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No, the whole reason Apple withdrew it from Great Britain is that it refused to weaken its security in response to the Home Office's TCN. The whole issue these articles are discussing is Apple's refusal to do exactly what you're saying. Apple clearly states otherwise (and would suffer colossal brand damage were it to lie, even amongst laymen). You are engaging in pure conjecture, and not even a very good conjecture at that, without a basis in fact. Ternus probably used the old wording because the old wording is still true. It's possible that Apple's legal team was the driving force behind the choice of wording.
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This is just not true. Apple's current platform security white paper clearly states what you're complaining they took away:

"many Apple services use end-to-end encryption, which means the user’s iCloud data can be accessed only by the users themselves, and only from the trusted devices where they are signed in with their Apple Account."

And: " If a user chooses to turn on Advanced Data Protection, their trusted devices retain sole access to the encryption keys"

Also, there's no need to make suppositions such as this: > Your key is likely a KEK (key encryption key) that opens another key (not “your” key, let’s call it the actual key) that your data is secured with.

The details of keys are clearly outlined in the same white paper: "Most iCloud data is first encrypted on the user’s device, using device-generated iCloud keys, before being uploaded to iCloud servers."

So no - there's no layer of keys that Apple or the UK or whatever can use to bypass e2e where it's enabled.

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> "If a user chooses to turn on Advanced Data Protection, their trusted devices retain sole access to the encryption keys"

The implication is that if a user does not “choose to turn on” Advanced Data Protection, then something else also has access to their encryption keys.

Users in the UK cannot “choose to turn on” Advanced Data Protection.

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> if a user does not “choose to turn on” Advanced Data Protection, then something else also has access to their encryption keys

That's exactly the case. Without it, Apple Support, anyone with a valid warrant/subpoena, insider threats, successful phishers, etc. could access iCloud data.

Previously, Apple did not support E2EE for user data in iCloud, but later added it - that's what "Advanced Data Protection" is, after all.

But I believe when it was introduced, it was a news item (not from Apple, but from industry watchers) that it wasn't available in the UK, likely because of UK laws that harm privacy. It is the foremost surveillance state after China and North Korea, after all.

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So exactly like local disk encryption on Windows devices?

By default, Microsoft has a copy of your laptop's encryption key and will hand it over in response to a warrant.

> Microsoft Shared BitLocker Keys With FBI, Raising Privacy Fears

https://www.techrepublic.com/article/news-microsoft-bitlocke...

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If you're comparing your security model to Windows, then it's already beyond hope of salvation.
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This isn't related to the article, and it's not true? iCloud ADP still exists in its original form, there was no modification allowing 3rd parties access to ADP decryption keys.
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ADP no longer exists in the UK

https://support.apple.com/en-us/122234

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It still exists, but U.K. users cannot turn it on if they have not done so previously.

From your link:

> Users in the UK who have not already enabled Advanced Data Protection will no longer have the option to do so.

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iCloud ADP no longer exists in the UK.
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They claim E2EE for certain services. "Your key is likely a KEK" - What makes you think this? That would straight up not be E2EE.

They're also clear that much of iCloud isn't E2EE unless you have "Advanced Data Protection": https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651

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The on-device private key material has to be a KEK anyway, otherwise it wouldn't be usable on all your iCloud-linked devices.

I still trust Apple in the USA at least. When I enrolled in advanced data protection, it did say nobody not even Apple, not just not Apple. It may be that they need to tighten their contractual language everywhere to deliver a uniformly semantic sentence.

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Where exactly do they say this, where is this wording change?

https://support.apple.com/en-us/102651#advanced

"This specifies no one, not even apple." I.e they don't store the keys you use for e2e encryption. They've systematically been against introducing backdoors here. Now, is it possible they have and they've been lying through their teeth? Surre, but its unlikely they would be so brazen.

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I think that's just for Advanced Data Protection, which apparently isn't offered in the UK. Here's what the page says about the default Standard data protection:

"Your iCloud data is encrypted, the encryption keys are secured in Apple data centers so we can help you with data recovery, and only certain data is end-to-end encrypted."

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Not sure about the extent of UK investigative powers, but I would assume that FISA in the US could indeed force Apple to lie to keep a change secret.
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> Not sure about the extent of UK investigative powers, but I would assume that FISA in the US could indeed force Apple to lie to keep a change secret.

Under what provision of FISA could the US government order Apple to stop doing end-to-end encryption?

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveilla...

It's one thing to say "hand over what you have access to on user X", it's another for "re-architecture your system to break E2E".

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I think we're well past assuming that laws apply to governments at this point.
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> I think we're well past assuming that laws apply to governments at this point.

I'm reminded of the saying "Whether you think you can or think you can’t, you’re right."

* https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/02/03/you-can/

How much is this 'fatalistic' attitude self-fulfilling?

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Someone claims a specific law would allow the government to do a specific thing, this claim is rebutted, and then it becomes "how naive to think the law ever mattered." Just reflexive abject cynicism. No the US government isn't perfectly lawful, yes the content of the laws does nonetheless matter a whole lot. Nuance.
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I believe FISA can force silence but not lies (“compelled speech”).
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The legality of the FISA order to Lavabit is untested. My understanding is that that included restricting documentation changes to not reveal the key handoff.
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Correct. This is why warrant canaries work.
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Does FISA force silence/lies about backdoors? I am not versed in any FISA cases being tested in court against e2e practices.
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It doesn't need FISA. Somehow (I have theories..) all media were prevented from disclosing Epstein information. For decades.
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Didn't they also deceptively say that those things that Apple cannot access only apply to local content, but if you have an iCloud backup (which pretty much anyone has), then Apple has access to that.
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> People will point out that your key is created on your device, lives on your device, and never leaves your device, but that is just your key. Your key is likely a KEK (key encryption key) that opens another key (not “your” key, let’s call it the actual key) that your data is secured with.

The near exact same deception has been put in place by Google/Microsoft/Apple with passkeys. It used to be, before passkeys, that people really could have a secret hidden behind an actual HSM, impossible to copy.

But they teamed to come up with passkeys that can now... Be copied from device to device. A secret, safe behind a HSM, replaced by something that can be copied.

What a win for security.

And all the idiots are cheering: "buuut buuuuuut buuuuuut it is CONVENIENT".

Yeah.

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Well, if Apple provided the KEK to the UK government then Apple is capable of generating another KEK for its own use. That means Apple can in fact access customer data on its own, just after a couple extra steps.

(Yes it is theoretically possible to create a complex encryption scheme whereby the UK government posses the only copy of a key that is in turn needed to generated a duplicate KEK, but I find it hard to believe Apple and the UK government have organized such a dance without a simple backup for the day the magic UK key gets lost/corrupted.)

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Given the legalese these extra steps are all that matters. Keep in mind that Apple could just update the software to do whatever it wants it to do, too. It's not like Apple customers are in control of what runs on their phones.
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This is what it boils down to for me. Whatever Apple claims they are doing today, and even what they are actually doing today, could change tomorrow. My phone just got an iOS update overnight. Do I know what changed? No I do not.

The thing about a secret is that once someone else knows it, it's no longer a secret. It's at best a confidence.

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it appears apple has done this in response to government interference which they cannot even legally disclose. what would you have apple do here?
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Came to say this. It actively hurts Apple's revenue to make these changes and not be able to market themselves as privacy leaders. They wouldn't make these changes unless they had to.

It's one thing if your company never tried to be privacy-first and you went above and beyond what the government requested but there's no evidence of that here.

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Exit the UK market and reveal the letter in a US court.
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This would be better for their UK customers how, exactly?
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I contend it is better to refuse than to be complicit.
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Apple leaving the UK won't go down lightly, MP's will shit themselves for real.
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If Apple gave the user unconditional control of their own devices, they wouldn't be able to comply with these orders. But they never want to do this nor would the cellular providers permit this.

But I don't think we should reason based on "put yourself in mega-corp's shoes, they absolutely have to X thing". Rather, we should ask what people can do.

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>If Apple gave the user unconditional control of their own devices, they wouldn't be able to comply with these orders.

They could be trivially given orders not allowing them to sell devices where users "have unconditional control" too, so it's not like that's a magic technical solution that bypasses the legal/political demands.

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Can we please just cut this kind of stereotypical, childish response from HN discussion?

Presumably you want to use this device with literally any online service, who is still subject to the laws of the governments under which they reside. Presumably you want to install software on this device which must abide by the laws of the governments under which you reside. Presumably you want to purchase this device from a store which has to comply with the laws of the governments under which they operate.

The central issue here is the government, and that is something the people can change if they care enough.

If you want to totally own the phone and software you can: buy a Librem. But for god’s sake please stop constantly whining that other companies don’t all offer products under the exact obscure and unpopular terms you specifically demand.

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The comment is very reasonable.

The tech companies do above and beyond what is legally required to make their customers accessible.

Prior to TCNs Apple was going to scan icloud anyway. It does indicate at least some integrity that they changed plans and refused to decrypt ADP.

Encryption is legal in many countries. Not in the UK of course. But in countries where encryption is legal, it is the decision of OpenAI, Microsoft etc, to keep data unencrypted. Certainly this is very bad for the user.

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Historically Apple has not gone above and beyond. They have done the opposite and actively worked to close multiple loopholes that governments have used and could in the future have used to demand access to customer data.
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Apple is commendable for that. You can surely see the point I am making.

Inference is the main example. The AI companies can implement attestation. They can entirely legally have no knowledge of customer prompts, with minimal infrastructure costs.

They only refuse because they want to go beyond the law, they want to enforce the law themselves and need the data to be accessible.

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Could you please stop name calling?
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Nobody is name-calling. I called the comment childish, and I believe it is. It is perfectly okay to separate an individual from the inevitably flawed and imperfect way they carry themselves, as we are all subject to do.
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Nothing is forcing the user to use iCloud
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