It's clear from the breadth and variety of exposures that there's no due diligence or guardrails inside OpenRouter on who they market and how they classify their providers. Their response to this indicates a few first steps but none seem to have the force of law and i'd have expected more from a Stripe aquisition.
Very glad that my daily driver is a local model and I only use these external services sparingly.
That being said, the best ZDR agreement is the one that your company has directly with the inference provider(s). Unfortunately:
- Not everyone is large enough (or has enough $$) for that. - Ultimately you’re in the same position of having to “trust” that they’re doing ZDR; even after auditing their security docs.
Expect many more companies to follow.
They explicitly specified USA, EU, UK, and Israel-hosted services as acceptable as long as it’s ZDR. They said that inference hosted in China was something they didn’t want.
The talk is here: https://www.youtube.com/live/akEqiXFo3GM
ZDR is a marketing ploy. It’s not real. Only naive people believe it’s real.
Could it be a moat to offer a zero-trust (based on technical impossibility) ZDR solution for corporate customers, or is everyone who’s paranoid enough about that just going to host local models on-prem eventually?
Unfortunately, I highly disagree. I'm deeply disappointed that they don't even have the gall to call the violators out so we can be informed. Dug around for so long and I can't still find all the rule-breaking providers. It's a bunch of "trust us bro" nonsense. Name and shame should be the minimum here.
Its possible to be very certain of the evidence you have but not be able to prove its not been tampered with or fabricated, for example.
Coincidentally later on I set my OR settings to only allow some providers that I can rely on, not blindly let OR route to wherever they like.
More importantly, many providers (AtlasCloud, Novita and StreamLake were named but there seems to be more implied in the blog post) have been rerouting requests to MiniMax servers on the backend and not processing their own prompts.
The obvious question is whether OpenRouter has done any auditing on their inference providers. Based on the researcher's blog post, I guess not.
https://www.dragos.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-security-canary-...
https://novita.ai/blog/minimax-requests-privacy-notice/
> A routing configuration issue caused an API forwarding path intended for specific customers to apply more broadly.
> If you used MiniMax models through Novita between 2026-05-28 and 2026-11-11, your request contents may have been accessed or retained by a third party. This includes requests made directly through Novita and those routed to Novita through OpenRouter.
“routing configuration issue”?!? Imagine if AWS got caught storing your S3 on some other provider’s disks and they said it was a “routing configuration error”! They shouldn’t have software that can do this at all! The API is supposed to be for their own GPUs!
Together’s is weird:
> As part of routine software testing, we collected prompt samples authorized for that use and stored them in a private Hugging Face repository. The samples came from requests to the MiniMax M3, GLM-5.2, and Kimi K2.6 models, primarily on June 24, July 4, July 8, and July 14, 2026.
Did Dragos really “authorize” Together to store their canary “prompt samples”? Somebody screwed up here.
> During development of our public GitHub repository, xorl, an AI coding agent committed a credential that provided access to the private Hugging Face repository. Our automated scanning detected the exposed credential, and we reverted the commit.
They didn't rotate the credential they knew was exposed!?! I guess "an AI coding agent" didn't think of doing that. Also FYI kids, reverting a commit does not delete the data from the repository.
In before they claim an AI agent wrote this disclosure that included certain "errors".
https://www.together.ai/blog/security-event-prompt-leakage-f...
Amusingly, the first time I typed “neocloud” it got autocorrected to “bro cloud”. I almost decided to leave it alone.
Yet, the basic idea of these myriads of canaries is good. I see several use cases, including in research.
The only thing you can trust is possibly(and not always) your own hardware, your own staff and companies you can directly inspect.
You do dont find real world company documents on the web that you could train on. And companies certainly won’t upload them to you so you can improve your models, not even with incentives. But provide a model with dirt cheap input pricing and free outputs - and you gut yourself a firehose.
To think that the “labs” wouldn’t train on this is like thinking they’d never have trained on shadow library books because, “well, it’s illegal”. They did it back then and it gave them an advantage over the competition. So why wouldn’t they now?
This one is actually the simplest for me, you can run decision models on your own laptop, and you can see how cheap and fast they are, it's actually amazing how "good" (jev etc is still better) they are.
So instead of thinking of them as a "LLM" for hosting pricing, it's easier to think of them as a API as a service, it's practically "how much can we charge someone for processing in bulk for an action and to get them sticky".
You setup whatever workflow you want for the decision models and then you practically never change it, because why would you, it's dirt cheap (for you and they provider), they (the provider) is making money on your outsourcing for every API action and it's going to be consistent because it's going to be for a long time.
That said, if you don’t believe OpenAI when they say they don’t train on your decision API inputs you shouldn’t trust them regarding LLM inputs either.
Of course, even with a privacy-respecting inference provider, if a modern, relentlessly proactive LLM runs in a harness with internet access, it can easily accidentally exfiltrate your data anyway.
Rather you have to trust the equipment operator (which in this era of clouds isn't necessarily the vendor) not to intentionally compromise their own hardware (see https://tee.fail/). But other than that quibble yeah, tinfoil looks like an excellent option that's much less likely to leak than current alternatives.
The payment is where you have to provide real infos.
I just hope the payment infos is stored at a different place than prompt/conversations storage so mapping of user id to payment id is not trivial.
What? I've never provided real world info when paying.
I always use Monero when paying for AI tokens. Crazy to do anything else.
The number of providers they have added is absurd, there have to be some that have almost no compute and just upstream everything. So stealing is their only possible business model.
openrouter.ai hasn't really promised that they do any vetting or due diligence, as far as I know. This whole space has had the scammy crypto vibe from the beginning.
https://www.together.ai/blog/security-event-prompt-leakage-f...
though this is not similar as ZDR, it's crazy to see so many incidents in last few months.
I don't understand why these names are being coyly tiptoed around as if they're trying to protect the privacy of these companies blatantly lying about ZDR. Why isn't OR calling out the actual providers they off-boarded by name? Why is OR basically protecting them under a cover of anonymity?
Lost a lot of trust in OR that's for sure, in-spite of some other positive reception I see here for this move.
Edit: Wording update.
That still leaves the desire of people to make informed decisions about what providers to use unresolved. If reputation is the only thing we have to go on when choosing a provider to send a bunch of sensitive data to, it'd be nice if the folks who actually know whether a provider is trustworthy would share that info.
But, since the email they sent identified the provider and the model (MiniMax, in my case) and the dates of use, it seems like it won't be secret for long what the other problem providers are. I'll assume the email to users of other providers will also include those details, so people can post about it even if OpenRouter is cagey about it in their blog post.
That's exactly what's confusing me though? Why is OR basically covering for these providers by not naming them?
https://x.com/nateberkopec/status/2123992018850595164?a=UMOK...
> Just got the email from Openrouter and now the story is confirmed
> Atlascloud, Novita (who I know was flagged US with ZDR on openrouter) and Streamlake were… oops! Forwarding your data BACK TO MINIMAX IN CHINA
I have my harness set to show me "diffs" of the catalog when I start a new session.
There was a mass-downgrade to non-ZDR a few days ago. At the time I wondered why.
It was all older (not latest release) Chinese models being run by second-party inference providers.
...draw your own conclusions....
There's also a good article at https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/11/a-leaky-ai-supply-c... , and a few earlier comments at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50582794 , https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50585962 and https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50562582 .
Did they? It says the attacker was able to create unauthorized CVMs (makes sense), able to obtain application credentials (significance unclear to me), and that they rotated their KMS root key in response (which is confusing to me because if they use hardware backed keys then I don't understand how the root key could ever be compromised).
So does this imply they aren't actually providing a proper hardware backed TEE? But that's also confusing because at least if you provision a VM you can have the hardware attest to its state.
The TEEs are real. The problem was caused by software bugs. Running a TEE app (CVM) is more than dropping a binary into TEE. Two problems remain: (1) migration, you don’t want to completely lose the data if the hardware dies, and (2) upgradability, you want to patch the app when there’s a bug without building the state from scratch. So we want to decouple the states from hardware.
Using the hardware key is painful. The solution is to introduce a separate key manager (KMS). It releases keys to the app iff. the app follows a predefined “policy” (code, hardware attestation, etc). We can decouple the states from hardware based on a remote KMS.
This is rather a common design. You can find it in our system, as well as other mature frameworks like Confidential Containers.
As the system grows, a bug was introduced to the policy of how we replicate a KMS’s key material (for redundancy). The attacker exploited it with multiple sophisticated attacks, eventually being able to cheat a running KMS to hand over the keys to a fake one, like it’s a legit KMS replica. As a result, the keys protected by the KMS became at risk.
To mitigate the problem, the legacy KMS was dropped and a new KMS was deployed. We have then rotated all the keys associated with the legacy KMS. A series of protocol and code audit is ongoing to prevent future failure.
(https://docs.phala.com/dstack/design-documents/decentralized... , https://docs.phala.com/dstack/design-documents/key-managemen...)
Actually it looks like a pretty decent solution once the inevitable bugs and footguns are ironed out.
Though frankly I would think anyone even slightly bothered about ZDR does not start their train of thought with "OK so we're going to put a middle man in"