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VOR is extremely short range and requires an extraordinary number of transmitters to provide any volume of coverage. Additionally it cannot provide coverage over oceanic areas. We USED TO have a nearly global long-range land based navigation system called LORAN, which only required one master station and a few remote stations to provide continent-scale coverage. But it was decommissioned in a cost savings move after it was determined that it could be replaced by GPS. It worked perfectly fine until it was decommissioned in 2010, not that long ago.

In the '90s I used to fly light aircraft back and forth between Seattle and Alaska. You were frequently out of range of any VOR transmitters, but that LORAN always worked. NDBs? That didn't work so great for Ron Brown.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loran-C

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On VOR: It's also a PITA to use, and for inexperienced people, or someone who rarely uses it, they can confuse flying towards and away from the station.
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If you are a general aviation goober like me, flying a 1960's propeller airplane, sure, that is true.

However, in a modern commercial aircraft, all position sources including VOR-DMEs, GPS, and IRS are cross-compared by the flight management system and turned into a latitude, longitude, and circular error of probability. There is no TO/FROM flag to worry about in a 777, and no reverse sensing on the back side of a localizer approach.

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Yeah that makes sense. My experience is mostly in 70s to early 90's prop planes, I have had the opportunity to use a glass cockpit a few times and it was much easier. I guess i did the typical thing and contextualized this on my experiences and ignored that 99.9% of flights are not GA haha.
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Time was, if you didn't understand how to use VORs, you couldn't really fly. We used them as primary en route nav, as well as for approaches, for many decades. As a CFI I think most of the confusion around VORs these days comes down to poor or inadequate training.
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That's fair. I replied to someone else with a similar remark, but essentially doing most of my flying in 70s to 90s prop planes, I imagine the tools I'm most used to are just dated. Your point around training is likely very accurate, I had some great teachers but I also had a few instances of being given inaccurate information and having to teach the teacher so to speak.
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I don't fly and I wouldn't call my self someone that plays a lot of flight simulator. But I do enjoy navigation methods and I did learn the basics and practices of VOR navigation. I got an Android app that simulates flying courses, holding patterns etc, but only the navigation part. I would say I learned some intuition to it.
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> Additionally it cannot provide coverage over oceanic areas.

It's really hard to jam oceanic areas though, you need a vessel capable of sustaining human life autonomously at least for days plus dealing with the high seas.

Buoys could theoretically be used for that purpose, yes, but good luck getting them stationary enough. Maybe some of the secret services could pull off such a trick but at least no ordinary civilian.

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> sustaining human life

Not really. Drone ships are very much a thing these days.

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How can a drone ship hold its designated position while it's blocking gps?
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Astral navigation is probably accurate enough
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What about terrain following? I would guess decent topographical maps of the world aren't that hard to come by today, to get a good idea of where you are.

Although that approach depends on you being able to see the ground neither of which is guaranteed over a body of water or in poor visibility.

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maybe we need to update those giant concrete arrows on the ground...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcontinental_Airway_System

and have giant concrete QR codes

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All VORs provide a radial that you’re on. Not all provide a distance to the station. VOR/DME or VORTACs provide both. Plain VORs do not.

As more and more are decommissioned, the percentage that support distance-measuring goes up, as the ones being decommissioned are more likely to be the less-useful ones, which are less likely to have supported DME in the first place. So most remaining ones support both, but it’s not assured without checking.

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By taking a bearing from TWO VORs simultaneously, the distance to each can be computed. That's why planes have two VOR receivers and instruments.
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Seems like we'd need a modern version that's less susceptible to jamming, otherwise aren't we just replacing one jammable service with another?
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There are two types of GPS jamming.

There's GPS jamming by the military, mostly in war zones. This seldom effects airliners because they steer clear of active war zones.

Then there's GPS jamming by delivery drivers who don't want their boss watching over their shoulder all the time. When the article mentions jammers as small as a cellphone and costing less than $100, those are sold to drivers.

Delivery drivers don't jam LORAN or VOR, though - so it's not jammed by the second type.

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If I was a concerned boss, I would likely use GSM cell info to track my drivers. While not good enough to do turn-to-turn navigation it certainly is good enough to tell where people are.

Btw, don't smartphones have this built in? I remember some old and cheap Android phones without GPS that came with this.

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> boss watching over their shoulder all the time

Sounds like the root cause to me. It should be illegal to use GNSS to track employees, or anyone really.

Jamming is starting to sound a lot like self-defense against surveillance.

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GPS jamming is fairly detectable right? I wonder if we could create some crowd souced map of jammers. I think this kind of already exists as fairly course data but if a bunch of people installed fixed GPS sensors at home and wired them up to note every time their location lock is lost or moves. It could create a hyper detailed map of where the jammers are and track them moving in realtime.
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They're easy to find, but not necessarily with stuff from off the shelf. Professionals with the right equipment though have no trouble locating them. The FCC is happy to hand out 5 and 6 digit fines for operating a GPS jammer and has fined retailers tens of millions for selling them.
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Russia has a satellite constellation for global jamming.
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GPS jamming was being investigated by the NTSB as a possible reason for this air crash that killed 4 people near White Sands Missile Range.

The plane reported GPS signal loss 5 minutes after the jamming started by WSMR. Three other planes in the area also reported GPS loss.

https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2026-08-05/ntsb-medevac-...

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I’d bet a lot of money that the NTSB will determine that the pilots’ failure to maintain clearance from terrain during a visual approach will be the primary cause with contributing factors of dark, moonless night and GPS jamming.

That one’s going to be on the flight crew, not the GPS jamming test.

HN discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49181099

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I'm not going to argue that as it's always easy to blame dead people, but there's two different types of jamming.

One is to actually jam the signal IOW preventing reception. The other is to overpower the satellites' signals and replace them with your own. That defeats the doppler calculations of GPS needed for triangulation, and instead the receiver believes it's where the jammer wants it to be.

If the latter includes altitude information, then it's a huge problem.

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I believe it’s been made public that this was a jamming test, not a spoofing test.
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If you overpower a signal, is there a difference? I'm not saying you're right or wrong here. I'm just saying there's a long history of coverups in the government and military.

If you can say, "oh we were only jamming" when in fact you were spoofing, well that's certainly a super easy excuse to hide behind.

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In either case, asking for and being cleared for a visual approach (as the crew did and was) puts the onus on them to maintain continuous visual contact with the airport and to maintain their own terrain and obstacle clearance, which it’s safe to say they didn’t do.
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Eh a month or two before the October 2023 Israel conflict - there were many reports of GPS jamming in the middle east impacting air transport aircraft. To the point where it basically caused various failure modes that shouldn't have happened with avionics (think the things you'd expect in a fuzzing scenario). It was pretty eye opening example of just how poor modern avionics are (and their integrations) when they get unpredictable inputs & the dependant downrange systems that rely upon that data.
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Being much closer to the receiver and tied into terrestrial power grids, ground-based beacons can transmit at higher powers than GNSS signals and be received at much higher powers.

Received GNSS power is on the order of -130dBm (10e-16 W) - you can jam that with a 1W terrestrial source for hundreds of meters around. Way more if you're willing to scale the power from car USB power levels to bigger grid-connected supplies.

LORAN, from my quick googling, looks to be about 6-7 orders of magnitude higher received power.

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Most pre-GPS navigation systems have shorter baselines than GPS and therefore accuracy is much worse, on top of generally being more complicated
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And LORAN. But it may make a come-back.

GPS signals are just incredibly weak so it takes next to nothing to drown them out, easier still if you are above the receiver.

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I would be curious on and interested in guidance from a GNSS expert on what the risk profile is when you're using jam resistant frequencies with a multi GNSS constellation chipset (GPS, Galileo, BeiDou), WAAS (GNSS corrections received via satellite), and when close enough to airports that support it, LAAS (GNSS corrections broadcast from airports). Follow up questions would be what countermeasures are available to bolster GNSS reliability during critical phases of flight (takeoff and landing), as well as how cellular tower networks could be used as distributed sensor fabrics for constantly monitoring for and triangulate GNSS jamming using SDR (or perhaps start with a handful of GNSS reference monitoring stations at major airports for this monitoring).

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49186101

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49184484

GPSJam: Daily maps of possible GPS interference - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37868106 - October 2023 (89 comments)

GPSJam: Daily Maps of GPS Interference - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32245346 - July 2022 (82 comments)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmitter_hunting | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudo-range_multilateration | https://www.arrl.org/direction-finding

https://geodesy.noaa.gov/CORS/ | https://arcg.is/18fWq8

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Because GPS and other GNSS have only a very weak signal strength there are no jam resistant frequencies, you can jam them all very efficiently, or you can jam them very efficiently in selective way (jam BeiDou, but not GPS).

GPS was jammed even as early as Iraq war.

"Coalition troops also got a glimpse of GPS’s greatest weakness during the Gulf War. Iraqi forces installed jammers, for example, on top of landmarks such as Saddam Hussein’s palaces to prevent them from being hit, Mastalir says. This helped the military realize early on that it would have to further develop its laser-guided munitions and other weapons that acquire targets when GPS is unavailable"

https://web.archive.org/web/20160208233555/http://www.scient...

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A lot of work is being done to make GPS more jam resistant, and - just as important - more spoof resistant. The latest batch of satellites has a whole raft of countermeasures to help a receiver to identify whether the received signal is genuine or whether it was spoofed. Receivers too can do a lot to detect spoofing by just observing the signal (for instance: unrealistic power levels on reception, impossible response to vehicle movement and others besides), but quite a few of those are unrealistic or too expensive for regular (non military) applications. Jam resistant frequencies do not exist as you already mentioned, from a physics perspective. But GP might mean this to refer to the new M-Code signal, and these are sent out on different frequency offsets from the main carrier, so effectively different frequencies.
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Jam resistance and spoof resistantance are very different.

What work is done to make GPS more jam resistant?

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L5 is considered to be more jam resistant, but it is still in the process of being rolled out and most receivers do not have that capability. It will take the better part of a decade to be rolled out completely but the space side should be done by 2027 so if you need it you can get it but you'll need a completely new receiver.

https://insidegnss.com/onenav-l5-direct-technology-enables-d...

For obvious reasons hard information about all this is tricky to come by, you can read what is available from non-classified sources though and you can glean quite a bit from there.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_signals#L5

The third edition of 'Kaplan' is still excellent reading on the subject even though it is 10 years old now.

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> L5-band signals are 30x harder to jam and interfere with compared to L1, and they offer superior performance in difficult-to-navigate areas such as urban canyons and tree-covered regions.

Impressive performance.

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https://gps.stanford.edu/research/current-and-continuing-gps...

Single element antennas, adaptive antennas, beam steering antennas. Basically attempting to pull good RF while avoiding bad RF.

(this has been applied in the Russo-Ukrainian war in modified Starlink equipment)

GPS antenna mods make Starlink terminal immune to jammers - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39616417 - March 2024 (72 comments)

https://olegkutkov.me/2023/11/07/connecting-external-gps-ant...

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The Russian response to directional antennas is to mount GPS jammers on satellites

https://www.gpsworld.com/todd-humphreys-russian-satellites-a...

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Probably be easier and more reliable to use star navigation with modern cameras, computers and atomic clocks. Especially for commercial aircraft flying above the weather.
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Celestial navigation requires an accurate clock and an almanac that needs to be updated. It is completely impractical for non-military applications.
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Is that really that impractical?

With a quick calculation 50 ms time offset would mean about 20 meter difference. You can get that accuracy with NTP over residential internet and a better TCXO could hold that for a day. You could sync clocks and download the almanac at each airport. The almanac could be digitally signed and NTP has an option for authentication, too. That's about 10 USD of hardware (plus what you need for image capture and processing).

I'm pretty sure with dedicated hardware and better solutions you could get much better accuracy.

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They did it in the 60s for the B2 bomber[0]. I think computers are slightly faster and more reliable today, so it at least seems plausible.

[0] https://www.righto.com/2026/04/B-52-star-tracker-angle-compu...

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Does the almanac need updating? I regularly use plate solving with my telescope and I've never had to update it's stars database
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Guess its back to the good ol' map, compass and stopwatch.
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We have starlink I am sure they can figure something out.
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Starlink lacks the high precision atomic clocks on board of the satellites, that is also why Starlink needs a GPS fix to bootstrap itself.
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Maybe the starlink clocks could continuously calibrate from gps? Clock drift is usually a slow thing (like thermals). Their inter-satellite data links have all sorts of relative clocking info.
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IIUC, GPS picks one satellite and 3 more to establish time differences between the first one and the other 3. There's only one point in universe where the set of differences would match what was observed, given the broadcast orbital data of satellites, and that gives the location of the receiver. It's like you are provided radii and center coordinates of 3 circles on a paper that intersect at 1 point and you are to math that point.

So GPS-like systems need precise orbital data and coherent clock from each satellites, or otherwise the receiver cannot figure out those radii.

Presumably you can have each sats reflect a clock from the same master ground station but that's not how GPS is implemented currently.

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Coherency is a state. My question is if that state can be achieved by just tuning the individual clocks/locations based on GPS as a master. And, there's other tricks, with all the inter-satellite communication [1].

And, there's a contextual difference here between civilian GPS and military GPS. Much of the precision in the existing GPS satellites is to support the military use of GPS, with intentionally error injected into the civilian side.

And, by the nature of the hostile environment the military operates, military craft don't have as strong of a reliance on something that's ephemeral, like a GPS signal on a battlefield.

[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2501.05302

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What you describe is very normal in telecom and has been for a long time. 4G, 5G, etc are all totally dependent on every device syncing to the one higher up in the chain. These days typically a digital control loop is used to tune a high frequency voltage-controlled oscillator which feeds a counter. An event (like GPS PPS, or an ethernet frame arriving on the cable) is extracted from the signal and the counter generates a timestamp. The chips to do this are incredibly cheap and the performance is hard to comprehend.

https://www.ti.com/product-category/clocks-timing/clock-netw...

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We have starlink I am sure we can figure it out. Like... launch a better GPS system with one rocket?
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doesn't take sat swarms. what you need are some cash and bunch of educated and motivated smart people. that can be tricky sometimes
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