The Signal Foundation wouldn't be able to finance Signal operations if too many people started using it and they'd probably end up selling it to some VC who'd immediately force people to buy a subscription or riddle it with ads.
In addition they'd probably undermine the encryption to curry favor with the government.
Good to see they’re making some progress towards addressing this issue and that they are “cautiously optimistic that some major OS providers, like Google and Apple, are engaging with us on how these systems should better interface with privacy-sensitive apps like Signal.”
It’s like iCloud. If I send a photo of my kids to my parents, that could wind up on their iClouds. At that point whatever Apple does with that is out of my hands. I can clearly explain this to them if needed. But with AI there’s a lot more opacity, plus the average person does not understand permissions or look at TOS to see how their stuff is used.
Just give me tech that works the same every time.
Because that is really what you are asking for. Buy a device and an OS for life.
What do you really mean?
The buttons are programmable and nothing ever changes
It’s vulnerable as an old Android OS but I simply don’t do anything important except take phone calls.
But a pager-style device is certainly doable if there is a market for it, and probably the best in terms of security. The question is whether or not Signal (the company) accepts it on their network. Normally, they don't allow third party clients.
I had the phone.
It was great.
Thankfully, Signal pushed and Apple responded pretty quickly. Now we can tighten up our settings via:
Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps Settings > Siri > App Access Permissions
With the option to "always ask," or "always allow," or "never allow."If the goal is to ensure security and privacy of a chat screen or an excel window full of bank balances, wouldn't you want to prevent any app, on any OS from getting screen access?
Serious question.
I mean is there a way to prevent all background processes from taking screen shots while, say, Signal or something else private is in use? Across linux, Windows, MacOS, Android, ios etc? I feel like users should be able to set every OS to operate that way.
BTW, I get and understand the failure state that occurs when the person you're talking to is a moron and is running Claude YOLO or something while you're chatting with them. I'm only talking about ensuring security on your own end.
> Across linux
Yes, but you do need to go to great lengths to do this. The reason is because there's so many things that subtly can extract data. If you want to prevent a system that can take screenshots, then you have to disable screenshots entirely. You have to disable screenreaders. That's all possible, but does interfere with user experience, all because you're concerned about someone potentially hijacking that system. Truthfully that's not in most users' threat models. Similarly you'd have to disable all USB ports and capabilities because a USB device can control your system (see rubber ducky). And many more. To give you a small example, go install noscript into your browser (or install the tor or mullvad browser and put on the strict security settings and browse the internet). It increases privacy and security, but it does come at a big UX cost.The most secure computing system is an inert rock. It's also not very useful.
> The most secure computing system is an inert rock. It's also not very useful.
Hang on. That might still have user fingerprints. Better lock it upAI agents sure are convenient. By looking at your messages they can tell you that there is an accident on the road to the airport your flight is departing from and that you should consider leaving early. So it gets prioritized over privacy.
For people who are against that tradeoff, Apple can make your device less convenient (lockdown mode), I guess that's an advantage over competitors.
> Why the F would any app have access to my signal messages?
How do you think those toast notifications work? That has to integrate with the iOS system, which needs to be able to read (at least part of) the message. While that's default behavior, you can disable, but that requires you not being able to preview your messages. Though different levels of security/privacy for different preferences and threat models. So pick your own.Yeah, it is likely this.
A decade ago I worked for a company that provided secure communications apps (email, IMs, etc) for both Android and iOS and (as one of the Android developers) I remember pointing out to higher-ups that it was trivial to write an app on Android that would tie into the accessibility APIs Android provided to bypass all of our app's network and storage security (the accessibility APIs would allow you to automatically read the text out of any standard OS text controls of any installed app while running as a background service to provide alternative means of presenting the data, like text to speech, etc).
But instead of providing accessibility, an attacker app could just take all that data and silently upload it somewhere.
This did mean the attacker would have to physically access the phone one time to install the accessibility logger service (or they'd have to phish a user to install it themselves), but after that initial install they could forever bypass the security on our app with absolutely no way for the user to know data was being exfiled unless they are the type that is meticulously auditing which apps are installed on their phone.
Destroying accessibility is unfair to people who need it, but I recommended we add a feature to our app that would default to notifying the user with a clear warning whenever another running app had accessibility read access.
My recommendation never got followed, at least for the remainder of my time at that company (they got bought up by Blackberry about a year later and the office I was working in got shut down).
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_overlay#Screen_shots
Rust / WebAssembly can do a lot.
GrapheneOS is not a direction in that, you're just trading one megacorp for different not-yet-megacorp. Both have security-first manifest, which means both insist on making the devices secured from their owners.
Instead of making a stance against this stupid anti-competitive practice, you decided you want to play along, relying on the goodwill of the community to push app developers to allowlist you.
> Instead of making a stance against this stupid anti-competitive practice, you decided you want to play along
Again, not sure what you're talking about, but if you are talking about Play Integrity, then that couldn't be farther from the truth. We've been talking about this issue for a long time now, calling Google out on it, and even talking with regulators.
> relying on the goodwill of the community to push app developers to allowlist you
This also doesn't make any sense. Apps don't have to allowlist GrapheneOS for them to work.
They allow you to isolate google-apps - great.
They don't allow root - meh, I guess, but I'm not really trying to do real work on a phone (or I'll just use termux).
The fact you can't change the lowest levels of the operating system might be annoying if you're and Android developer (idk) but as a user its not so bad.
The great thing is they are open source. If a group of like minded people wanted to distrubute GrapheneOS but hackable I'm sure they could if they had the expertise and resources.
And if GrapheneOS somehow becomes malicious I'm sure someone will fork them and form a like minded community around different values.
The issue is telecoms are some of the most devious monopolists you will ever encounter. They literally helped change laws, add certification barriers, assist 3 letter organization campaigns on US citizens, and self-sign firmware images... blacklisting 3rd party OS on hardware though imei anti-theft systems.
Starlink is successful because they pulled off a miracle business deal getting these telecoms to cooperate with Direct Connect satellite VoLTE services. =3
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/who-owns-your-wireless-s...
It doesn't have to, signal runs on AOSP and doesn't enforce the fake "security" theater Play Integrity scam.
So why should it "officially support" GOS?
> they are not on their app store
Why should Signal be in GrapheneOS app store? Their app store is intentionally so minimal, there's no good reason do add the unrelated, optional app if Signal doesn't restrict installations from Play Store or Aurora.
Signal can work on being added to Accrestent if they want to be promoted, but that's unlikely given that Signal has a ~hard reliance of GCM for notifications (and apparent refusal to adapt Unified Push as an option).
Signal is aiming for being a mainstream, not niches like GrapheneOS, I'm afraid.
The GrapheneOS store has less than 20 apps and does not include third-party ones, just system apps.
A Graphene user should install from the play store.
So they do support Graphene and do not warn people not to install Signal on Graphene.
If you don't want to use the play store, not even anonymized via the Aurora store, then you have a special case, and this special case apk exists just for you.
By the way here are three wishes for a magic lamp:
1. People stop acting like it matters whether privacy and anonymity are different things.
2. People stop acting like it matters if "Wayland is a protocol".
3. People stop acting like using all your RAM ASAP is not wasting it.
I think it would be unlikely that any spam is going to come from the paid accounts. When phone numbers are way cheaper.
Frankly, the paid accounts are overpriced. But, anyone that wants to pay with money instead of phone numbers is going to be fine supporting Signal anyway.
The best argument for Monero is that the overlap of people that want to pay with a KYC payment method and that would pay in the first place instead of a phone number is very small.
Both for account creation, as you mention, and for donations. I see they do take some crypto for donations now, which is good. But not the most obvious one!
Take my money guys!
Signal is for pretend-security.
No. Signal is for content privacy by code and metadata privacy by policy and also code but weaker.
If you didn't notice, SimpleX had way less users and way worse UX.
Being built for different things doesn't make it pretend security. You're completely correct that it's not for anonymity. You're completely wrong that it's not secure.
It's also their policy to refuse to update their privacy policy which is currently lying to users about the sensitive data they collect and store.
There are better ways to secure your content and meta data from more trustworthy companies.
Can we please stop it with this?
In real-world practice, the 501c3 named Signal and Amazon Web Services that its servers run on can see the metadata of which users messaged which other users at what time.
This is why they haven't given the users the option to invite other users with a string (or "token" or whatever) so the inviting user can be messaged without a PSTN number or Google id being demanded from the invitee.
If you're trying to buy some good shit on the street or meet up at "da show" with urbanite degenerates, Signal is great.
Serious people, infosec pros, execs, etc stopped using Signal about two years ago -- at least that's what I saw from my corner of the world.
Most likely a decentralized service such as a fork of Signal that uses their own infrastructure, or (self-hosted) Matrix, or XMPP.
"Signal" in the previous comment referred to the service hosted by the 501c3 named Signal, not the body of open source software named Signal ; these are overlapping but different things.
FOSS quietly shines in the private (as in, among private entities).
Organizations that are universally recognizable as working on "serious" things have coalesced around Matrix and Element X or other Matrix clients (some not FOSS), instead of services hosted by third parties (such as Slack). Different audience but an example of modern literacy.
"Small" users such as "l33t hax0rs" which I read as "age range of teenager to college freshman", often set up their own XMPP servers and use OMEMO. Perhaps these users are not organized around something "serious", but their choice to have self-respect and gain literacy to act it out is something that can be taken seriously.
To answer your question more directly: anything with decent technical merit that either doesn't require a 3rd party or the 3rd party can be specifically chosen.
I recently wrote on this topic, not so much the technical pieces but the vibe-perspective
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50417774it comes across like more of a ploy to get you to scare people away and get them to use other, less secure, messengers
Another similar thing recently was I was trying to help a woman send a document to her lawyer, and for whatever reason I couldn't figure out how to share it with him via text or whatsapp. Somehow I was able to share it to my own phone via whatsapp, and from there I made a group text in Whatsapp with me and her lawyer to share the document.
With AI agents I think we're similarly getting into territory where it's not so clear-cut as Signal is making things out to be. I share the knee-jerk "keep your agents out of my stuff!" reaction but I don't think that's a sustainable/pragmatic choice. It might be correct as a principle but if it locks you out of the operating system, it's not Signal's job to disable key OS features on the grounds that the OS is insecure - at a certain point Signal might as well just wipe the hard drive, but that's not Signal's role. Signal is there to enable people to send messages, not stop them from doing so.
I find this surprising. What mechanism enforces this? This kind of restriction, AFAIK, is only possible on Android and iOS because users do not control the system (no "root" on user builds). On Linux, I certainly can screenshot Signal or any other "app" because the whole OS is under my control.
ps. Yes, trust is an onion, blah blah HDMI decoder boxes, etc, but I’m limiting the problem space to ‘software solutions only’, matching the problem space that the vast majority of AI device scanning of Signal content occurs in.
I would stop using Signal if it required "attestation," which my GrapheneOS phone does not have anyway.
It's not even hard to imagine why this is useful. Imagine you're sharing/streaming your screen and your password manager accidentally opens on the shared area.
With the biggest one being the number of people who apparently assumed that when they send a message to someone, that person couldn't just tell anyone else what they said anyway.
Most people admire German engineering thanks to the "Deutsche Qualität" ad campaign, yet we forget that came from Opel, one of most unreliable carmarkers at the time.
Apple has invested billions to advertise how private they are, but reality is more complex than that. They have been hostile to security researchers multiple times, and have been slower than the industry average at patching vulnerabilities multiple times.
This is unfortunate because a lot of the people who are knowledgeable and care about security/privacy spend their days in front of a keyboard, which is always going to be vastly better to jot out messages with than any kind of handheld mobile device.
It's certainly not. A reasonably hardened Linux box, preferably running open firmware, is certainly more private, and also probably more secure, at least against interference by Apple.
If you need to reduce spam sign-ups, let me pay a few dollars in crypto instead.
Now a Signal account will be linked directly to your Google/Apple account and credit card.
I for one 100% agree with you, they should accept crypto, regardless.
Maybe it's just because it's less widespread where I am, but nevertheless.
I hope they will add anonymous crypto support, but you can create an anonymous signal account.
In the countries like Russia they simply blocked incoming registrations SMS from Signal and the others to wade off people from the service. I wouldn't risk using a direct payment in a country famous for jailing people for payments to "extremists" organisations either.
Just do email, or stop calling yourself "private" and "secure"
Most likely such an attempt will fail even earlier than Google/KYC become relevant: their account creation vCaptcha de-facto doesn't accept challenges made from VPN connections (based on app reporting the network status, not endpoint IP).
I do think they should accept crypto.
Of course you can?
Maybe I am missin your point, but that is fundamental basic that you put the encryption and decryption in the ends, and you can transfer over any inherently insecure technologies.
But you need the ends to be secure of course.
When a company lies to their users about their risks when using an app being marketed to activists and whistleblowers whose lives/freedom could be put at risk you know exactly how they feel about protecting their customers.
I don't see the same privacy policy online.
> Signal Terms & Privacy Policy
> Signal is designed to never collect or store any sensitive information. Signal messages and calls cannot be accessed by us or other third parties because they are always end-to-end encrypted, private, and secure.
It's _designed_ to never collect...
> Signal utilizes state-of-the-art security and end-to-end encryption to provide private messaging and Internet calling services to users worldwide (“Services”).
That is the first sentence I see under "Privacy Policy".
> Your calls and messages are always encrypted, so they can never be shared or viewed by anyone but yourself and the intended recipients.
Is this the part that is a lie?
> Information we may share
> Other instances where Signal may need to share your data
* To meet any applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request.
* To enforce applicable Terms, including investigation of potential violations.
* To detect, prevent, or otherwise address fraud, security, or technical issues.
* To protect against harm to the rights, property, or safety of Signal, our users, or the public as required or permitted by law.
Oh, I see what you mean. That's pretty broad.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messaging_Layer_Security
[2] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OMEMO
[3] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-the-Record_Messaging_proto...
Signal is better than basic SMS, iMessage, Facebook Messenger, etc. That's got value. It's convenient and has reached critical mass so the barrier to entry is low enough that it's a viable option.
It's better than nothing, and just secure enough to be worth it and just secure enough to maintain a customer base.
It's still a business, and they will make it as secure as needed to earn money, and no more secure than that.
[0]: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android
What can Signal do to annihilate your concerns without giving you access to their system?
At best they (very) passively fight against third party clients connecting to their official servers.
At best they (very very very) passively fight against self-hosting the server by not providing elaborate guides and having the public repo lag behind production.
The one you download also has proprietary binary blobs.
This is straight up lies, and I don't need to prove it to this specific user, because I already have, but (s)he likes to be obtuse and wilfully ignorant.
For anyone else, full source reproducible verified for iOS: https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...
And the Android clients come with closed source components from Google. It's still not a problem, but it's true.
The build of Signal Server from public source does not mean that's what they deploy in production.
For security analysis the Signal Server is immaterial, all claims of security can be verified from the client. For all intents and purposes the server is just a dumb pipe.
You have no idea how demotivating your comment is for people who have taken a pay cut, and dedicated their lives to try and find a better balance between usability, privacy and sustainability.
There are better alternatives to signal and other companies who aren't outright lying to their users about what data they collect and store in their privacy policy.
You can read more about the issue here: https://web.archive.org/web/20250117232443/https://www.vice....
Note that at the bottom of that article they talk about giving users a way to "disable" the pin, but there is no actual opt of the pin. If you choose not to create one, one is created for you, and that's used when uploading your data to the cloud even though you won't ever be able to recover the data. You cannot opt out of the data collection.
You can't just say it and leave. Anything better than SMS which was not even meant for communication.
But lumping imessage and even Facebook messenger in the same pile is disingenuous.
There are serious cryptographers working on iMessage too, eg. https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/03/03/post-qua...
SMS should indeed not be included in the same conversation as those two.
I should be able to expect basic privacy in my day-to-day chats without needing to spend time/money/resources setting up a goddamn second device just to have truly private chats with my friends and family.
"Settings > Notifications > Notification Content and selecting "No Name or Content" (or "No Name or Message" on Android), the device prevents the operating system from storing sensitive message previews in its internal database. Additionally, enabling Sealed Sender in Signal's privacy settings hides the sender's identity from Signal's servers, preventing traffic analysis."
Until / unless the recipient responds and the traffic analysis detects back-and-forth and pairs your message's recipient with the recipient's recipient.
https://abcnews.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-...
This decision is mine to make, not Signal's. As the owner of the computer, I decide what programs have access to what. Signal has no business attempting to block my own user agent, which I run with my fully informed consent, accessing my own data.
As a user of signal, I do expect signal to prevent my chats from being read by anything other than the other contact.
Preventing man-in-the-middle is different, something you can actually do technically. That is something you can actually promise to a degree.
Either Signal respects that regular people have general purpose computing or they don't.
Over the years we’ve had various requests for conversation or personal usage data, including a court case of some church, and we told them the truth - that we don’t receive any. They said to send that in writing and that was it.
Here was my reply years ago to Moxie Marlinspike about why decentralization is key to provable privacy:
https://community.intercoin.app/t/web3-moxie-signal-telegram...
But really, the key to privacy is trusting the recipient, because one the data lands on the other device, it's outside of your control, and if the user has malware enabled (consciously or not) there's not much you can do about that.
I cannot expect privacy on Signal for voices and opinions critical of Israel. I wouldn't trust any marketing about privacy coming out of Big Tech, YCombinator or Silicon Valley. They made their bed and now they have to sleep in it.
* Discuss the issue with google keyboard privacy
* Discuss the issue with the google translate API
* Release all of the backend automation code for their infra that runs signal
That said: periodic reminder that Signal cannot protect you from your chat partners' devices. You might have this protection enabled, but if your chat partner has it disabled, their OS's AI can now read your chats.
Signal feels like a begrudging partner in this, not someone who has your back. I love Signal but they have a lot of work to do. It was only recently that (and too late for me) that they could even backup the last 90s of chats when sending in a device for repair. It feels like they hate users. Why is WhatsApp (which harvests your entire address book to meta) still have a better experience?
Signal does keep the message history in an encrypted sqlite file.
Unfortunately they store the key in plaintext alongside it.
what a sad day for hackernews
The smart play is to have companies in many countries and have them federate traffic across each others infra (like tor) and to have third-party clients with their own ability to implement the E2EE bits...
- or, even better: use something like Matrix amongst friends, you only need a slightly technical friend to set it up for you and now it's really hard for someone to violate your trust, and you're not even a big target for mass surveillance: win-win.
As it stands, Signal can still be compelled to act against their users, especially those not under US jurisdiction, and they're forbidden from talking about it. They're directly under the CLOUD act (if they're not a honeypot designed explicitly to drown out other private messengers, which sounds conspiratorial but its the only thing that makes sense based on how effective their marketing is compared to others- the concerns raised against Signal would kill other messengers).
The developers might be bona-fide idealists and the E2EE encryption might be reliable (if only when compiling the app from source oneself), but it feels obvious that the US authorities would gain access to things like contact metadata or forcing a compromised build on request. The app is leaky in this regard, and Signal rents cloud infrastructure which enables covert shenanigans with the server, like compromising the infamously vulnerable Intel SGX which is the only thing keeping people's contact lists (uploaded by default to the server) private.
My general impression is that Signal is about as secure as I can reasonably expect, but that the entire ecosystem is compromised because it's going through two companies that are beholden to the US government.
Ah yes, I do remember: https://soatok.blog/2024/08/14/security-issues-in-matrixs-ol...
As for Signal being open source (or your claim in the link that it is not open source as in they don't provide the source for builds; and you only need to look at the client source for the security claims), as of a previous post about Signal on HN I have started verifying the builds on iOS which I can confirm are fully source reproducible:
https://github.com/commandersaki/signal-ios-build-verificati...
Signal already provide instructions on Android reproducible builds and it wouldn't really take much to extend that to fully source reproducible.
It's a stupid take that the country matters. If the tech is sound and trustless, it won't matter what country the company is based in.
Similarly "digital sovereignty" is stupid. E2EE is what matters. And SimpleX shows that you can essentially add highly effective client-side metadata encryption.
For content privacy, you're much better off with an E2EE file service hosted in North Korea than non-E2EE file service in Switzerland.
Technology must work around this fundamental fact, or work within the law: everything else is a perpetually losing battle.
You can't have an organisation providing anonymous E2EE if there are laws that force KYC or CSAM scanning; and you will be hard pressed to argue on the side of fraudsters and kiddie fiddlers in front of the population.
Like I said, the best solution is small local groups; just like neighbourhoods- there's no actual need to have ONE directory and ONE "instance" of a chat network outside of convienience.. and truthfully, it's not that convenient, because everyone chooses a different chat network anyway. (Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook messenger-- which isn't whatsapp for some reason, Wechat, Threema, etc,etc,etc,etc).
I think Signal's threat model is more about law enforcement local or national than intelligence agencies with backdoors in the internet.
As it happens a lot of the abuse of our rights comes from law enforcement. So it's a big improvement to protect against that.
I don't think anyone's expecting Signal to be super anonymous when it's run on AWS.
Yeah, I admit they should work a lot more on metadata privacy. Because anonymity is important in messaging for contact privacy.
This is speculation about mass surveillance by intelligence services. If they're in your threat model then Signal is not the right choice.
Single is decent for law enforcement in your threat model, but SimpleX is still preferable.
JWZ site, so if you don't want the HN testicle egg, copy paste, don't click:
Whether this fact is a pro, con or irrelevant to protecting software user "privacy" is a question left to the reader
Different readers may arrive at different answers. Not all readers will necessarily share their answers in comments. Commenters comprise a small portion of readers
The problem is that this is also what someone not serious about protecting our privacy would say.
Similar claims from big tech ad-companies I support... taking with a grain of salt.
Cry me a river.
[1] or instead of your phone number, give us your CC number.
I want them to accept anonymous payments too, but they use zero knowledge proofs, so the non-anonymous payment does not link you to them. Also, they don't get cc number, Google does.
if it was, it wouldn't require a phone number or a payment to sign up. that's an utter non-starter for a privacy tool. no public API, no third-party clients, no first-party web client. Signal Messenger LLC is, painfully obviously, a SaaS company operating at a loss and waiting for a buyout from a megacorp.
and the undeserved glazing it got from the media reeks of operation mockingbird bullshit.
The payments use zero-knowledge proofs, so they're not linked to you. All that's known by anyone is that your payment method purchased a Signal account.
There are third party clients.
So you're advocating for web cryptography. That opens up a significant attack vector for your privacy.
It's a non-profit that can't go against privacy for its users.
>and the undeserved glazing it got from the media reeks of operation mockingbird bullshit.
Instead of spreading fud, since signal clients are fully reproducible, meaning the code on github is what's in the apps running on your phone, please point to the code that makes it backdoor in some way. Because you could easily prove these claims. But instead you provide no evidence.
I have family conversations in Signal that I want Siri and Spotlight to be able to index. I've been considering moving to a different app solely because of this. Make it a setting!!
I don't trust Google and Facebook, but I do trust Apple. Don't force-distrust Apple on my behalf, I don't want that. This should be my choice.
Signal could even make it the default, because I have no shame in asking my family to let me index their chats. That would be better for the masses, I'd imagine.
It may be the best we have, but the bar is so low.
How can you claim to care about security and your desktop application is just a electron wrapper?
Over 300 MB & 1 GB ram for a texting app?
This is a very unfocused team.
And I don't find signal-desktop's load onerous on my middling-RAM computer, though this is the only Electron app I have running (I get the impression that many HN readers have multiple Electron apps going, which I guess would add up.)
Is it nowadays? AI should be able to port the app to any OS in a couple days.
(Fun fact: Signal only recently enabled registering without sharing your fucking phone number just a few months ago. and only on Android. They don't need your phone number, they don't use it for anything. and you wouldn't want them to. But they want it anyway. That's not privacy.)
Apple is one of the only companies that truly cares about privacy over mere security. This doesn't mean they don't also have some truly serious security, but rather that they simply don't collect data they don't need, and also that they avoid collecting anything other than what they need.
Contrast this with other tech giants, who want all your data, but promise to keep it secure.
Companies even want you to think that them securely holding all your data is the same as it being private to you. That's on purpose.
- WhatsApp only ever said they used an older version of the Signal protocol (that, e.g. lacks post-quantum encryption).
- I think WhatsApp can encrypt your backups, but that is not the default.
The backup thing, plus the AI stuff mentioned in the article make it much more likely your WhatsApp conversations end up stored in the clear somewhere than your Signal conversations.
The other main reason WhatsApp is currently worse than Signal is that WhatsApp harvests your metadata (to support Meta's ad-tech business) and Signal does not.