd assume they don't anymore (I last worked there a decade ago).