(www.quantamagazine.org)
“The edifice of science is not raised like a dwelling, in which the foundations are first firmly laid and only then one proceeds to construct and to enlarge the rooms,” the great mathematician David Hilbert wrote in 1905 (opens a new tab). Rather, scientists should first find “comfortable spaces to wander around and only subsequently, when signs appear here and there that the loose foundations are not able to sustain the expansion of the rooms, [should they] support and fortify them.”
But sometimes, some of the ugly science gets out of the lab a bit too soon, and it usually doesn't end well. Usually people get their hopes up, and when it doesn't live up to the hype, people get confused.
It really stood out during the covid pandemic. We didn't have time to wait for the long trials we normally expect, waiting could mean thousands of deaths, and we had to make do with uncertainty. That's how we got all sorts of conflicting information and policies that changed all the time. The virus spread by contact, no, it is airborne, masks, no masks, hydroxycholoroquine, no, that's bullshit, etc... that sort of thing. That's the kind of thing that usually don't get publicized outside of scientific papers, but the circumstances made it so that everyone got to see that, including science deniers unfortunately.
Edit: Still, I really enjoyed the LK99 saga (the supposed room temperature superconductor). It was overhyped, and it it came to its expected conclusion (it isn't), however, it sparked widespread interest in semiconductors and plenty of replication attempts.
The reflexive "in mice" comments seem to be bemoaning how science is done.
Mathematics is going through a huge, quiet, upheaval. The litmus test will be when, if ever, someone wins a Fields using a proof-assistant in an essential way.
Total amateur here, but it strikes me that one important difference is that performance matters in software in a way that it doesn’t in mathematics—that is, all proofs are equally valid modulo elegance. That means that abstractions in software are leaky in a way that abstractions in mathematics aren’t.
In other words, in software, the same systems get reused in large part because they’ve been heavily refined, in terms of performance, unexpected corner-case behavior and performance pitfalls, documentation of the above, and general familiarity to and acceptance by the community. In math, if you lay new foundations, build some new abstraction, and prove that it’s at least as powerful to the old one, I’d think that you’d be “done” with replacing it. (Maybe downstream proofs would need some new import statements?)
Is this not the case? Where are people getting stuck that they shouldn’t be?
The value of a proof is not only its conclusion but also the insight that it provides through its method.
The goal of mathematics is not to prove as many theorems as possible but rather to gain an ever deeper understanding of why certain statements are true. The way that something is proved can be more or less useful to advancing that goal.
As an example the elementary proof(s) of the prime number theorem are just about as famous as the original proof. Sometimes the second bite of the cherry is even juicier than the first.
Ultimately, a proof is an argument that something is true. The simpler "more elegant" proof is generally going to be more convincing.
You're assuming that the point of interactive theorem provers is to discover new mathematics. While that's an interesting research area, it seems like the more practical application is verifying proofs one has already discovered through other means.
How good do you think AI will be at proving new results given that training set?
Math is going to change, and change massively. There's a lot of whistling past the graveyard going on from those who are frightened by this prospect.
What LLMs are good at is organizing concepts, filling in detail, and remembering to check corner cases. So their use should help mathematicians to get a better handle on what's terra firma and what's still exploration. Which is great. Proof by it-convinced-other-mathematicians doesn't have a flawless track record. Sometimes major theorems turn out to be wrong or wrong-as-stated. Sometimes they're right, but there's never been a complete or completely correct proof in the literature. The latter case is actually quite common, and formal proof is just what's needed.
But that is because everyone has to switch to the new system. There are no shortage of experimental OSs that do things in different ways. They fail because of switching costs not because making them is hard.
A machine checked proof is valid if it happens once. You dont need the whole world to switch.
Refactoring formalized developments is vastly easier than refactoring software or informal math, since you get verified feedback as to whether the refactoring is correct.
That's fine in math. Math is true or it is not. People who overturn popular conjectures in math get fame, not approbation.
Being able to prove things in something like Lean means that stuff like Mochizuki's work on the abc conjecture could be verified or disproven in spite of its impenetrability. Or, at the very least, it could be tackled piecemeal by legions of students tackling a couple of pages every semester.
To be clear, there's much more to math than writing down and checking proofs. Some of the most important contributions to math have been simply figuring out the right questions to ask, and also figuring out the useful abstractions. Those are both firmly on the "analog" side of math, and they are every bit as important as writing the proofs. But to say that we have this huge body of rigorous argumentation in math, and then to finally do the work of checking it formally is "taking it too far," is a really bewildering take to me.
No, I don't think formalizing proofs in Lean or other proof systems should dominate the practice of math, and no, I don't think every mathematician should have to write formal proofs. Is that really where we're heading, though? I highly doubt it. The article worries about monoculture. It's a legitimate concern, but probably less of one in math than in many other places, since in my experience math people are pretty independent thinkers, and I don't see that changing any time soon.
Anyway, the conclusion from all this is that the improved ability for mathematicians to rely on automated tools to verify mathematical reasoning would be a great asset. In my opinion the outcomes of that eventuality would be overwhelmingly good.
Isn't that still an unresolved question? Wave-particle duality and all that.
Proofs tend to get generated upstream of people trying to investigate something concrete about our models.
A computer might be able to autonomously prove that some function might have some property, and this prove is entirely useless when nobody cares about that function!
Imagine if you had an autonomous SaaS generator. You end up with “flipping these pixels from red to blue as a servis” , “adding 14 to numbers as a service”, “writing the word ‘dog’ into a database as a service”.
That is what autonomous proof discovery might end up being. A bunch of things that might be true but not many people around to care.
I do think there’s a loooot of value in the more restricted “testing the truthfulness of an idea with automation as a step 1”, and this is something that is happening a lot already by my understanding.
You've got the wrong idea of what mathematicians do now. There's not a proof shortage! We've had autonomously discovered proofs since at least Automated Mathematician, and we can have more whenever we want them - a basic result in logic is that you can enumerate valid proofs mechanically.
But we don't want them, because most proofs have no value. The work of a mathematician today is to determine what proofs would be interesting to have ("compelling motivations"), and try to prove them.
There are things that need to be done by humans to make it meaningful and worthwhile. I’m not saying that automation won’t make us more able to satisfy our intellectual curiosity, but we can’t offload everything and have something of value that we could rightly call ‘mathematics’.
If you believe Wittgenstein then all of math is more and more complicated stories amounting to 1=1. Like a ribbon that we figure out how to tie in ever more beautiful knots. These stories are extremely valuable and useful, because we find equivalents of these knots in nature—but boiled down that is what we do when we do math
In other words, declarative statements relate to objects in the world, but mathematical statements categorize possible declarative statements and do not relate directly to the world.
Read about Lisp, the Computational Beauty of Nature, 64k Lisp from https://t3x.org and how all numbers can be composed of counting nested lists all down.
List of a single item:
(cons '1 nil)
Nil it's an empty atom, thus, this reads as:[ 1 | nil ]
List of three items:
(cons '1 (cons 2 (cons 3 nil)))
Which is the same as (list '1 '2 '3)
Internally, it's composed as is,
imagine these are domino pieces chained.
The right part of the first one points
to the second one and so on.[ 1 | --> [ 2 | -> [ 3 | nil ]
A function is a list, it applies the operation over the rest of the items:
(plus '1 '2 3')
Returns '6Which is like saying:
(eval '(+ '1 '2 '3))
'(+ '1 '2 '3) it's just a list, not a function,
with 4 items.Eval will just apply the '+' operation to the rest of the list, recursively.
Whis is the the default for every list written in parentheses without the leading ' .
(+ 1 (+ 2 3))
Will evaluate to 6, while (+ '1 '(+ '2 '3))
will give you an error
as you are adding a number and a list
and they are distinct items
themselves.How arithmetic is made from 'nothing':
https://t3x.org/lisp64k/numbers.html
Table of contents:
https://t3x.org/lisp64k/toc.html
Logic, too:
The fact that the domain of study is countable and computable is obvious because humans can’t really study uncountable or uncomputable things. The process of doing anything at all can always be thought of as narrowing down a large space, but this doesn’t provide more insight than the view that it’s building things up.
Mathematicians will just adopt the tools and use them to get even more math done.
Ya, so? Even if automation is only going to work well on the well understood stuff, mathematicians can still work on mysteries, they will simply have more time and resources to do so.
No.
>You can
Not right now, right? I don't think current AI automated proofs are smart enough to introduce nontrivial abstractions.
Anyway I think you're missing the point of parent's posts. Math is not proofs. Back then some time ago four color theorem "proof" was very controversial, because it was a computer assisted exhaustive check of every possibility, impossible to verify by a human. It didn't bring any insight.
In general, on some level, proofs like not that important for mathematicians. I mean, for example, Riemann hypothesis or P?=NP proofs would be groundbreaking not because anyone has doubts that P=NP, but because we expect the proofs will be enlightening and will use some novel technique
Note on the other hand that proving standard properties of many computer programs are frequently just tedious and should be automated.
If you've ever worked on a proof for formal verification, then its...work...and the nature of the proof probably (most probably) is not going to be something new and interesting for other people to read about, it is just work that you have to do.
And I expect GP has actually a lot of experience in mathematics - there are exactly right and this is how professional mathematicians see math (at least most of them, including ones I interact with).
Or more poetically, "if my grandmother had wheels she would have been a bike[1]" is a folk wisdom precisely because it makes so much sense.
I used to do a lot of proofs coming all the way from Peano arithmetics, successor operators and first-order tableaux method.
I think it's great that a lot of work is done using proof assistants, because clearly it's working out for researchers; diversity of research and of methods is a great strength of science. I really can't see how you can "push it too far", pen-and-paper proofs are not going anywhere. And as more researchers write machine-checked proofs, new techniques for automating these proofs are invented (which is what my research is about hehe) which will only make it easier for more researchers to join in.
> Currently, mathematicians are hoping to formalize all of mathematics using a proof assistant called Lean.
_Some_ mathematicians are trying to formalize _some_ of mathematics using a proof assistant called Lean. It's not a new development, proof assistants have been used for decades. Lean 4 has definitely been gaining popularity recently compared to others, but other proof assistants are still very popular.
> a dedicated group of Lean users is responsible for determining which definitions should go into Lean’s library
The article makes it sound like there is a single, universal "The Lean Library" that everyone is restricted to. I assume it refers to mathlib? But at the end of the day it's just code and everyone is writing their own libraries, and they can make their own decisions.
(1) Math journals are being flooded with AI slop papers loaded with errors. I can see a time when they will require papers to be accompanied by formal proofs of the results. This will enable much of the slop to be filtered out.
(2) Formalization enables AI to do extensive search while staying grounded.
(3) Formalization of the historical math literature (about 3.5M papers) will allow all those results to become available for training and mining, to a greater extent that if they're just given as plain text input to LLMs.
The formal definition of "function" is totally different! This is typically a big confusion in Calculus 2 or 3! Today, a function is defined as literally any input→output mapping, and the "rule" by which this mapping is defined is irrelevant. This definition is much worse for basic calculus—most mappings are not continuous or differentiable. But it has benefits for more advanced calculus; the initial application was Fourier series. And it is generally much easier to formalize because it is "canonical" in a certain sense, it doesn't depend on questions like "which exact expressions are allowed".
This is exactly what the article is complaining about. The non-rigorous intuition preferred for basic calculus and the non-rigorous intuition required for more advanced calculus are different. If you formalize, you'll end up with one rigorous definition, which necessarily will have to incorporate a lot of complexity required for advanced calculus but confusing to beginners.
Programming languages are like this too. Compare C and Python. Some things must be written in C, but most things can be more easily written in Python. If the whole development must be one language, the more basic code will suffer. In programming we fix this by developing software as assemblages of different programs written in different languages, but mechanisms for this kind of modularity in formal systems are still under-studied and, today, come with significant untrusted pieces or annoying boilerplate, so this solution isn't yet available.
[1] Later it was discovered that in fact this set isn't analytic, but that wasn't known for a long time.
[2] I am being imprecise; integrating and solving various differential equations often yields functions that are nice but aren't defined by combinations of named functions. The solution at the time was to name these new discovered functions.
Can't you just formalize both definitions and pick the one to work with based on what you want to do? Surely the only obstacle here is the time and effort it takes to write the formalization?
Or, alternatively, just because you've formalized the advanced calculus version doesn't mean you need to use the formalization when teaching basic calculus. The way we've proven something and the way we teach that something don't have to be the same.
I think I disagree. There are formal proofs and informal proofs, there are rigorous proofs and less rigorous proofs. Of course, a rigorous proof requires rigor, but that’s close to tautological. What makes a proof is that it convinces other people that the consequent is true. Rigor isn’t a necessary condition for that.
I'm not a mathematician but that doesn't sound right to me. Most math I did in school is comprised concepts many many layers of abstraction away from its foundations. What did you mean by this?