(www.cve.org)
Agree that the article is downright painful to read though.
That's usually nested, and either cri-o or... KVM.
AWS instances are slow to launch; they take whole seconds. Nested virtualization allows running something like firecracker/crosvm/rust-vmm atop a normal AWS instance, without needing a bare-metal one.
Sometimes that’s justified in the name of making the security code simple enough to reason about, but making it harder to use has a security cost also.
If you're running multitenant for mutually-untrusting customers, that excuse goes out the window.
Also, how could VPS hosting still be a thing if KVM is that easily escaped?
EDIT: I am talking about KVM in general, not nested virtualization.
> If you're running multitenant for mutually-untrusting customers, that excuse goes out the window.
I still don't understand what you mean by this then?(Aside: my current guess at the appropriate security posture towards Nitro Sandboxes, in the current era of vulnerabilities, is "decent, but probably has security holes too, and is less widely scrutinized, don't count on it either". Thoughts?)
Any recommendations for good guides on that, besides "design very careful IAM policies and security groups, harden any common services they have access to, and ideally run them under separate AWS accounts"?
Do your lambda functions always get a per-customer dedicated instance or is firecracker distributing them so that multiple customers can have VMs on the same actual box?
Sounds like it would be pretty expensive for Amazon to dedicate an instance to every customer, especially for those with small workloads.
If that's the case, why would it not hold for Amazon but would hold for everyone else?
At some point in the past they did, for pretty much exactly this reason. I'd assume they don't anymore (I last worked there a decade ago).
That does not seem to be what HN has been thinking for months.
CVE still listed...
Although, at the pace of improvement, I'd bet it won't even be necessary in a year or so.
Sure, some projects are trying to be responsible or are trying to keep waves of slop PR's from drowning them, but that is by no means an indication of a general distaste for AI code. It's been largely embraced.
Also in this case, a "missed potential" if it eventually fails to reach anyone.
Of course I imagine they used AI to find the exploit, and the documentation may have come as an output from that process.
I guess its time for all of us to step aside, leave space for somebody who knowns what they are doing, and go fishing...
At first, there were just big logic blocks and storage that did as they were told.
Later, in hardware, there were all sorts of optimizations built in where the logic would do its own thing -- so you'd get caches and speculative execution and even on-the-fly conversion from one instruction set to another.
This abstraction was also piled onto the runtime -- you'd write machine code, then assembly, then higher level languages; eventually you'd run in interpreted or just-in-time generated bytecode (hello to Java from UCSD p-System from the 70s and Burroughs machines in the 60s). And of course... operating systems...
Now, we've got machines reading source code (and machine code, and everything in between) and they've got some ability to thing the thing to make it thing. Sometimes correctly (enough to pass existing tests) and sometimes without the ability to express to the human what the thing they thinged was.
But, we're all living in the land of mel and for some it's always been better to go fishing than to pretend to participate.
Perhaps they are rewriting it with less slop?
The CVE itself: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-99312
So this is a tricky one. You can (and should) deploy unikernel workloads on metal and avoid nested virt but this is hard to make economically viable in some cases.
This is going to affect "sandbox" providers and their customers more than anything else.
FTFY
Just don’t.
Honestly, this gives me pause on the whole "VM is sufficient for any agentic sandbox environment" theory.
Since he made that comment there has been numerous virtualization vulnerabilities in KVM, Xen, HyperV, and all other hypervisors as well as all their device virtualization helpers/ecosystem. I fail to see how Theo's statement is anything but 100% right. It's just that we can't live with it because we must sell VMs.
There is a reason you graduate to bare metal, then you graduate to air gapped.
Virtualization does reduce the attack surface, but it's still there. This is a thread for a hole in it.
In the meantime the patching will continue until security improves!
Don't allow nested KVM.
Mitigations are layered, first not using a shared VPS, and instead running your own bare metal server with something like proxmox to run the containerization.
Those containers could be susceptible to issues between them too, but you at least control the environment and can put more checks and balances in place.
Shared cloud and vps is going to become bumpy and more insecure the next little while. There's no way around it.