"many Apple services use end-to-end encryption, which means the user’s iCloud data can be accessed only by the users themselves, and only from the trusted devices where they are signed in with their Apple Account."
And: " If a user chooses to turn on Advanced Data Protection, their trusted devices retain sole access to the encryption keys"
Also, there's no need to make suppositions such as this: > Your key is likely a KEK (key encryption key) that opens another key (not “your” key, let’s call it the actual key) that your data is secured with.
The details of keys are clearly outlined in the same white paper: "Most iCloud data is first encrypted on the user’s device, using device-generated iCloud keys, before being uploaded to iCloud servers."
So no - there's no layer of keys that Apple or the UK or whatever can use to bypass e2e where it's enabled.
The implication is that if a user does not “choose to turn on” Advanced Data Protection, then something else also has access to their encryption keys.
Users in the UK cannot “choose to turn on” Advanced Data Protection.
That's exactly the case. Without it, Apple Support, anyone with a valid warrant/subpoena, insider threats, successful phishers, etc. could access iCloud data.
Previously, Apple did not support E2EE for user data in iCloud, but later added it - that's what "Advanced Data Protection" is, after all.
But I believe when it was introduced, it was a news item (not from Apple, but from industry watchers) that it wasn't available in the UK, likely because of UK laws that harm privacy. It is the foremost surveillance state after China and North Korea, after all.
By default, Microsoft has a copy of your laptop's encryption key and will hand it over in response to a warrant.
> Microsoft Shared BitLocker Keys With FBI, Raising Privacy Fears
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/news-microsoft-bitlocke...
From your link:
> Users in the UK who have not already enabled Advanced Data Protection will no longer have the option to do so.
They're also clear that much of iCloud isn't E2EE unless you have "Advanced Data Protection": https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651
I still trust Apple in the USA at least. When I enrolled in advanced data protection, it did say nobody not even Apple, not just not Apple. It may be that they need to tighten their contractual language everywhere to deliver a uniformly semantic sentence.
https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#advanced
"This specifies no one, not even apple." I.e they don't store the keys you use for e2e encryption. They've systematically been against introducing backdoors here. Now, is it possible they have and they've been lying through their teeth? Surre, but its unlikely they would be so brazen.
"Your iCloud data is encrypted, the encryption keys are secured in Apple data centers so we can help you with data recovery, and only certain data is end-to-end encrypted."
Under what provision of FISA could the US government order Apple to stop doing end-to-end encryption?
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveilla...
It's one thing to say "hand over what you have access to on user X", it's another for "re-architecture your system to break E2E".
I'm reminded of the saying "Whether you think you can or think you can’t, you’re right."
* https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/02/03/you-can/
How much is this 'fatalistic' attitude self-fulfilling?
The near exact same deception has been put in place by Google/Microsoft/Apple with passkeys. It used to be, before passkeys, that people really could have a secret hidden behind an actual HSM, impossible to copy.
But they teamed to come up with passkeys that can now... Be copied from device to device. A secret, safe behind a HSM, replaced by something that can be copied.
What a win for security.
And all the idiots are cheering: "buuut buuuuuut buuuuuut it is CONVENIENT".
Yeah.
(Yes it is theoretically possible to create a complex encryption scheme whereby the UK government posses the only copy of a key that is in turn needed to generated a duplicate KEK, but I find it hard to believe Apple and the UK government have organized such a dance without a simple backup for the day the magic UK key gets lost/corrupted.)
The thing about a secret is that once someone else knows it, it's no longer a secret. It's at best a confidence.
It's one thing if your company never tried to be privacy-first and you went above and beyond what the government requested but there's no evidence of that here.
But I don't think we should reason based on "put yourself in mega-corp's shoes, they absolutely have to X thing". Rather, we should ask what people can do.
They could be trivially given orders not allowing them to sell devices where users "have unconditional control" too, so it's not like that's a magic technical solution that bypasses the legal/political demands.
Presumably you want to use this device with literally any online service, who is still subject to the laws of the governments under which they reside. Presumably you want to install software on this device which must abide by the laws of the governments under which you reside. Presumably you want to purchase this device from a store which has to comply with the laws of the governments under which they operate.
The central issue here is the government, and that is something the people can change if they care enough.
If you want to totally own the phone and software you can: buy a Librem. But for god’s sake please stop constantly whining that other companies don’t all offer products under the exact obscure and unpopular terms you specifically demand.
The tech companies do above and beyond what is legally required to make their customers accessible.
Prior to TCNs Apple was going to scan icloud anyway. It does indicate at least some integrity that they changed plans and refused to decrypt ADP.
Encryption is legal in many countries. Not in the UK of course. But in countries where encryption is legal, it is the decision of OpenAI, Microsoft etc, to keep data unencrypted. Certainly this is very bad for the user.
Inference is the main example. The AI companies can implement attestation. They can entirely legally have no knowledge of customer prompts, with minimal infrastructure costs.
They only refuse because they want to go beyond the law, they want to enforce the law themselves and need the data to be accessible.